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Abstract 
In this thesis first, I investigate the link between firms’ environmental and social 
disclosures (ESD) and their profitability, as well as establish the direction of 
causality between the two. Second, I examine the association between ESD 
with firms’ market value, employee productivity and carbon eco-efficiency 
respectively. Finally, I examine the relations among firms’ CSR related board 
attributes, CSR strategy and their environmental and social performance (ESP).  
The first empirical chapter shows that firms with higher profitability tend to 
provide more ESD, which is consistent with the accounting- and economics-
based arguments that ESD involve a real as well as an opportunity cost that 
more profitable firms with higher slack resources are better able to afford.  
The results regarding market value analysis show that overall ESD, in particular 
social disclosures matter to investors. Investors appear to be placing higher 
values on firms seen to be behaving in a socially responsible manner. 
Presumably, more responsible behaviour in the social arena reflected in higher 
disclosure helps to mitigate the information asymmetry, and hence the 
perceived social risk of the firm. Investors thus place higher values on such 
firms. The evidence on the link between firms’ ESD and their ESP measures 
supports this explanation. Specifically, I find that more social (environmental) 
disclosure in prior year reflects better social (environmental) performance as 
captured by higher employee productivity (more carbon eco-efficiency) in the 
current year.  
The results of the final empirical chapter show that boards having certain CSR-
conducive attributes, particularly independent directors, women directors, and 
directors with financial expertise on the audit committee, are more likely to 
develop a multi-pronged CSR strategy which in turn translates into superior 
environmental and social performance. Furthermore, I find that firms with better 
ESP tend to further strengthen their board CSR orientation. In other words, the 
analysis suggests the presence of a positive and cyclical link between CSR 
orientation, firm CSR strategy, and firm environmental and social performance.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background and motivation 
The credit crisis and climate change have led mainstream investors to become 
increasingly aware of sustainability reporting as an important information source 
of insight into the long-term viability of companies. The UK was the first country 
to introduce mandatory carbon reporting. The Deputy Prime Minister of the UK 
at the Rio+ 20 Submit 2012 said that, 
“Counting your business costs while hiding your greenhouse gas 
emissions is a false economy…British companies need to reduce 
their harmful emissions for the benefit of the planet, but many back 
our plans because being energy efficient makes good business 
sense too. It saves companies money on energy bills, improves their 
reputation with customers and helps them manage their long-term 
costs too.” (Source: published by the Department for Environment 
Food and Rural Affairs website on 20th June 2012) 
The financial crisis is an opportune time to refocus on how firms are managing 
their environmental and social responsibility. 90% of UK large public companies 
now report regularly on the environment and social impacts of their business 
operations (Grayson, 2007, p.5). Moreover, there is evidence particularly from 
the UK to suggest that firms are now producing higher and better quality 
environmental and social disclosures (Gray et al., 1995). With the rising trend in 
the quantity and quality of environmental and social disclosures, a number of 
studies have examined the link between a firm’s environmental disclosures and 
its financial performance including profitability (Brammer and Pavelin, 2006, 
2008; Clarkson et al., 2008; Cormier et al., 2011; Freedman and Jaggi, 1988; 
Patten, 1991). However, all of these mentioned studies find no link between 
environmental disclosures and various measures of a firm’s profitability. 
Discussing the limitations of their own work, and that of others, Brammer and 
Pavelin (2008) suggest that future work should use longitudinal data and try to 
resolve causality concerns. In this thesis, I address both these issues. Using 
longitudinal data (2005-2009), I first establish the contemporaneous association 
between environmental and social disclosures and firm profitability, and then 
drawing upon Nelling and Webb’s (2009) application of Granger causality 
methodology I address the issue of causality between these variables.   
There has also been a substantial increase in socially responsible investment in 
recent years in the UK, especially the growth in the number of socially 
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responsible investment funds offered by institutional investors. Institutional 
investors are playing an important role in progressing corporate social 
responsibility and have an important role in promoting more responsible 
business behaviour. “There has been a substantial increase in socially 
responsible investment in recent years in the UK, especially the growth in the 
number of socially responsible investment funds offered by institutional 
investors who are demanding improvements in social and environmental 
disclosure generally” (Solomon, 2007; p.241). Yet, according to Clarkson et al. 
(2011), less than 50% of surveyed chief financial officers and top environmental 
officers believe environmental responsibility can enhance shareholder value. 
However, from a capital market’s perspective, public disclosures of how a firm 
addresses its environmental and social challenges can have significant financial 
implications. To the extent that these disclosures reveal a firm’s current 
environmental and social performance as well as its future potential, investors 
can gauge how well the firm is currently managing its environmental and social 
risks, and how well it is equipped to tackle these in the future. Based on such 
arguments, some studies have examined the link between a firm’s 
environmental disclosures and its market performance (e.g., Freedman and 
Patten, 2004; Lorraine et al., 2004; Shane and Spicer, 1983; Stevens, 1984). All 
of these studies find a negative stock market response to release of 
environmental information.  
The findings of the aforementioned studies however, are quite contrary to the 
expectations based on voluntary disclosure theory (Verrecchia, 1983) that 
higher and better quality environmental (and social) disclosures should help 
reduce information asymmetry between the firm and its investors (Al-Tuwaijri et 
al., 2004; Brammer and Pavelin, 2008). Results of the recent work in this area 
however, have been more in line with this theoretical reasoning. For example, 
Cormier et al. (2011) find that environmental and social disclosures help reduce 
the information asymmetry (as measured by the stock’s bid-ask spread and its 
share price volatility) between the firm and its investors. Hence, it can be 
argued that higher and better quality environmental and social disclosures can 
be a reflection of superior environmental and social performance (Verrecchia, 
1983), can help lower the information asymmetry between a firm and its 
investors, and by implication lower its firm risk. Thus such disclosures would be 
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associated with higher market values of such firms. Accordingly, in this thesis, I 
extend Cormier et al.’s (2011) analysis by examining the link between a firm’s 
environmental and social disclosures and its market value. It is important to 
mention here the findings on the relation between corporate environmental and 
social disclosures and firm environmental and social performance. Prior studies 
on this topic find mixed results. For example, consistent with the legitimacy 
perspective, Patten (2002a) finds a negative link, while consistent with the 
economics based voluntary disclosure theory, Clarkson et al. (2008) find a 
positive relationship between the two sets of variables. In this thesis, I further 
test this link by using environmental and social disclosure scores and two 
different environmental and social performance measures, namely carbon eco-
efficiency and employee productivity respectively. The findings of a positive 
association between the two sets of variables lend further support to the 
economics based voluntary disclosure theory argument.  
The roles of governance (such as board attributes) and CSR strategy have 
been rarely studied in the CSR field. Prior studies drawing on the management 
perspective, particularly the resource-based view of the firm, have studied the 
link between a firm’s economic performance and its environmental performance 
(e.g., Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Clarkson et al., 2011) assuming this link to be 
driven by the unobserved or indirectly measured CSR strategy. Moreover, from 
a corporate governance perspective, drawing particularly on the resource 
dependency theory, scholars have studied the link between a firm’s board 
attributes and corporate social performance (Johnson and Greening, 1999; 
Mallin and Michelon, 2011).  
While studies drawing on the management literature particularly the resource 
based view of the firm (Hart, 1995) hypothesise that superior managerial 
capabilities and superior CSR strategy translate into superior CSR performance, 
neither of these two explanatory variables, are explicitly accounted for in the 
research design. Nevertheless, these studies do acknowledge and control for 
the possible endogeneity between managerial capability, CSR strategy and 
CSR performance (e.g., Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Clarkson et al., 2011). Studies 
from the corporate governance perspective, while acknowledging the strategy 
setting and advisory role of the board (as per resource dependency theory, 
Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), neither explicitly consider the strategic decisions of 
13 
 
the board in this regard, nor control for the possible endogeneity of the link (e.g., 
Mallin and Michelon, 2011). In other words, prior literature on CSR from both 
management and corporate governance perspectives has tended to suffer from 
conceptual as well as methodological limitations. Hence, to date, no prior study 
takes a more integrated approach and studies the link between a firm’s CSR 
related board attributes, its CSR strategy and its environmental and social 
performance. In this thesis, using a sample of UK firms included in the FTSE 
All-Share Index from 2002 to 2010, I investigate the relations among board 
attributes, CSR strategy and firm environmental and social performance. Using 
an aggregated measure of CSR strategy and a latent construct capturing board 
level CSR attributes, I explore the possible endogenous link between CSR 
related board attributes, board CSR strategy and firm environmental and social 
performance.  
1.2 Research aim and objectives 
Based on the preceding discussion, the objectives of this research are: 
1. To investigate the relation between a firm’s ESD and its operating 
profitability, as well as to investigate the potential causality regarding this 
link; 
2. To examine the link between a firm’s ESD and its market value, 
employee productivity and carbon eco-efficiency respectively;  
3. To explore the relations among a firm’s CSR related board attributes, 
CSR strategy and its environmental and social performance.  
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
This research is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the 
motivation and the relevant background to this study. Chapter 2 discusses 
relevant theoretical and regulatory frameworks about environmental and social 
responsibility, as well as introduces the environmental and social responsibility 
measures used in this thesis. Chapter 3 reviews existing empirical literature 
about the interrelationships among corporate social responsibility, corporate 
governance and financial performance, followed by three empirical studies 
including chapter 4, 5 and 6. The last chapter provides a conclusion of this 
thesis.  
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The three research objectives enumerated above, are studied through three 
empirical chapters (i.e., Chapter 4, 5 and 6). Chapter 4 investigates the 
determinants of a firm’s ESD. The main research question of this empirical 
study is: is there an association between a firm’s operating profitability and its 
ESD? If so, what is the direction of causality between a firm’s operating 
profitability and its ESD? In this chapter, based on prior literature (e.g., Lee and 
Hutchison (2005) disclosure framework), I also control for a wide array of 
variables as determinants of ESD. Then using a pooled cross-sectional and 
time series data on FTSE 350 companies for most recent 5 years (2005-2009), I 
develop two sets of OLS regression models: one examines the relation between 
profitability and ESD, the other tests potential causality between operating 
profitability and ESD (i.e., Granger causality analysis). Finally, the robustness 
check further controls for the influence of governance disclosure on ESD. 
Chapter 5 examines the link between a firm’s ESD and its market value, and 
tests the relation between environmental (social) disclosure and environmental 
(social) performance. The research questions of this chapter are: first, is there 
an association between a firm’s ESD and its market value? Second, is there 
any relationship between a firm’s social disclosure and its employee productivity? 
Third, is there any association between a firm’s environmental disclosure and its 
carbon eco-efficiency? Accordingly, three regression models are developed to 
test these three questions.  
Chapter 6 investigates the relations among board attributes, firm CSR strategy 
and its environmental and social performance. This analysis draws on Hermalin 
and Weisbach (2003) theoretical framework, and develops a conceptual model 
to explore the possible endogenous links between board attributes, CSR 
strategy and firm environmental and social performance. Using a longitudinal 
dataset drawn from FTSE All Shares companies for nine years (2002-2010), 
structural equation modelling technique is used to examine these links.   
Overall, this thesis makes a number of contributions to existing CSR studies. 
First, contrary to prior mixed results (e.g., Brammer and Pavelin, 2008; Clarkson 
et al., 2008; Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012); it finds a clear positive link between 
a firm’s profitability and its environmental and social disclosures. It also 
establishes the direction of causality of this link, finding it to run from profitability 
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to disclosures. Second, it finds a clear positive link between a firm’s 
environmental and social disclosures and its market value. It thus extends the 
work of Cormier et al. (2011) who find that such disclosures reduce information 
asymmetry between a firm and its investors, but who do not explicitly establish 
the link of such disclosures with firm market value. Third, as mentioned above, 
prior literature on CSR from both management (particularly the resource based 
view of the firm) and corporate governance perspectives has tended to suffer 
from conceptual as well as methodological limitations. This study takes a more 
holistic approach, develops and tests a theoretical model that incorporates 
board attributes and CSR strategy variables into the analysis of a firm’s 
environmental and social performance. It methodologically and conceptually 
advances the management related stream of CSR literature, by explicitly 
measuring and incorporating in the research design variables that directly 
measure a firm’s board level CSR orientation and its CSR strategy, linking 
these with the firm’s environmental and social performance. The analysis thus 
helps advance the RBV-based CSR literature, by explicitly identifying the board 
level human resources and CSR strategies that can help firms achieve a 
competitive edge in the field of CSR. Furthermore, it contributes to the 
corporate governance related stream of CSR literature, by developing a 
theoretical model (adapted from Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003) which makes 
explicit the potentially endogenous links between board director attributes, firm 
CSR-related strategic decisions, and corporate environmental and social 
performance. It thus addresses two recent calls in this literature: first to address 
the issue of endogeneity in board-firm performance type analysis (Adams et al., 
2010); and second, it responds to the recent call to conduct board attributes-
conduct-performance type analysis (Johnson et al., 2013). The theoretical 
model developed in this thesis and its subsequent testing is among the first 
steps in addressing these calls. 
Finally, contrary to prior studies the majority of which focus on environmental 
responsibility, this thesis investigates environmental and social responsibility 
separately. Cormier et al. (2011) call for a separate analysis of environmental 
and social responsibility measures in future research. 
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Chapter 2: Environmental and social responsibility: theoretical 
and regulatory frameworks 
2.1 Introduction  
While investors have traditionally focused solely on firms’ financial performance, 
there is now growing interest in how firms perform on environmental and social 
issues. With the introduction of the Climate Change Act 20081, environmental 
and social responsibility has gained increased importance. UK has become the 
first country to introduce mandatory carbon reporting. According to 
(Papanicolaou et al., 2012), 
“On 20 June 2012, the UK Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Nick Clegg, 
announced at the Rio +20 Summit that all companies listed on the 
Main Market of the London Stock Exchange will be required to report 
their annual levels of greenhouse gas ("GHG") emissions from the 
start of April 2013. The announcement, which will initially affect an 
estimated 1,100 companies, follows a public consultation on policy 
options undertaken during the course of 2011.” (Source: published 
on the Jones Day website 04 July, 2012)  
Firms’ environmental and social policies as well as their performance in this 
area in any given year are increasingly important for all classes of investors and 
essential for the growing socially responsible investment market, and for 
investments in firms that meet specified environmental and social criteria.  
Moreover, the credit crisis has caused mainstream investors to become 
increasingly aware of firms’ environmental and social impact as an important 
information source of insight into the long-term viability of their businesses. For 
example, mainstream investors have come to recognize the usefulness of 
environmental and social information as a proxy for evaluating firms’ 
management quality and the ability of management to promote long-term firm 
sustainability. Investors are now able to pursue a more fundamental integration 
of environmental and social information into their financial analysis, given the 
greater availability of materially relevant environmental and social information at 
the key performance indicator level. In today’s business climate, environmental 
                                                          
1
 The Climate Change Act 2008 sets a target for the UK to reduce carbon emissions to 80% below 1990 levels by 
2050. It also set an interim target of a 34% reduction by 2020 (with the potential to increase this to a 42% cut given 
an international agreement) and established the concept of carbon budgets.  
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and social responsibility contributes to meeting environmental and social 
challenges as well as avoiding and/or meeting government regulations.  
2.1.1 Definitions and background  
The definition of environmental and social responsibility is complex and diverse, 
which is commonly referred to as corporate social responsibility (CSR) or at 
times as environment, social and governance (ESG) responsibility. “As socially 
responsible investment has become more firmly established as one of the 
mainstream considerations in institutional investment, the terminology has 
broadened to include environmental, social and governance factors, referred to 
as ESG factors”. (Solomon, 2007; p.272) 
Commission of the European Communities (2002) defines corporate social 
responsibility as  
“companies having responsibilities and taking actions beyond their 
legal obligations and economic/business aims. These wider 
responsibilities cover a range of areas but are frequently summed up 
as social and environmental – where social means society broadly 
defined, rather than simply social policy issues. This can be summed 
up as the triple bottom line approach: i.e. economic, social and 
environmental.” (p.5)  
According to Dahlsrud’s (2008) study, the UK government (2001) states that 
corporate social responsibility  
“recognizes that the private sector’s wider commercial interests 
require it to manage its impact on society and the environment in the 
widest sense. This requires it to establish an appropriate dialogue or 
partnership with relevant stakeholders, be they employees, 
customers, investors, suppliers or communities. CSR goes beyond 
legal obligations, involving voluntary, private sector-led engagement, 
which reflects the priorities and characteristics of each business, as 
well as sectoral and local factors.” (p.10)  
With the development of stakeholder theory, CSR is the concept used to refer to 
the responsibility of a corporation towards all relevant stakeholders.  
The term ESG appears in the United Nations Principles of Responsible 
Investment (UNPRI) and is also employed by major business consulting firms. 
The terminology is employed in various contexts – risk valuation, socially 
responsible investment, corporate responsibility etc. It has been used as a 
generic term in capital markets in recent years.  
18 
 
The definitions show that environmental and social responsibility is not new at a 
conceptual level; business has always had environmental and social impacts, 
been concerned with stakeholders - government, customers or owners, and 
dealt with regulations. Hence, in this thesis, CSR and ESG refer 
interchangeably to a firm’s environmental and social responsibility.  
2.1.2 Difference and linkage between environmental and social 
disclosures (ESD) and environmental and social performance (ESP) 
Environmental and social responsibility encompasses both environmental and 
social disclosures (ESD) and environmental and social performance (ESP), 
which will be studied separately in this thesis. Many prior studies fail to 
differentiate ESD from ESP. Therefore, it is important to point out the difference 
between ESD and ESP. ESD stands for disclosures collected from firms’ 
reports e.g., sustainability report, annual report, website etc. For instance, 
previous researchers use annual reports to measure ESD, including Business 
Review, Operating and Financial Review and other 10K reports (e.g., Ingram 
and Frazier, 1980; Wiseman, 1982; Gray, 1995; Patten, 2002a; Deegan et al., 
2002; Campbell, 2003; Henriques, 2010). ESP refers to firms’ actual 
environmental and social performance such as Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) 
data, carbon emission, water usage, employee CSR training and community 
contribution etc. (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Clarkson et al., 2008).  
However, there is a significant linkage between ESD and ESP. One the one 
hand, it can be argued that firms doing ‘good’ should be willing to provide more 
‘green’ information (Clarkson et al., 2008). On the other hand, it can also be 
argued that poor environmental or social performers may tend to provide more 
information for gaining legitimacy (Patten, 2002a). Hence, drawing upon the 
economics based voluntary disclosure theory, one can argue that firms with 
good environmental and social performance should be willing to provide more 
ESD, which is difficult for poor firms to mimic. From socio-political theories, 
firms with poor environmental and social performance should tend to provide 
more ESD to meet external environmental and social challenges such as 
legitimacy pressure. Both types of theories will be discussed further in the next 
section.  
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Empirically, Clarkson et al. (2008) drawing on both economics based voluntary 
disclosure theory and socio-political theories, investigate the relation between 
firms’ environmental performance and environmental disclosure. Environmental 
disclosure data is collected from firms’ sustainability reports or websites. A 
refined disclosure index is developed based on GRI guidelines published in 
2002. They focus on purely discretionary disclosure (i.e., data is collected from 
voluntary disclosure sources such as sustainability reports or websites), which 
is helpful in analysing the propensity and quality of voluntary disclosure. 
Environmental performance is measured by the total toxic waste that is treated, 
recycled or processed as a percentage of the total toxic waste generated by 
each firm (% recycled) and the ratio of TRI to firm sales. Clarkson et al. (2008) 
predict either a positive association between environmental performance and 
the level of discretionary environmental disclosure as per voluntary disclosure 
theory, or a negative association as implied by the socio-political theories. Their 
findings support economics based voluntary disclosure theory. In other words, 
they find that firms with better environmental performance tend to disclose more 
voluntary environmental information, which is difficult for poor firms to mimic 
(i.e., differentiate their firm types). 
Patten (2002a) examines the relationship between environmental disclosure 
and environmental performance for a sample of 131 US companies. 
Environmental disclosure is based on firms’ annual reports in 1990 (i.e., content 
analysis of 8 indicators and also report line counts). Environmental performance 
is measured as the ratio of a firm’s specific amount of toxics released to 
revenue (both data are for the year 1988). After controlling for firm size and 
industry classification, Patten finds a negative and significant link between 
environmental disclosure and environmental performance. 
In this thesis, Chapter 4 examines ESD and firm profitability; Chapter 5 
examines ESD and firm market value, employee productivity and carbon eco-
efficiency respectively; and Chapter 6 investigates the link between board CSR 
attributes, CSR strategy and firm ESP. I use Bloomberg environmental and 
social scores to measure firms’ environmental and social disclosures, and adopt 
Asset4 environmental and social scores to measure firms’ environmental and 
social performance. Detailed explanation about these two datasets is provided 
at the end of this chapter.  
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2.2 Voluntary ESD 
Current economic recession has underscored the need for companies to 
become more transparent in terms of providing both financial and non-financial 
disclosures. Thus, environmental and social disclosures have become part of 
companies’ governance to control and manage potential risk such as regulatory 
risk related to environmental fines.  
Environmental and social information from a firm addresses several stakeholder 
groups, not just investors and financial analysts. There are different users of 
environmental and social reports such as investors, regulators and competitors 
etc. Voluntary ESD enables users to better understand and communicate with 
firms. For example, Solomon (2007) states that “for environmental reporting, the 
United Nations Environment Programme identified the following user groups: 
employees, legislators and regulators, local communities, investors, suppliers, 
customers and consumers, industry associations, environment groups, science 
and education, and the media” (p.246). Environmental reports enable regulators 
to know firms’ environmental impact and can thus help make future 
environmental policy. Thus ESD should address a wide array of user groups – a 
variety of stakeholders. Furthermore, firms that issue environmental and social 
reports are expected to gain from meeting investors’ demands, from cost 
savings and from building a broad-based corporate reputation (Dowling, 2004). 
Thus it can be seen that investors appear to be an important user group of 
environmental and social information, and ESD could be a communication 
channel between firms and their (largely institutional) investors. 
In the following section, first, general voluntary disclosure theory is introduced, 
followed by relevant theoretical frameworks underlying ESD. Then ESD drivers, 
challenges and recommendations are reviewed. 
2.2.1 General voluntary disclosure theory 
Firms provide mandatory disclosure through regulated financial reports such as 
financial statements, which is compulsory for all UK companies. Some firms 
engage in voluntary communication such as analysts meetings, sustainability 
reports and internet sites etc. Gibbins et al. (1992) argue organisations may 
disclose information to support the efficiency of exchange and production, but 
they also disclose information to establish their compliance with the social 
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values in regulations and informal norms. Reporting and disclosure are among 
the most important tools used by companies to communicate with their 
stakeholders and diminish information asymmetry between them.  
Voluntary disclosure refers to information made public through a firm’s free 
choice. It could be affected by culture, social, economic or behavioural factors 
that are specific to each firm. There is no general accepted definition for 
voluntary disclosure. Francis et al. (2008) state that, 
“The primary insight from theoretical work is that managers disclose 
their private information because rational market participants would 
otherwise interpret nondisclosure as unfavorable news and 
consequently discount the value of the firm’s assets (see Grossman 
and Hart [1980], Milgrom [1981], Verrecchia [1983, 2001]). The 
manager’s disclosure mitigates the adverse selection problem in 
capital markets by reducing information asymmetry between the firm 
and investors, enabling greater liquidity and lowering the firm’s cost 
of capital (Glosten and Milgrom [1985], Diamond and Verrecchia 
[1991])”. (p.56) 
Furthermore, Tian and Chen (2009) state that, 
“Compulsory information disclosure means relevant laws and rules, 
such as Company Law, Securities Law, Accounting Rules, and 
regulatory agencies’ regulations, clearly regulate that listed 
companies must actualize information disclosure. Voluntary 
disclosure means, except for compulsory disclosure, listed 
companies disclose information voluntarily for the sake of companies’ 
images, investors, and accusation risks avoidance”. (p.55) 
Voluntary disclosures can include strategic information such as company 
characteristics and strategy, and nonfinancial information such as socially 
responsible practices. Thus voluntary disclosure represents the excess of 
information that depends on the free choice of management decision and 
outside market factors.  
Costs and benefits analysis 
Managers of companies provide voluntary information which they consider is 
useful for stakeholders’ needs. In other words, the voluntary disclosure is 
considered by mangers to be incremental information or serves other purposes 
that benefit the company. Voluntary disclosure can benefit investors and firms. 
It reduces information asymmetry and helps investors make better capital 
allocation decisions. Furthermore, voluntary disclosure may enhance a firm’s 
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credibility, based on the perception that cost of the information released is a 
sufficient condition to assure the firm’s credibility. In addition, voluntary 
environmental and social disclosures could act as a signal of ethical and 
trustworthy corporate governance. Stakeholders believe these firms not only 
have integrity but also competent managers. In short, the potential benefits of 
voluntary environmental and social information can be the increase of share 
value and investor numbers; improvement of the access to capital market and 
the relations with external stakeholders; and the reduction of share volatility and 
information asymmetry.  
However, providing voluntary information may decrease competitive advantage, 
and it is costly to provide information voluntarily. Voluntary information may 
affect the competitive advantage of firms, because voluntary information may 
enable competitors to value/position a firm, especially for the same industry. 
Moreover, voluntary disclosure implies additional costs to companies including 
both real and opportunity costs. From an accounting and economics 
perspective, production and distribution of voluntary environmental and social 
information entails costs, even if it is likely to confer benefits (Verrecchia, 1983). 
For example, Brammer and Pavelin (2008) suggest that there are two types of 
costs involved in making disclosures: the costs of measuring, verifying, collating 
and publishing environmental (and social) information; and the loss of strategic 
discretion associated with making public commitments to verifiable future 
actions and/or performance (p.122). 
Hence, it is important for firms to balance the benefits of voluntary disclosure 
against the costs.  If benefits exceed costs either in the short or long term 
(depending on the managers’ purpose), then they will choose to disclose 
information voluntarily. 
It is worth mentioning the proprietary costs theory. Proprietary information is 
defined by Dye (1985) as  
“any information whose disclosure potentially alters a firm’s future 
earnings gross of senior management’s compensation… This 
includes information whose disclosure could generate regulatory 
action, create potential legal liabilities, reduce consumer demand for 
its products, induce labor unions or other suppliers to renegotiate 
contracts, or cause revisions in the firm's credit standing in addition 
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to that information which is, in the traditional sense, strategically 
valuable.” (p.123)  
Dye (1985) also proposes in the discussion that all market participants share 
the common belief that the private information contemplated to be released by 
the firm being studied is non-proprietary. Under the proprietary costs theory, 
Dye (1985) shows that nondisclosure or partial disclosure can be optimal option 
for companies even if credible information is available.  
The proprietary costs theory (Verrecchia, 1983; Dye, 1985) suggests that 
companies should be fully transparent if there are no costs to be transparent. 
However, empirical studies show there is variation in disclosure quality (Beyer 
et al., 2010), implying it is important to balance the tension between the costs 
and benefits of disclosure. An explanation can be that there are proprietary 
costs to disclosure which are driven by rent-extracting from stakeholders such 
as competitors and suppliers etc. 
2.2.2 Theoretical frameworks underlying ESD 
Existing literature suggests that there is no unifying theoretical framework 
explaining voluntary ESD. Some earlier studies point to the lack of a testable 
theory (Ingram and Frazier, 1980; Wiseman, 1982) related to motivation for 
such disclosures. More recent studies suggest that there are a few theoretical 
frameworks that could explain firms’ voluntary ESD.  
One stream of existing literature uses legitimacy or political economy theories to 
explain firms’ environmental or social disclosures (Gray, 1995; Patten, 2002a; 
Deegan, 2002; Campbell, 2003; Cho and Patten, 2007). These so called socio-
political theories argue that firms with the worse public image tend to disclose 
more environmental and social information. In other words, poor performers 
who face more political and social pressure and threatened legitimacy, attempt 
to increase discretionary ESD to change stakeholders’ perceptions about their 
actual performance. The socio-political theories tend to emphasize external 
contextual factors (such as media visibility) and corporate characteristics (such 
as industry and size) to determine E or S disclosure.  
The other stream of studies attempts to use economics based theories to 
explain firms’ environmental and social disclosures, such as agency theory or 
economic costs and benefits analysis (Cormier et al., 2011; Clarkson et al., 
24 
 
2008). According to economics based theories, firms with better financial/non-
financial performance should disclose more environmental and social 
information. These firms should attempt to convey their firm types through 
voluntary ESD which would be difficult for poor firms to mimic. Economics 
based theorists place more emphasis on firms’ financial characteristics such as 
market performance, operating financial performance, and economic costs (i.e., 
costs and benefits analysis) to determine the motive for environmental and 
social activities.  
However, according to Hershcovis et al. (2009),  
“…while the socio-political theorists more often present sustainability 
reporting as non-credible, the economic perspective suggests that 
disclosure decisions are based on a cost-benefit assessment, not 
necessarily to manage impressions for the stakeholders. Although 
most research has argued for either one theory or the other, the 
reality may be a combination of both, which is rooted in the learning 
curve of preparers and internal processes of organizations” (p.9).  
Hershcovis et al.’s (2009) argument indicates that the learning curve of 
preparers and internal processes such as internal corporate governance matter, 
and there is not necessarily one theory to explain corporate environmental and 
social disclosures. Indeed, the findings regarding the determinants of ESD 
indicate that both types of theories could work together. For example, 
economics based theories can explain the influences of profitability, while socio-
political theories tend to explain media exposure and industry effects. Some 
relevant theoretical frameworks of both categories, namely socio-political 
theories and economics based disclosure theories are reviewed in the following 
sections.   
Socio-political theories 
2.2.2.1 Legitimacy theory 
Legitimacy theory has become increasingly used by accounting researchers in 
the last decade, particularly researchers working in the area of environmental 
and social accounting to explain ESD (Patten, 1992; Gray et al., 1995; Deegan 
and Rankin, 1996). For example, the theory has been used to explain voluntary 
disclosures made within annual reports or sustainability reports. The following 
section will describe the notion of ‘social contract’ and ‘legitimacy theory’ used 
to explain ESD. 
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Legitimacy theory is centred on the notion of a ‘social contract’. Social contract 
refers to a contractual relationship between organisations and society. The 
existence of this contract ensures business to perform various socially desired 
actions in return for approval of its objectives, other rewards and ultimate 
survival. Failure to comply with societal expectations (in essence, to comply 
with the terms of the social contract) may lead to sanctions being imposed by 
society (Deegan and Unerman, 2006; p.271). However, different managers will 
have different perceptions about the terms of the social contract, and hence 
they will adopt different strategies to ensure firms’ operations are acceptable to 
various stakeholders. 
The concept of legitimacy is central to legitimacy theory. Legitimacy is defined 
by Suchman (1995) as “a generalised perception or assumption that the actions 
of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions (p.574).” 
Legitimacy theory is described as a positive theory (Deegan, 2006), as it seeks 
to explain firms’ behaviour in terms of efforts made to appear legitimate, rather 
than prescribing how firms should behave (which is the role of a normative 
theory of corporate conduct). When a firm’s performance threatens its 
legitimacy, it will lead to economic (e.g., limited provision of financial capital), 
legal (e.g., lawsuits) or social (e.g., publicity campaigns) action.  
Legitimacy theory implies a reactive or proactive approach of companies to 
provide voluntary ESD. On the one hand, firms can voluntarily disclose any 
positive environmental and social information to inform stakeholders about their 
intentions to improve their environmental and social performance. On the other 
hand, when firms’ environmental and social activities threaten their legitimacy, 
they can provide extra environmental and social information to influence 
stakeholders’ perceptions about their negative performance without changing 
actual behaviour. Legitimising strategies might also occur at an industry level. 
That is, if an entire industry has a crisis of legitimacy it might be efficient for a 
centralised industry body to undertake activities that bring some legitimacy to 
the industry as a whole (Deegan, 2006).  
Legitimacy theory originates from political economy theory (Deegan, 2006) that 
will be discussed in the next few paragraphs. 
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2.2.2.2 Political economy theory 
Gray et al. (1996) state political economy theory is “the social, political and 
economic framework within which human life takes place” (p.47). Political 
economy theory has been divided into two broad streams by Gray et al. (1996) 
– ‘classical’ and ‘bourgeois’ political economy. Classical political economy 
theory tends to explain disclosures as being a tool by which powerful individuals 
maintain their own ‘favoured’ positions to the detriment of those individuals 
without power. Bourgeois political economy theory is content to perceive the 
world as essentially pluralistic. Legitimacy theory is embedded in the ‘bourgeois’ 
branch of political economy theory, which assumes that many classes of 
stakeholders have the power to affect various decisions by companies, 
government and other entities. Empirically, Gray et al. (1995) conduct a 
longitudinal study about corporate social disclosure in the UK, using the CSEAR 
social disclosure database for the period covering 1988-1995. The data 
reported is collected by using content analysis of UK firms’ annual reports. 
However, due to time and labour constraints, the database was collected only 
up to year 1995. Gray et al. (1995) review relevant literature about corporate 
social reporting and investigate the trends of social disclosure in the UK. They 
argue that political economy, legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory need not 
be competitor theories but may be seen as alternative and mutually enriching 
theories from alternative levels of resolution. By using the bourgeois political 
economy theory, the findings indicate a significant change in social disclosure 
behaviour throughout the period. Overall, “the theoretical perspectives prove to 
offer different, but mutually enhancing, interpretations of these phenomena” 
(Gray et al. 1995). 
According to Deegan and Unerman (2006),  
“political economy theory explicitly recognises the power conflicts 
that exist within society and the various struggles that occur between 
various groups within society. The perspective embraced in political 
economy theory and also legitimacy theory, is that society, politics 
and economics are inseparable and economic issues cannot 
meaningfully be investigated in the absence of considerations about 
the political, social and institutional framework in which the economic 
activity takes place.” (p.269)  
Solomon (2007) posits that from a corporate environmental reporting 
perspective,  
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“political economy theory focuses on power and conflict in society, 
the specific historical/institutional environment of the society in which 
it operates and the acknowledgement that corporate environmental 
reporting can reflect different views and concerns”. (p.242)  
Hence, based on political economy theory, environmental and social reports 
can “serve as a tool for constructing, sustaining and legitimising economic and 
political arrangements, institutions, and ideological themes which contribute to 
the corporation’s private interests. Disclosures have the capacity to transmit 
social, political, and economic meanings for a pluralistic set of reporting 
recipients” (Guthrie and Parker, 1989; p.166). 
Economics based voluntary disclosure theories 
2.2.2.3 Agency theory 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) define the principal-agent relationship as “a 
contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another 
person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves 
delegating some decision making authority to the agent” (p.308). In the agency 
framework, managers are the agent and shareholders are the principal. 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the basic principal-agent relationship 
is confronted with a fundamental issue – the agency problem. That is, the agent 
may not act in the best interests of the principal. Furthermore, the agency 
problem is seen to exacerbate under conditions of information asymmetry. 
Cormier et al. (2011) posit that more environmental or social disclosure leads to 
less information asymmetry between a firm and its investors, thus lowering firm 
risk. Hence, shareholders seek to control managers’ behaviour through bonding 
costs and monitoring activities (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Under agency 
theory, voluntary disclosure can be seen as one of the bonding costs incurred 
on the part of managers to minimize their agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Managers may show shareholders that they are acting optimally through 
voluntary disclosure (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
It is worth mentioning that some theories can be applied to both ESD and ESP. 
For example, from an information asymmetry perspective, agency theory can be 
used to explain ESD, while from an over and under investment point of view, 
agency theory is more relevant to ESP, which will be explained in the next 
paragraph. 
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Friedman (1970) posits that engaging in CSR is symptomatic of an agency 
problem or a conflict between the interests of managers and shareholders. He 
argues that managers can use CSR as a means to pursue their own social, 
political, or career agendas at the expense of shareholders. Based on this 
argument, Barnea and Rubin (2006) state that if CSR expenditure reduces firm 
value, then a negative relation between CSR expenditure and insider ownership 
is expected. They argue that a firm’s insiders (corporate managers, directors 
and large blockholders) may have an incentive to increase CSR expenditure to 
a level that is higher than that which maximizes firm value if they gain private 
benefits (e.g., enhance their reputation for respecting their employees, 
communities and the environment) from a high CSR rating. Hence, CSR may 
create a conflict between different shareholders. They also argue that a firm 
with high debt levels will be more difficult for insiders to over-invest in CSR, as 
they have less cash available. Barnea and Rubin (2006) use a sample of large 
US companies to examine the relation between firms' CSR performance ratings 
and their ownership and capital structures. The dependent variable is CSR 
rating of each firm, and key independent variables are insider ownership, 
institutional ownership and leverage. Consistent with their expectation, they find 
that CSR performance can create a conflict between different shareholders, and 
find insider ownership and leverage are negatively related to a firm’s social 
rating, while institutional ownership is uncorrelated with it. They explain that “at 
high ownership levels, the cost to insiders of increasing CSR expenditure 
(which yields a higher CSR rating) is larger than the related benefits. In other 
words, insiders downplay the importance of their private benefits compared to 
firm value because they own more of the firm. Thus, the negative relation 
suggests that the cost incorporated in CSR is significant” (p.16). Furthermore, 
the negative correlation between leverage and CSR also supports the CSR-
conflict hypothesis, as higher leverage makes firms spend less on CSR. 
Recently, Jo and Harjoto (2012) investigate the relation between CSR 
performance and corporate financial performance (CFP) and examine the 
relative importance of stakeholder theory and agency theory by using a large 
sample of US companies during the period from 1993 to 2004. They propose 
two hypotheses, namely the overinvestment hypothesis based on agency 
theory and the conflict resolution hypothesis based on stakeholder theory. In 
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other words, agency theory-based overinvestment hypothesis indicates that 
CSR engagements are costly activities and a waste of scarce resources, and 
therefore have an adverse impact on firm value. However, stakeholder theory-
based conflict-resolution explanation predicts that the firm value of socially 
responsible firms engaging in CSR activities is higher than that of socially 
irresponsible firms ignoring CSR activities, because CSR engagement reduces 
conflict of interest between managers and non-investing stakeholders. This 
implies firms still under-invest in CSR activities and that the financial market 
values investment in CSR activities.  
As mentioned above, from the overinvestment perspective, Barnea and Rubin 
(2010) argue that CSR engagement may cause a principal-agent problem. 
Affiliated insiders may have an interest in overinvesting in CSR, if doing so 
provides private benefits such as enhancing their reputation as good social 
citizens. However, from the conflict resolution perspective, stakeholder theory 
indicates that managers conduct CSR to fulfil their moral, ethical, and social 
duties for their stakeholders and strategically achieve corporate goals for their 
shareholders. After correcting for endogeneity bias, Jo and Harjoto (2012) find 
that CSR engagement positively influences CFP, which supports the conflict-
resolution hypothesis based on stakeholder theory rather than the CSR 
overinvestment argument based on agency theory. In addition, they find that 
firms’ CSR engagement with the community, environment, diversity, and 
employees plays a significantly positive role in enhancing CFP. 
2.2.3 Drivers of ESD 
Solomon and Lewis (2002) suggest that markets, social, political and 
accountability factors are the main sources of incentives for environmental and 
social reporting. They summarize the incentives to disclose as: to improve the 
company’s image; to market the company and its products; to comply with 
regulations; to manage pressure from customers and peer companies in the 
same industry; to attract investment; to meet the demand for environmental 
information; to acknowledge social responsibility; as a form of political lobbying, 
as an acceptance of change in society’s ethics and a result of company ethics. 
According to them, costs of disclosure, lack of awareness of environmental 
issues, and avoiding providing information to competitors are main reasons for 
not disclosing. 
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Maximiano (2007) conducts a survey of CSR completed by members of the 
Philippines Chamber of Commerce and Industry and a focus group discussion 
of CSR experts. Based on the feedback from CSR experts, respondents 
perceive the motivation to apply CSR disclosure is consumers’ demand. This 
implies that the public expects firms to be ethical and socially responsible, thus 
public expectation is a key driver that motivates firms to practice and 
institutionalize their CSR. According to Maximiano (2007), this is followed by the 
improvement of firms’ reputation and image. Managerial and personal values 
rank the third, part of business strategy ranks the fourth, community demand is 
the fifth, and recruitment and retention of employees rank the sixth. Compliance 
with regulations and laws appears to be a motivator that drives firms to 
institutionalize their CSR. However, according to Maximiano (2007), it seems 
that regulatory compliance is the least of all enumerated drivers. As 166 
business executives say that businesses should institutionalize CSR, which 
means going beyond compliance with laws and regulations. 
2.2.4 ESD challenges and recommendations 
For researchers, there are some challenges to measuring the quality of 
voluntary ESD. First, given the absence of clear mandatory guidelines as to 
what firms should report in terms of their environmental and social responsibility, 
how studies measure ESD varies greatly. Second, even though there are some 
reporting frameworks such as GRI guidelines; it is difficult to quantify key 
performance indicators to ensure that these are comparable between firms and 
industries. Bloomberg disclosure scores used in this thesis, provide a 
comprehensive ESD measure with comparable and quantifiable indicators. 
These will be discussed in detail at the end of this chapter.  
In the way of suggestions for improving the quality of disclosures, Jones (2010) 
makes some recommendations for firms and their accountants in relation to 
environmental reporting. First, Jones (2010) suggests that managers and 
accountants should take immediate action to address their environmental 
threats. Second, they should use new environmental accounting systems to 
measure, capture and disclose corporate environmental impacts. Third, explore 
alternative monetary and non-monetary valuation systems. Finally, companies 
should disclose their environmental performance or activities to their 
stakeholders. Building on prior literature, Jones also develops a multilayered 
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theoretical model (eight premises) with respect to environmental accounting and 
reporting. Based on the theoretical model, Jones posits that firms should report 
their environmental accounting to their stakeholders because of the stewardship 
function of the boards. Overall, it appears that self-regulated voluntary approach 
might be suitable, when the market is still ‘learning’ the merits of environmental 
and social responsibility.  
2.3 ESP 
In this section, theories underlying ESP are reviewed, followed by the 
discussion of ESP importance. 
2.3.1 Theoretical frameworks underlying ESP 
2.3.1.1 Stakeholder theory 
The most dominant theory used by existing CSR studies is stakeholder theory. 
Freeman (1984) asserts that firms have relationships with different stakeholders 
who both affect and are affected by the actions of the firm. He defines a 
‘stakeholder’ as “any identifiable group or individual who can affect the 
achievement of an organisation’s objectives, or is affected by the achievement 
of an organisation’s objectives” (p.46). In accordance with this paradigm, 
stakeholders include customers, suppliers, employees, communities, and the 
general public, besides managers, stockholders and creditors. Freeman (1984) 
suggests that managers should understand a firm’s rationale, the organisational 
process used to mange relationships with stakeholders, and the set of 
transactions that takes place among the organizations and their stakeholders. 
Freeman’s (1984) stakeholder theory states that firms should use CSR as an 
extension of effective corporate governance mechanisms to resolve conflicts 
between managers and non-investing stakeholders.  
Comparing with the shareholder theory that focuses on the shareholder primacy 
(Friedman, 1970); stakeholder theory posits firms are accountable to all 
stakeholders, not just their shareholders. Shareholders provide capital and bear 
residual risk; a firm should remain accountable to its shareholders through its 
management structure for maximising shareholders wealth. The accountability 
relationship towards shareholders is termed as ‘fiduciary duty’ under directors’ 
responsibility of Companies Act 2006. However, it can also be argued that when 
‘Enron’ collapsed, it was not only the shareholders but also every one of the 
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stakeholders suffered. Each of the stakeholders is compensated on the basis of 
agreements (e.g., employees are compensated through salary, and other 
suppliers of capital through return of their capital with interests), but they have a 
legitimate or moral right to claim on the value created by the firm.  
As mentioned in section 2.2.2.4, Jo and Harjoto (2012) investigate the relation 
between CSR performance and corporate financial performance (CFP) and 
examine the relative importance of stakeholder theory and agency theory. After 
correcting for endogeneity bias, they find that CSR engagement positively 
influences CFP, which supports the conflict-resolution hypothesis based on 
stakeholder theory rather than the CSR overinvestment argument based on 
agency theory. 
The instrumental aspect of stakeholder theory explains the relationships 
between stakeholder management practices and corporate performance. The 
instrumental stakeholder theory suggests a positive relationship between ESP 
and financial performance, and the satisfaction of various stakeholder groups is 
instrumental for organisational financial performance. 
Enlightened shareholder theory 
According to Solomon and Solomon (2004), stakeholder-agency theory so 
called enlightened shareholder theory 2  argues that the implicit and explicit 
negotiation and contracting processes entailed by stakeholder–management 
relationships serve as monitoring and enforcement mechanisms that prevent 
managers from diverting attention from broad organisational financial goals. 
Furthermore, according to Orlitzky et al. (2003), 
“by addressing and balancing the claims of multiple stakeholders 
(Freeman and Evan 1990), managers can increase the efficiency of 
their ’s adaptation to external demands. Additionally, according to a 
firm-as-contract analysis (Freeman and Evan 1990), high corporate 
performance results not only from the separate satisfaction of 
bilateral relationships (Hill and Jones 1992), but also from the 
simultaneous coordination and prioritization of multilateral 
stakeholder interests.” (p.405) 
                                                          
2  There is a gradual broadening of the corporate governance agenda, characterized by a move away from a narrow 
agency theory view toward a broader, stakeholder-oriented view that embraces concepts of corporate social 
responsibility and sustainability. (Solomon and Solomon, 2004) 
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Enlightened stakeholder theory 
Enlightened stakeholder theory argues that stakeholder theory should not be 
viewed as a legitimate contender to value maximization, because it fails to 
provide a complete specification of a firm’s purpose. According to Jensen 
(2010),  
“…enlightened stakeholder theory, while focusing attention on 
meeting the demands of all important corporate constituencies, 
specifies long-term value maximization as the firm’s objective.” (p.33) 
“It can make use of most of what stakeholder theorists offer in the 
way of processes and audits to measure and evaluate the firm’s 
management of its relations with all important constituencies. 
Enlightened stakeholder theory adds the simple specification that the 
objectives function—the overriding goal—of the firm is to maximize 
total long-term firm market value.” (p.39).  
Furthermore, Jensen (2010) argues in order to maximize a firm’s market value, 
managers who play a critical role in leading and sustaining the firm’s strategic 
vision, must not only satisfy, but also enlist the support of all corporate 
stakeholders. He states that enlightened stakeholder theory adds the simple 
specification of a firm’s objective function (i.e., to maximize total long-term firm 
market value), which differentiates from the (multi-objective) stakeholder theory 
as proposed by Freeman (1984). “Stakeholder theory gives them the 
appearance of legitimate political access to the sources of decision-making 
power in organizations, and it deprives those organizations of a principled basis 
for rejecting those claims” (Jensen 2010, p.42). In other words, it can be used 
by managers to seek personal interests. However, enlightened stakeholder 
theory enables management to assess the tradeoffs among its stakeholders, 
which solves the problems arising from stakeholder theory.  
It is necessary to point out the difference between the enlightened stakeholder 
theory and the enlightened shareholder theory. Enlightened shareholder theory 
would ultimately attribute priority to shareholders’ interests, but also encourage 
firms to balance short-term loss against longer-term business success (Macve 
and Chen, 2010). However, the enlightened stakeholder theory focuses on the 
firm’s objective, which is to maximize total long-term firm market value. 
Therefore, enlightened shareholder theory reflects an updating rather than a 
replacement of the traditional view of the corporation as an instrument for 
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delegating to managers (as ‘agents’) the responsibility for maximising the 
wealth of shareholders’ (as ‘principals’) (Macve and Chen, 2010).    
2.3.1.2 Resource based view of the firm (RBV) 
It is necessary to mention the resource based view of the firm (RBV). The RBV 
theory is widely used in strategic management literature and is a basis for 
explaining the competitive advantages of a firm (Penrose, 1959). To transform a 
short-run competitive advantage into a sustained competitive advantage 
requires the resources to be valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable. 
The ‘resources’ can be divided into resources and capabilities: resources are 
tradable and non-specific to the firm, but capabilities are firm-specific and are 
used to engage the resources within the firm, such as implicit processes to 
transfer knowledge within the firm (Makadok, 2001).  
Penrose (1959)3 considers a close relation to exist between the availability of 
resources to a firm and the development of innovative ideas and strategies by 
its managers, while Bourgeois (1981) considers slack to be a resource cushion 
that firms can use in a discretionary manner, both to counter threats and exploit 
opportunities. The resource-based view of the firm proposes that valuable, 
costly to copy firm resources and capabilities provide the key sources of a 
sustainable competitive advantage (Barney and Arikan, 2005). In other words, 
only firms with resources and capabilities that are not easily duplicated by 
competitors can have a competitive advantage. Resources can be physical, 
financial and firm-specific assets such as superior managerial or employees’ 
skills and internal processes, and capabilities including the ability to accomplish 
specific value-added tasks with development of supporting resources. 
The RBV theory can be used to explain ESP. Firms with financial resources and 
unique managerial capabilities, as manifested in superior environmental 
strategies (as argued by Clarkson et al. 2011) are able to gain competitive 
advantage. First to apply RBV theory to explain competitive advantages in 
environmental responsibility is Hart (1995). Hart (1995) theorized that proactive 
investments in environmental strategies including pollution prevention and 
product stewardship could confer both environmental and economic benefits to 
firms such as improving manufacturing efficiency, enhancing reputation and 
                                                          
3
 Penrose (1956) states that excess resources are important determinants of organisational structure, growth, and 
performance. 
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raising rival’s costs. Hart (1995, p.999) also emphasized the importance of 
communicating these environmental strategies to external stakeholders, as 
these could “.....reinforce and differentiate a firm’s position through the positive 
effects of a good reputation.” Furthermore, Russo and Fouts (1997) empirically 
tested the predictions of RBV, and found a positive link between environmental 
performance and firm operating profitability. They assumed this link to be 
mediated by the unobserved superior environmental strategy which they 
conjectured to be based on unique combinations of intangible (such as human, 
reputation, technology), and tangible (such as financial reserves and physical 
equipment) assets. The RBV theory has also been applied by more recent 
studies including those of Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2004) and Clarkson et al. (2011) 
both of whom argue that the reason for their finding of a positive link between a 
firm’s environmental and financial performance is the unobserved capabilities 
particularly managerial quality and CSR strategy. 
2.3.1.3 Resource dependence theory (RDT) 
According to Hillman et al. (2009), resource dependence theory is one of the 
most influential theories in organisational theory and strategic management, 
which recognizes the influence of external factors on organisational behaviour. 
Although constrained by their context, managers can act to reduce 
environmental uncertainty and dependence by providing essential resources to 
a firm or by helping the firm secure these resources through linkages with its 
external environment. RDT has been applied in corporate governance literature, 
particularly in studies related to board of directors. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) 
suggest five actions that firms can take to minimize environmental dependences: 
1) mergers/vertical integration, 2) joint ventures and other inter-organisational 
relationships, 3) appropriate selection of members of boards of directors, 4) 
political action, and 5) executive succession. Boards of directors can be a 
solution to reduce external uncertainty including that posed by environmental 
and social challenges. Furthermore, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) suggest that 
directors can bring four benefits to organisations: 1) information in the form of 
advice and counsel, 2) access to channels of information between the firm and 
environmental contingencies, 3) preferential access to resources, and 4) 
legitimacy.  
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Based on the RDT theory, Mallin and Michelon (2011) argue that board of 
directors can bring in four benefits to a firm: advice and counselling; legitimacy; 
channels for communicating information between external organisations and the 
firm and preferential access to commitments or support from important 
stakeholders in the firm’s environment. Hence, directors can provide critical 
resources to reduce external uncertainty, as well as can be seen as a 
mechanism of legitimacy and reputation. In their analysis, board reputation is 
captured by board composition, competence, diversity, leadership, structure 
and links with the external environment. Based on these arguments, they find 
that the proportions of independent, community influential and female directors 
are positively linked with corporate social performance, while the presence of a 
corporate social responsibility committee is positively associated with 
community performance. In addition, they find that CEO duality and community 
influential directors with multiple directorships have a negative effect on 
corporate social performance of the 100 Best Corporate Citizens.    
Hillman et al. (2009) posit that RDT can be integrated with other theoretical 
perspectives to examine the phenomenon of interest. They point out that 
several similarities exist between RDT and stakeholder theory, which both 
recognize the firm’s interdependence on external and internal contingencies. 
Hillman et al. (2009) state perhaps combining RDT recognition of the 
multiplexity of dependencies with the insights from stakeholder theory would 
yield greater insights for managing dependencies and the specific strategies to 
do so. From the stakeholder and legitimacy perspective, the board of directors 
can be seen as a mechanism of legitimacy and reputation, since its role is to 
ensure the company is run efficiently and stakeholders’ interests are taken into 
consideration in top management’s decision making (Michelon and Parbonetti, 
2010). From the resource dependency perspective, the board of directors can 
provide critical resources to a firm and enables the firm to minimize its 
dependence or gain resources from external environmental (Pfeffer, 1972). In 
other words, the board of directors according to RDT theory can be a solution to 
external challenges including CSR challenges that a firm faces in the market in 
which it operates.    
To sum up, in this thesis I draw on a number of different theories to support 
different aspects of my empirical analyses as appropriate. The first empirical 
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chapter (i.e., Chapter 4) focuses on the economics based costs and benefits 
analysis to examine the link between operating profitability and ESD. In the 
second empirical chapter (i.e., Chapter 5), agency theory and the ensuing 
information asymmetry problem, is used as the basis to investigate the relation 
between ESD and market value of the firm. In the last empirical study (i.e., 
Chapter 6), RBV and RDT theories are adopted to explore the influences of 
board attributes and CSR strategy on a firm’s ESP.  
2.3.2 Importance of ESP 
Solomon and Solomon (2004) note that it seems increasingly likely that creating 
value for stakeholders by businesses focusing attention on maximizing value for 
local communities, employees and environmental impacts, may be synonymous 
with creating financial value for shareholders. Ignoring the needs of 
stakeholders can lead to lower financial performance and even corporate failure. 
Performance of a firm on its environmental and social challenges has now 
become very important. It can affect a company’s overall performance and risk 
profile. A study by EIRIS (2009) shows that environmental and social 
performance enables investors to understand corporate governance and risk 
management of the firms in which they invest, and ensures capital flows to be 
directed towards better-managed firms. ESP can potentially reflect a firm’s risk 
management, its management quality and its competitive advantage. 
ESP and risk management 
When mainstream capital markets look at environmental and social issues, two 
focal points immediately emerge: risk caused by (bad) environmental and social 
performance, and business opportunities based on proactive environmental and 
social performance (EFFAS, 2009). Environmental and social issues could 
affect firms’ risk and business opportunities which are linked with their economic 
performance. The scope of risk management systems has evolved from a 
financial focus to a broader range of environmental and social issues. For 
example, in the long run, ESP data assists in marketing firms’ names and 
managing their reputation risk. 
A study by EIRIS (2009) analyses the strategies of environmental and social 
risk management for firms in the FTSE All World Development Index between 
2005 and 2008. The study focuses on how well firms are addressing 
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environmental and social risks under four areas: board responsibility; risk 
management systems; identification of environmental and social risks and 
potential liabilities; and opportunities. It is found that 1) Japanese firms 
demonstrate the strongest performance; 2) financial sector demonstrates poor 
performance in environmental and social risk management, which may be a 
result of poor disclosure or the failure of financial institutions to recognize the 
relevance of considering environmental and social risk; and 3) firms perform 
well on environmental and social risk identification but poorly on management 
(e.g., board responsibility). 
ESP can also be a means of risk management for banking industry. For 
example, Macve and Chen (2010) examine the roles that voluntary code 
specifically - Equator Principles play in encouraging consideration of social and 
environmental issues in project financing. They state that protecting the 
environment is a by-product of banks’ risk management process. The Equator 
Principles are a set of principles committing the signatory banks to finance only 
projects that meet social responsibility criteria. Compliance with these criteria 
should be good for the bottom line of the signatory banks, as well as good for 
society as a whole (Heal, 2005).  
However, environmental and social risk management is not just for financial 
institutions but for all firms and their shareholders. According to a report 
produced by the Global Reporting Initiative (2009),  
“Investors expect to see a discussion of the key risks and 
opportunities associated with ESG strategies, and prefer to see this 
consolidated into a single section of a report. ESG information 
generally identifies firms’ key risks and opportunities linked to 
corporate strategy and market trend, which can be helpful for 
investors to make decision.” (p.6)  
Therefore, it can be stated that environmental and social issues enable firms 
and their investors, to understand the risks and opportunities businesses face, 
allowing enhanced risk management and security selection (Bassen and 
Kovacs, 2008).   
ESP and management quality 
Greenwald (2009) finds that more and more firms treat environmental and 
social issues as part of their firms’ strategy. Greenwald investigates the 
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relationship between environmental and social performance data and 
management quality for a sample of US investment banks. The results show 
that the US investment banks that survived in the credit crisis performed better 
on environmental and social issues than those that didn’t. According to 
Greenwald, this perhaps surprising correlation suggests a strong indicator of 
management quality: managements able to assess and mitigate longer-term 
strategic risks to their business are also better equipped to cope with a crisis.  
Greenwald (2009) finds that social dimension and corporate governance data 
from the 5 investment banks were quite similar in 2006, including policies and 
actual performance measures such as committee independence and 
compensation ratios. However, environmental dimension reveals key 
differences. He concludes that environmental factors do not have a significant 
material link to the financial performance of companies in the short term. 
However, these subtle differences in company reporting may provide important 
signals concerning the seriousness with which ESG factors are taken by 
management, thus impacting the long run performance of the firm.  
ESP and competitive advantage 
Jones (1995) develops a model that integrates economic theory and ethics. 
Jones (1995) finds that firms conducting business with stakeholders on the 
basis of trust and cooperation have an incentive to demonstrate a sincere 
commitment to ethical behaviour. The ethical behaviour of firms in turn can 
enable them to achieve a competitive advantage, because they will develop 
lasting, productive relationships with these stakeholders.  
Russo and Fouts (1997) examine CSR from a resource-based view of the firm 
perspective. They argue that CSR, specifically environmental performance can 
constitute a source of competitive advantage, particularly in high-growth 
industries. They find a positive link between environmental performance and 
firm operating profitability. They assumed this link to be mediated by the 
unobserved superior environmental strategy which they conjectured to be 
based on unique combinations of intangible (such as human, reputation, 
technology) and tangible (such as financial reserves and physical equipment) 
assets.   
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McWilliams and Siegel (2001) posit that CSR can be a differentiation strategy to 
create new demand to command a premium price for an existing product 
(service). Firms that seize an early opportunity to develop technologies in 
anticipation of new environment issues such as climate change may offer a 
lower risk profile and enhanced return opportunities to their shareholders 
compared with their competitors. Furthermore, CSR may act as a vehicle for 
innovation, which may provide a test of a product or service before launching 
that product or service to a wider public (Kanter, 1999 cited by Husted, 2005). It 
is also evident that CSR has a close relationship with R&D (McWilliams and 
Siegel, 2000).  
To sum up, environmental and social issues are important for firms to manage 
potential risks and opportunities and their business performance; and for 
investors to evaluate firms’ performance, especially business long-term viability. 
2.4 Regulatory frameworks and policy guidelines of 
environmental and social responsibility 
In the following paragraphs, relevant regulatory frameworks and policy 
guidelines regarding environmental and social responsibility reporting are 
introduced. Many firms already provide environmental and social information 
voluntarily. For example, they promote their environmental and social 
accomplishments either in their annual reports and/or in a separate stand-alone 
report. Firms in industries such as energy, forestry, and manufacturing use 
similar reporting techniques as a means to answer their critics (Tschopp, 2005). 
However, in the absence of legislative requirements governing the form of 
environmental and social disclosures, there is an inherent degree of variation of 
reporting styles. Nevertheless, there are some regulatory frameworks and policy 
guidelines guiding firms’ environmental and social responsibility reporting such 
as the AA1000 Assurance Standard, the Companies Act 2006 (about director’s 
duty) and the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). These will be described in the 
following paragraphs of this chapter. 
41 
 
2.4.1 International policy guidelines 
2.4.1.1 The Institute of Social and Ethical Accountability (ISEA) AA1000AS  
The AA1000 Assurance Standard launched on 25 March 2003 is the world’s 
first assurance standard developed to ensure the credibility and quality of an 
organisation’s public reporting on social, environmental and economic 
performance (AA1000 Framework, 2003). The external audit process of a firm’s 
sustainability report is mainly based on the AA1000, GRI guidelines, ISAE3000, 
and/or Lloyd’s Register Quality Assurance. Assurance process involves 
stakeholder interviews, comparing reports, and reviewing documentation 
accuracy etc. For example, 
 “Evaluate the nature and extent of adherence to the AA1000AS 
principles of inclusivity, materiality and responsiveness and assure 
the behaviour of the organisation as reported.” – United Utilities 2010 
corporate responsibility report: Assurance section 
Following a comprehensive multi-stakeholder revision of the 2003 standard, the 
AA1000 Assurance Standard 2008 was developed. It provides a comprehensive 
method of holding an organisation to account for its management performance 
and reporting on sustainability issues by evaluating the adherence of an 
organisation to the AccountAbility Principles and the reliability of associated 
performance information. It requires the assurance providers to look at 
underlying management approaches, systems and processes and how 
stakeholders have participated. This enables them to evaluate the nature and 
extent to which an organisation adheres to the AccountAbility Principles. The 
assurance providers use the Principles as criteria when evaluating an 
organisation. It provides findings and conclusions on the current status of an 
organisation’s sustainability performance and provides recommendations to 
encourage continuous improvement. 
2.4.1.2 The UN Global Compact (UNGC) 
The UN Global Compact (UNGC) is a strategic policy initiative for firms that are 
committed to aligning their operations and strategies with ten universally 
accepted principles in the areas of human rights, labour, environment and anti-
corruption. The ten principles are listed as follows (UNGC homepage): 
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Human Rights 
 Principle 1: Businesses should support and respect the protection of 
internationally proclaimed human rights; and 
 Principle 2: make sure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses.  
Labour 
 Principle 3: Businesses should uphold the freedom of association and 
the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; 
 Principle 4: the elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labour; 
 Principle 5: the effective abolition of child labour; and 
 Principle 6: the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment 
and occupation.  
Environment 
 Principle 7: Businesses should support a precautionary approach to 
environmental challenges; 
 Principle 8: undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental 
responsibility; and 
 Principle 9: encourage the development and diffusion of environmentally 
friendly technologies.  
Anti-Corruption 
 Principle 10: Businesses should work against corruption in all its forms, 
including extortion and bribery.  
The UNGC increased pressure on its signatories to report regularly on their 
ESG achievements, and removed 394 of approximately 3775 signatories for 
inadequate reporting (Ethical Performance, 2008). By complying with these 
principles, firms demonstrate their commitment to their stakeholder 
responsibility, and such firms are more likely to embrace environmental and 
social activities as an issue addressing their organisations.  
The Principles for Responsible Investment are the result of an initiative 
brokered by the United Nations Environment Programme and the UN Global 
Compact. Asset owners, investment managers and professional service 
partners are invited to sign up to a set of six principles on environmental, social 
and governance issues. The Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) 
provide impetus for investors to give greater consideration to ESG risks and 
provide better disclosure of ESG matters (Gifford, 2009). 
2.4.1.3 Global Reporting Initiative’s Sustainability Reporting Guidelines 
The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) was launched in 1997 to develop a 
globally accepted reporting framework (G3 guideline) and to enhance the 
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quality of sustainability reporting. The key aim of GRI guidelines is to improve 
transparency, comparability and clarity. The GRI 2000 guidelines were revised 
in 2002 and 2006. The most recent one (2006 GRI G3 guidelines) includes 
three different types of disclosure guidance: strategy and profile; management 
approach; and performance indicators.  
 Strategy and Profile: Disclosures that set the overall context for 
understanding organizational performance such as its strategy, profile 
and governance. 
 Management Approach: Disclosures that cover how an organization 
addresses a given set of topics in order to provide context for 
understanding performance in a specific area. 
 Performance Indicators: Indicators that elicit comparable information on 
the economic, environmental and social performance of the organization 
(p.5). 
Reporting firms are encouraged to follow this structure in compiling their reports, 
however, other formats may be chosen. According to Henriques (2010), GRI 
reporting guidelines have been developed by a multi-stakeholder process, 
which gives it a high degree of legitimacy, and set out the most highly regarded 
and widely used set of environmental and social indicators. Compliance with the 
GRI reporting guidelines is voluntary and these guidelines emphasise 
environmental, social and economic disclosures. Accordingly, by complying with 
these guidelines, firms demonstrate that they take their stakeholder 
responsibility seriously. 
Most firms’ sustainability reports are disclosed in the form of GRI framework. 
According to a recent study by the Sustainable Investment Research Analyst 
Network (2009), more than 80% of S&P 100 companies provide information 
through sustainability websites; almost half produce a sustainability report; and 
more than one-third make use of the GRI guidelines, the international standard 
for environmental and social reporting. Worldwide, 77% of the world’s 250 
largest firms use the GRI. Gifford (2009) states that GRI has pioneered the 
development of the world’s most widely used sustainability reporting framework 
and is committed to its continuous improvement and application worldwide. This 
framework sets out the principles and indicators that firms can use to measure 
and report their economic, environmental and social performance. Investors are 
increasingly asking their investee companies to use GRI as a reporting 
framework. 
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Based on GRI guidelines, a firm’s sustainability report generally includes the 
following information; 
 ‘About the report’ section briefly introduces the content of a firm’s 
sustainability report;  
 CEO statement consists of business strategy, risks and opportunities 
information; 
 Company information includes business services and products, culture, 
vision and value, governance and company structure; 
 CR/sustainability strategy shows relevant CR strategy used or will be 
used in the following year; 
 GRI G3 guidance - GRI table with key performance indicators including 
economic, social and environmental information respectively; 
 Performance data contains past and/or future data with 5 years goals; 
and most of them are quantitative information; 
 Stakeholder engagement and materiality sections; 
 Assurance (GRI guidelines recommend the use of external assurance for 
sustainability reports in addition to any internal resources); 
 ‘Contact us’ part provides information about a firm (e.g., media enquiry).   
To sum up, AA1000AS, UN Global Compact and Global Reporting Initiatives 
reporting guidelines are voluntary policy guidelines at international level. 
According to Burchell (2008), in the UK, the Company Law Review and its 
subsequent output (the Government White Paper on Company Law), attempted 
to reach a compromise on the issue of non-financial reporting, by calling for 
firms of a certain size to report on social and environmental issues. That is, if it 
is 'material' to a firm's operations, then adequate pressure should be brought to 
bear on firms to fully disclose their impacts. In the UK, there are some 
regulatory requirements regarding environmental and social responsibility such 
as Companies Act 2006 and Pension Funds Amendment Act 2001 which are 
discussed in the following section.  
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2.4.2 Regulatory frameworks in the UK 
2.4.2.1 Companies Act 2006 and Pension Funds Amendment Act 2001 
UK Companies Act 2006 sec.417 (5) and (6) state that environment, employee, 
social and community issues are the key areas a quoted company is required to 
provide information about, using financial and/or non-financial key performance 
indicators. The UK Companies Act suggests that companies should follow a 
“comply or explain” approach to reporting of non-financial indicators in their 
Business Review. 
Sec.417 (5) In the case of a quoted company the business review must, to the 
extent necessary for an understanding of the development, performance or 
position of the company's business, include— 
(a) the main trends and factors likely to affect the future development, 
performance and position of the company's business; and 
(b) information about— 
(i) environmental matters (including the impact of the company's 
business on the environment), 
(ii) the company's employees, and 
(iii) social and community issues, 
including information about any policies of the company in relation 
to those matters and the effectiveness of those policies; and 
(c) subject to subsection (11), information about persons with whom the 
company has contractual or other arrangements which are essential to 
the business of the company. 
If the review does not contain information of each kind mentioned in paragraphs 
(b) (i), (ii) and (iii) and (c), it must state which of those kinds of information it 
does not contain. 
Sec.417 (6) The review must, to the extent necessary for an understanding of 
the development, performance or position of the company's business, include— 
(a) analysis using financial key performance indicators, and 
(b) where appropriate, analysis using other key performance indicators, 
including information relating to environmental matters and employee 
matters. 
“Key performance indicators” means factors by reference to which the 
development, performance or position of the company's business can be 
measured effectively. 
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The Pension Funds Amendment Act 2001 is a new mandatory requirement for 
UK pension fund trustees to disclose how they have considered social, 
economic and environmental matters.  
These are compulsory environmental and social related disclosure 
requirements in the UK. It appears that UK government tends to attach greater 
importance to environmental and social issues, especially in terms of calling for 
environmental and social disclosures from institutional investors such as 
pension fund trustees. Furthermore, it indicates that firms’ environmental and 
social issues are important in evaluating firms’ business performance; 
especially disclosures of their policies and performance related to employee, 
community and environment are given greater importance. In addition, 
according to a survey published by the Accounting Standards Board (FRC, 
2007), it is found that there has been an increase of reporting on environmental, 
employee and social issues; although very few companies discuss their 
contractual arrangements and relationships in any depth. 
2.4.2.2 Climate Change Act 2008 
The Climate Change Bill was introduced into the Parliament of the UK on 14 
November 2007 and became law on 26 November 2008. In March 2009, the 
Climate Change Act Impact Assessment was updated to reflect the final content 
of the Act. The key aims of the Climate Change Act 2008 are 1) to improve 
carbon management, helping the transition towards a low-carbon economy in 
the UK; 2) to demonstrate UK leadership internationally, signalling the 
commitment of sharing responsibility for reducing global emissions in the 
context of developing negotiations on a post-2012 global agreement at 
Copenhagen in December 2009. The Climate Change Act 2008 sets a target for 
the UK to reduce carbon emissions to 80% below 1990 levels by 2050. It also 
sets an interim target of a 34% reduction by 2020 (with the potential to increase 
this to a 42% cut given an international agreement). It has also established the 
concept of carbon budgets. The Act creates a new approach to managing and 
responding to climate change in the UK (Department of Energy and Climate 
Change, 2009). 
Overall, the regulatory frameworks in the UK such as Companies Act 2006, 
Pension Funds Amendment Act 2001 and Climate Change Act 2008 are 
47 
 
mandatory requirements for UK firms to provide relevant information about their 
environmental and social responsibility. However, since there is no clear 
mandatory guideline about environmental and social performance 
indicators/measurements, these regulatory frameworks appear to be the 
minimum requirements in the UK. Hence, it is difficult for firms to follow and 
provide relevant environmental and social information required by the wider 
user groups. However, there are some voluntary frameworks or policy 
guidelines providing environmental and social responsibility indicators in the UK 
(e.g., Carbon Disclosure Project indicators), which will be introduced in the next 
section.  
2.4.3 Other frameworks and policy guidelines in the UK 
2.4.3.1 Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) 
The Carbon Disclosure Project is an independent not-for-profit organisation 
holding the largest database of primary corporate climate change information in 
the world. Thousands of organisations from across the world’s major economies 
measure and disclose their greenhouse gas emissions, water management and 
climate change strategies through CDP. CDP put this information at the heart of 
financial and policy decision-making (CDP website). CDP provides detailed 
environmental performance indicators such as carbon emission or carbon 
intensity. In Chapter 5, carbon emission data (scope 1 and scope 2) is collected 
from CDP and is used to measure carbon eco-efficiency. 
2.4.3.2 Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) 
In September 2009, the Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs 
published Environmental Reporting Guidelines – Key Performance Indicators 
(KPIs) guidance for business and organisations to identify and address their 
most significant environmental impacts, and to set targets/KPIs to measure 
environmental performance. Transparency, accountability and credibility are the 
three general principles of the KPIs. Quantitative nature, relevance and 
comparability are the common requirements of the KPIs. There are 22 KPIs 
considered to be significant to UK businesses. These are supplemented by 
KPIs on supply chains and products. The KPIs include: 6 indicators of 
emissions to air, 2 indicators of emissions to water, 5 indicators of emissions to 
land, and 9 indicators of resource usage. There are 4 supplementary indicators 
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that measure business linked environmental impact such as supply chains, 
products, biodiversity, environmental fines and expenditures.  
2.4.3.3 Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) 
ACCA indicate that an ideal environmental report should consist of organisation 
profile, environmental policy statement, targets and achievements, performance 
and compliance, management systems and procedures and independent 
verification statement. Compared to other environmental reporting countries like 
US (toxic release inventory based reporting) and Sweden (product focused 
reporting), UK adopts compliance and performance based reporting. In other 
words, external regulations, companies’ environmental impacts and 
performance improvement targets setting are important components of 
environmental reporting. Furthermore, the ACCA UK Environmental Reporting 
Awards set out some criteria to judge companies’ environmental reporting levels, 
including completeness, credibility and communication, covering aspects like 
environmental impact, policy, targets, management commitment, internal and 
external credibility.  
To sum up, above-mentioned guidelines only refer to environmental dimension 
in the UK. Based on these voluntary guidelines, it can be seen that it is 
important for firms to provide more quantitative performance information (e.g., 
environmental impact including water or carbon emission etc.). Furthermore, it 
seems that only GRI provides the most comprehensive guidelines regarding 
social indicators. In this thesis, I use two comprehensive data sets, providing 
comparable and quantifiable indicators, namely Bloomberg environmental and 
social disclosure scores and Asset4 environmental and social performance 
scores, which will be explained in more detail at the end of this chapter.    
2.4.4 Stock Exchange related and government reporting requirements 
According to an EIRIS Report (2009), the London Stock Exchange requires 
companies to disclose the following: relevant environmental, social, workplace, 
and community information; to incorporate ESG disclosure requirements into 
listing rules and corporate governance standards; to implement disclosure 
requirements on a ‘comply or explain’ basis; to support the requirement for a 
resolution on a sustainability report; and to explore measures to encourage best 
practice amongst firms (e.g., through sustainable indices). Based on such 
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disclosures, many rating agencies have developed comprehensive 
environmental and social related indices such as Bloomberg and Asset4 that 
are used in this thesis.   
There is no doubt that stock exchanges currently play a key role in capital 
markets through setting a benchmark for disclosure through their listing 
requirements, ensuring liquidity and maintaining confidence and integrity in the 
market (EIRIS, 2009).  
As shown above, UK government and regulators increasingly expect and are 
beginning to require carbon reporting. For example, the UK was the first country 
to introduce mandatory carbon reporting (Papanicolaou et al., 2012). That is, all 
companies listed on the Main Market of the London Stock Exchange were 
required to report their annual levels of greenhouse gas ("GHG") emissions 
from the start of April 2013. 
Many other countries also require listed companies to provide ESG reporting. 
For example, the French government was the first to require publicly traded 
firms to include 40 social and environmental indicators in their reports to 
shareholders in 2003. More recently, the Swedish government announced in 
late 2007 that all 55 publicly traded firms in which it held ownership must begin 
reporting by 2010 on the extensive set of social and environmental indicators 
covered by the GRI guidelines. In addition, in early 2008 the Chinese 
government announced that state-owned firms would be expected to begin 
reporting their ESG records. Therefore, it is timely and relevant to study 
corporate environmental and social responsibility in the current climate of rising 
awareness of stakeholder responsibility.  
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Table 2.1 provides a summary of aforementioned frameworks. 
Table 2.1 A summary of relevant frameworks 
Framework International
/UK 
Guidelines/Requirements Mandatory/
Voluntary 
E(S)D/
E(S)P  
 
 
 
AA1000 
Assurance 
Standard 
 
 
 
International 
The assurance providers evaluate 
the nature and extent to which an 
organisation adheres to the 
AccountAbility Principles. They 
use the Principles as criteria to 
investigate the underlying 
management approaches, 
systems and processes and how 
stakeholders have participated. It 
provides findings and conclusions 
on the current status of an 
organisation’s sustainability 
performance and provides 
recommendations to encourage 
continuous improvement. 
 
 
 
Voluntary 
 
 
 
ESD 
 
UN Global 
Compact 
 
International 
Follow ten universally accepted 
principles in the areas of human 
rights, labour, environment and 
anti-corruption; and report 
regularly on firms’ ESG 
achievements. 
 
Voluntary 
 
ESP 
 
 
 
 
Global 
Reporting 
Initiative G3 
guideline 
 
 
 
 
International 
Report CEO statement such as 
business strategy, risks and 
opportunities; company 
information (like business 
services and products, culture, 
vision and value, governance and 
company structure); sustainability 
strategy; key performance 
indicator (including economic, 
social and environmental 
disclosure); performance data 
(past and/or future data, 5 years 
goals, most of them are 
quantitative information); 
stakeholder engagement and 
materiality; and assurance (GRI 
guidelines recommend the use of 
external assurance for 
sustainability reports in addition to 
any internal resources.) 
 
 
 
 
Voluntary 
 
 
 
 
ESD 
 
Companies 
Act 2006 
sec.417 (5) 
and (6) 
 
 
UK 
Require a quoted company to 
provide financial and/or non-
financial key performance 
indicators related to 
environmental, employee, social 
and community issues; and follow 
a “comply or explain” approach to 
non-financial indicators in its 
Business Review section. 
 
 
Mandatory 
 
 
ESD 
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Pension 
Funds 
Amendment 
Act 2001 
UK Require UK pension fund trustees 
to disclose how they have 
considered social, economic and 
environmental matters. 
Mandatory ESD 
 
 
Climate 
Change Act 
2008 
 
 
UK 
Set a target for the UK to reduce 
carbon emission to 80% below 
1990 levels by 2050, set an 
interim target of a 34% reduction 
by 2020, and established the 
concept of carbon budgets. It 
creates a new approach to 
managing and responding to 
climate change in the UK. 
 
 
Mandatory 
 
 
EP 
CDP 
environment
al 
performance 
indicators 
UK Provide detailed environmental 
performance indicators such as 
carbon emission 
Voluntary EP 
 
DEFRA 
Environment
al Reporting 
Guidelines 
 
UK 
Provide 22 key performance 
indicators (KPIs) guidance for 
business and organisations to 
identify and address their most 
significant environmental impacts, 
and to set targets/KPIs to 
measure environmental 
performance. 
 
Voluntary 
 
ED 
 
ACCA 
environment
al reporting 
guidelines 
 
UK 
Set out some criteria to judge 
companies’ environmental 
reporting level. An ideal 
environmental report should 
consist of organisation profile, 
environmental policy statement, 
targets and achievements, 
performance and compliance, 
management systems and 
procedures and independent 
verification statement. 
 
Voluntary 
 
ED 
London 
Stock 
Exchange 
requirements 
UK Require companies to disclose 
relevant environmental, social, 
workplace, and community 
information and to incorporate 
ESG disclosure requirements into 
listing rules and corporate 
governance standards etc. 
Voluntary ESD 
London 
Stock 
Exchange 
requirements 
UK All companies listed on the Main 
Market of the London Stock 
Exchange were required to report 
their annual levels of greenhouse 
gas ("GHG") emissions from the 
start of April 2013. 
Mandatory 
 
ED 
 
2.5 Environmental and social responsibility measures 
In this section, various available corporate social responsibility indices will be 
reviewed including those used in this thesis. These include environmental 
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and/or social responsibility measures from Bloomberg, Carbon Disclosure 
Project and Asset4 databases.  
According to Hammond and Slocum Jr. (1996), there are three different ways to 
measure a firm’s performance on corporate social responsibility. First, experts 
are asked to evaluate a firm’s corporate policies according to some established 
criteria. However, the validity of this measurement resides in the expertise of 
those persons making the assessments.  
Second, researchers have used content analysis of corporate annual reports 
and other documents to assess a firm’s social responsibilities (Friedman and 
Miles, 2001; Prado-Lorenzo et al., 2009). The content analysis method is based 
on a variety of disclosure frameworks (e.g., the most common one is the GRI 
guidelines), and uses data from annual reports and/or sustainability reports. The 
main advantage of this method is that it uses reasonably objective data, as now 
there is computer-aided software such as Leximancer available to help codify 
qualitative materials. However, the choice of variables is subjective.  
A third method is to use existing indices. In order to measure the level of social 
information reported, a widely used method called indexing has been adopted 
(Wallace and Naser, 1995). Indexing involves checking information disclosed 
against a list of information items. A score is then awarded depending on 
whether an item is disclosed or not, and a total score is derived for each firm. 
Hence, the index method is a model that combines several disclosure items into 
a single measure. Owusu-Ansah (1998) mentions that this approach has 
several advantages: it is capable of rank ordering companies in terms of their 
disclosure scores. Furthermore, Wallace and Cooke (1990) state that as a 
score of an index can be treated as a variable to which both parametric and 
non-parametric methods can be applied, indexing approach allows carrying out 
suitable statistical analysis. For example, Parsa and Kouhy (2008) show that 
the European Commission categorises corporate social responsibility into eight 
aspects: 1) workplace issues, 2) human rights, 3) impact on the community, 4) 
reputation, branding and marketing, 5) ethical investment, 6) environment, 7) 
ethics and corporate governance, and 8) health and safety (CSR Europe, 2003). 
Some of these items are divided into subcategories, giving rise to a total of 
eighteen social information items of the index. An item was scored one if it is 
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disclosed, and zero otherwise. A relative scoring procedure is established with 
disclosure scores calculated by dividing the actual score of a firm by its total 
maximum possible score (TMS). The relative index score (RIS) for each firm is 
the ratio of the actual number of items disclosed (AS) to the total maximum 
score potentially awarded (TMS). This approach provides the benchmark to 
compare/rank corporate social responsibility and enables to conduct statistical 
analysis.   
2.5.1 Development of environmental and social responsibility indices 
The early CSR index was developed by Moskowitz (1972), which he updated 
over several years (based on the surveys evaluated by Moskowitz and a panel 
of businessmen and MBA students). This index has been widely used in early 
CSR studies (Bowman and Haire, 1975; Cochran and Wood, 1984). However, 
Moskowitz’s index is only one-dimensional CSP measurement.  
It is followed by the Council on Economic Priorities’ rankings (CEP, 1977) which 
focus on the investigations of pollution control records of the largest companies 
in five highly polluting industries. Each company's social performance is 
objectively measured by eleven issues: environment, charitable giving, women 
in management, minority management, animal testing, information disclosure, 
community outreach, South Africa, family benefits, military work and nuclear 
involvement. Although scholars have used the CEP ratings broadly (e.g., Fogler 
and Nutt, 1975; Spicer, 1978; Freedman and Jaggi, 1982), some issues like 
animal testing, South Africa and family benefits are not commonly used in 
developing CSR index today. 
Carroll (1979) proposed a new corporate social performance model - a three-
dimensional model of corporate social performance, including social 
responsibilities (i.e., economic, legal, ethical and discretionary responsibilities), 
six social issues (consumerism, environment, discrimination, product safety, 
occupational safety and shareholders) and social responsiveness philosophy. 
Carroll’s multi-dimensional model of CSP is easy to understand and has an 
intuitively appealing logic, which is most durable and widely cited in the 
literature. However, Carroll’s model gives top priority to the economic dimension 
as an aspect of CSR, and the major problem is that social issues change and 
they differ for different industries. Prior studies investigate the relationship 
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between institutional ownership and firms’ corporate social performance. For 
example, Coffey and Fryxell (1991) adopt Carroll multidimensional CSP 
measurement and find that there is no relationship between institutional 
ownership and charitable giving, but a positive relationship between number of 
women on the board and institutional investment. They suggest that in 1984 
institutional investors were fairly indifferent to social criteria. They also provide a 
possible explanation of the positive link between number of women on the 
board and institutional investment as “institutional investors actually advocate 
board diversity, perhaps based on beliefs that it will improve firm performance” 
(p.442). 
McGuire et al. (1988) developed the Fortune magazine’s rating of corporate 
reputation, with eight attributes: quality of management, quality of products and 
services offered, innovation, value as a long-term investment, soundness of 
financial position, ability to attract and retain talented people, responsibility to 
the community and the environment, and wise use of corporate assets. 
Reputation indices are based on the assumption that CSP reputations are good 
reflections of underlying CSP values and behaviours. Since this index is based 
on surveys, it is very difficult to convert above attributes into quantifiable 
variables, and it is only applied in the US companies. 
Another index called New Consumer Group ratings was developed by Adams et 
al. (1991). This is the only index that differentiates CSR disclosure and 
performance, which includes CSR disclosure as one of firms’ CSR performance 
indicators. The 13 ratings produced by NCG include 4 main elements - CSR 
disclosure, women’s position, ethnic minorities’ position, philanthropy and 
environmental actions. The main issue is that the NCG index only focuses on 
consumer sector. Sectors such as financial services and media related products 
are not included, which is due to the difficulties associated with the assessment 
of CSR performance. 
KLD, EIRIS and CKRG have developed more complex indices using a variety of 
surveys and other data sources. More recent corporate social responsibility 
studies use KLD data. This index is compiled by an independent rating service 
which focuses on a wide range of firms over a broad spectrum of CSR screens. 
This database rates companies on 13 dimensions of CSR including community, 
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corporate governance, diversity, employee relations, environment, human rights, 
product quality and safety, alcohol, firearms, gambling, military, nuclear power 
and tobacco. Each dimension in the KLD database is summarized in terms of 
strengths (positive values) and concerns (negative values). A firm is given a 
score of 0 or 1 across each strength or concern. KLD based CSP index is 
widely accepted by practitioners and academics as an objective measurement. 
According to Callan and Thomas (2009), two of the more prominent aggregate 
measures used in academic studies are: the Fortune ratings data; or the indices 
formed from social attributes provided by KLD, with more recent studies 
gravitating toward the use of KLD data. Waddock and Graves (1997), for 
example, believe that the KLD indicators are superior to the Fortune data 
because the latter are more about a firm’s overall management than its socially 
responsible decisions. Furthermore, Chand (2006) asserts that a KLD-based 
index offers more objectivity than a measure based on Fortune’s survey data. 
However, KLD data is only applied for US studies. Graves and Waddock (1994) 
use KLD data to measure firms’ CSP, and find a positive link between 
institutional investors’ stock preferences and socially responsible performance. 
They suggest that the preference is due in part to the long-term performance of 
the investment. They also argue that CSR adds value to the organisation over 
the long term, attracting, in turn, leading institutional investors.  
However, it is argued by Humphrey et al. (2012) that it is not appropriate to 
calculate an overall CSP score as the total number of strengths minus the total 
number of concerns. If a firm is engaged in business practices that involve 
hazardous waste, this activity will be scored 1 under ‘concern’. This will lower 
the firm’s overall CSP score. If another firm is not engaged in practices that 
involve hazardous waste, it will receive 0 and thus hazardous waste will not 
contribute to the firm’s overall score. Furthermore, Humphrey et al. (2012) 
mention that there are several issues of KLD’s rating systems. Take hazardous 
waste production as an example. First, the binary ratings do not distinguish 
between the levels of hazardous waste production. Second, firms in heavy 
polluting industries like Oil and Gas have lower KLD score than other firms that 
have very limited or no disclosure to producing hazardous waste, regardless 
how well the firm manages its hazardous waste. Third, the number of measures 
within each of KLD’s dimensions can skew overall CSP scores. Take 
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environmental dimension as an example - a firm has a total of 5 strengths and 
10 concerns. By definition, the KLD ratings system is biased toward a higher 
concern score for those industries disclose information about their 
environmental concerns.  
In the UK, the most commonly used CSR index is Ethical Investment Research 
Service (EIRIS) CSP rating. Cox et al. (2004) use EIRIS data to measure CSP 
for a sample of UK firms and find that long-term institutional investment is 
positively related to firms’ CSP. EIRIS uses information such as annual reports 
and company publications, in addition to direct surveys of sample companies, to 
develop a set of relatively objective criteria relating to corporate social impacts 
and their management. The data is in the form of a searchable database with 
about 170 questions covering the whole range of social concerns, including 
environment, employee, community and society, human rights and supply chain. 
Due to data availability issue, some scholars only include the first three aspects 
of CSP as corporate social performance measurement (i.e., environment, 
employee and community). Comparing EIRIS with Bloomberg or Asset4 ESG 
databases (both of which will be discussed below), the latter two datasets (i.e., 
both Bloomberg and Asset4) are of better quality and are significantly more 
detailed than the ratings data available from EIRIS. Bloomberg provides 100 
data points and Assets4 has 250 key performance indicators. Similar to KLD, 
EIRIS do not distinguish between general and industry-specific ESG criteria. In 
addition, the ESG scores of Bloomberg and Asset4 range from 0 to 100, which 
improves on EIRIS granular 0 to 3 CSP rating scale (Humphrey et al., 2012).  
Recently, the Global 100 Most Sustainable Companies rating developed by the 
Canadian research firm CKRG has been released. This index consists of 10 
KPIs and a transparency indicator: energy productivity, carbon productivity, 
water productivity, waste productivity, leadership diversity, CEO-to-average 
worker pay, % tax paid, sustainability leadership, sustainability remuneration, 
innovation capacity and transparency. The CKRG Global 100 index is based on 
a group of data providers including Thomson Reuters and Bloomberg. The key 
advantage of this index is: ESG data is industry adjusted and integrated with 
financial data to enhance analysis.  
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To sum up, there are both advantages and drawbacks of previous CSR 
measurements (See Appendix 1 for details). It can be seen that some early 
studies tend to focus on only one or few areas of CSR. It seems difficult to 
construct a truly representative CSR measure because of its complexity. 
Measurement of a single dimension provides too limited perspective on how 
well a company is actually performing in the relevant social domains (Lydenberg 
et al., 1986; Wolfe and Aupperle, 1991). However, a variety of relevant/common 
dimensions have been identified from aforementioned indices, such as 
indicators related to employees, community relations, issues concerned with 
women and minorities, environmental responsibility and product safety. Some 
researchers construct CSR measurement from different stakeholders’ 
perspectives, namely employees, customers, communities and environment. 
Margolis and Walsh (2001) have reviewed ninety-five empirical studies that 
examine the link between CSR performance and financial performance. The 
ninety-five studies use twenty-seven different data sources to assess CSR 
performance, while environmental practices are the most commonly evaluated 
aspect of CSR performance, followed by community investment and human 
resources.  
In conclusion, some consistent criteria for developing a reliable CSR index are 
needed. First, CSR index should be suitable for cross-industry studies. Second, 
it should reflect some important aspects of CSR. Third, it should be possible to 
convert multidimensional CSR into quantifiable indicators. Finally, reliable and 
comparable data must be available from companies’ reports or websites. This 
thesis uses unique databases that meet above criteria. In the following 
paragraphs, Bloomberg, Carbon Disclosure Project and Asset4 environmental 
and social responsibility measures used in this thesis are introduced. 
2.5.2 Bloomberg ESD measures 
Bloomberg provides a comprehensive index including environmental, social and 
governance (ESG) disclosure scores (see Appendix 2 for details). It has 
researched 20,000 firms around the world and found ESG data disclosed by 
4100 firms in 52 countries4. For each firm, Bloomberg has developed ratios and 
                                                          
4 Use command BESGPRO <index> DES <go> then MEMB <go>, it is found that firms may not have disclosed all 3 
areas. Currently, there are 4077 firms processed for ESG information on a monthly basis. As of 25/02/2011, there 
are 625 companies in the FTSE all share index provide some ESG information.  
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KPIs to better compare and analyse firms on ESG metrics. Furthermore, 
Bloomberg seeks to be a standard-setter in the area through relationship with 
major non-governmental and not-for-profit organisations (e.g., GRI, UNGC and 
Ceres). The ESG scores measure firms’ environmental, social and governance 
disclosures, capturing the level of firms’ transparency related to its non-financial 
performance and governance. 
Bloomberg collects 100 different data points related to ESG. For each firm, 
Bloomberg then develops a score that ranges from 0 for firms that do not 
disclose ESG data to 100 for those that disclose every data point collected by 
Bloomberg. ESG data is collected from company–sourced filings (e.g., CSR 
reports, annual reports, company websites, and a Bloomberg survey that 
requests data from companies). According to Bloomberg, none of the data is 
estimated or derived; every data filed has transparency back to a company 
document. If a firm’s disclosure is not covered by ESG data points or 
companies do not disclose anything, then they will be marked as ‘N/A’. 
Furthermore, since weights assigned to different ESG factors are not constant 
across industries, the score is adjusted by industry and weighted by importance. 
In other words, each firm is only evaluated in terms of the data that is relevant 
to its industry sector. For example, a data point like Phones Recycled is only 
considered in the score for Telecommunications firms and not for other sectors. 
Similarly, Gas Flared only goes into computing the disclosure score for oil and 
gas exploration and production firms, while companies in other sectors are not 
penalized for not disclosing it. Data point such as Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
or Number of Independent Directors carries greater weight than other disclosure 
items, which is decided by ESG practitioners.  In addition, the score is then 
expressed as a percentage, making firms comparable both within and across 
industry sectors. Hence, the features of Bloomberg ESG disclosure scores meet 
the above-mentioned criteria of a reliable CSR index, that is, these are 
comparable across companies and industries; are quantifiable; are based on 
reliable data; and reflect timely and relevant aspects of CSR. 
The environmental ‘E’ score covers various types of environmental information 
that could broadly be classified as ‘hard’ items and ‘soft’ items. Hard items 
include data points like Carbon/GHG emissions, energy/water consumption, 
waste recycled, investments in sustainability and ISO certification, among 
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others. Soft items include firms’ environmental policies and initiatives such as 
waste reduction policy, energy efficiency policy and green building policy, 
among others. It can be seen from Appendix 2; approximately 80% of E items 
covered are hard data items, while only 20% of them (12 out of 60) are soft data 
points. Thus, the environmental score largely measures a firm’s hard 
environmental disclosure, which Clarkson et al. (2008) suggest, would be 
difficult for poor environmental performers to provide. Thus higher ‘E’ score 
would denote more environmentally responsible disclosure.  
The social ‘S’ score developed by Bloomberg mostly covers reporting of issues 
related to human resource relations such as employee health and welfare, as 
well as their training and development including training in CSR. The ‘S’ score 
also covers disclosure of issues of equality and diversity in employment, 
community spending and human rights. Based on the type of information 
covered, about 70% of social score is based on hard items while soft 
information makes up about 27% of the score (7 out of 26 data points). Thus the 
higher a firm’s ‘S’ score, the more inclined it is to be ‘socially’ responsible.  
2.5.3 Carbon emission data  
UK firms’ carbon emission data is available from the Carbon Disclosure Project 
website and published reports. As mentioned in section 2.4.3.1, the Carbon 
Disclosure Project (CDP) is an independent not-for-profit organisation working 
to drive greenhouse gas emissions reduction and sustainable water use by 
business and cities. Thousands of firms report their greenhouse gas emissions, 
water management and climate change strategies through CDP every year. The 
CDP then produces annual reports which analyse these responses, submitted 
through investors, supply chain, public procurement and cities programs. Hence, 
every year CDP publishes a number of analytical reports written by CDP partner 
organisations and provides detailed analysis of the responses indicating 
important trends and development, including the FTSE350 report. The 
FTSE350 report provides carbon emission data for FTSE350 companies, 
including aggregated carbon disclosure score, scope 1, scope 2, scope 3, and 
total carbon emission data. It can be used to work out carbon intensity (the ratio 
of carbon emissions to total sales in local currency). The reports released in 
recent years also provide information related to CDP’s verification (e.g., Year 
2011). However, due to data availability, only year 2008 and 2009 emission 
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data was available when the data for this study was being collected in 20105. 
Hence, this study uses data only for these two years. 
2.5.4 Asset4 ESP measures 
Asset4 a database of Thomson Reuters, provides environmental, social and 
governance performance information, which is primarily used by professional 
investors and corporate executives. It provides objective, relevant and 
systematic ESG performance information. A team of over 130 experienced 
analysts collect 900 ESG evaluation points per firm, which is used to calculate 
250 key performance indicators. Each data point goes through a multi-step 
verification process, including a series of data entry checks, automated quality 
rules and historical comparisons. Data sources include stock exchange filings, 
CSR and annual reports, non-governmental organisation websites and various 
news sources. Primary data used are objective and publically available.  
There are 18 categories of key performance indicators within four pillars, 
namely Economic (3 categories), environmental (3 categories), social (7 
categories) and governance (5 categories). Only environmental, social and 
governance pillars are relevant for the analysis in this thesis. The environmental 
score as defined by Asset4 “measures a company's impact on living and non-
living natural systems, including the air, land and water, as well as complete 
ecosystems. It reflects how well a company uses best management practices to 
avoid environmental risks and capitalize on environmental opportunities”. It 
covers “hard” performance indicators (as classified by Clarkson et al., 2008) 
such as information on energy used, CO2 emissions, water and waste recycled, 
and spills and pollution controversies. Hence, the aggregate environmental 
score measures a firm’s environmental performance. The social score as 
defined by Asset4 “measures a company's capacity to generate trust and loyalty 
with its workforce, customers and society, through its use of best management 
practices”. It covers issues like employee turnover, accidents, training hours, 
donations, and health and safety controversies. Social score also covers mostly 
“hard” performance indicators and hence is an objective measure of the social 
                                                          
5
 I also use Bloomberg to check carbon data availability. Use command CEDL <go> to check all companies submitted 
emission data to CDP, it is found that there are 2588 companies in the UK exchange market submitted emission 
data, but only 208 companies provide carbon information in 2006/2007/2008.  
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performance of a firm. Table 2.2 shows the pillars and sub-categories of ESG 
scores from Asset4.  
Table 2.2 ESG pillars and sub-categories (2002-2010) 
Pillars Sub-categories 
Environment score (ENVSCORE) – The environmental pillar 
measures a company's impact on living and non-living natural 
systems, including the air, land and water, as well as complete 
ecosystems. It reflects how well a company uses best 
management practices to avoid environmental risks and capitalize 
on environmental opportunities in order to generate long-term 
shareholder value. 
 
Emissions reduction 
Resource reduction 
Product innovation 
Social score (SOCSCORE) - The social pillar measures a 
company's capacity to generate trust and loyalty with its workforce, 
customers and society, through its use of best management 
practices. It is a reflection of the company's reputation and the 
health of its license to operate, which are key factors in determining 
its ability to generate long term shareholder value.  
Employment quality 
Health & Safety 
Training & Development 
Diversity 
Human rights 
Community 
Product responsibility 
Governance score (CGVSCORE) - The corporate governance 
pillar measures a company's systems and processes, which 
ensure that its board members and executives act in the best 
interests of its long-term shareholders. It reflects a company's 
capacity, through its use of best management practices, to direct 
and control its rights and responsibilities through the creation of 
incentives, as well as checks and balances in order to generate 
long-term shareholder value. 
 
Board structure 
Board function 
Compensation policy 
Shareholder rights 
Vision & Strategy 
Note: Datastream code is presented in parentheses. 
 
From Table 2.2, it can be seen that E, S and G pillars measure firms’ 
environmental, social and governance performance respectively. Asset4 ESG 
data can be obtained from Datastream. The ESG data is available from 2002 
onwards. Firms with no Asset4 ratings are excluded from the study in Chapter 6. 
This limitation of the analysis is discussed in further detail in the relevant 
chapter.  
Asset4 provides more comprehensive calculation of the rating scores. Key 
performance indicators, categories, pillars and overall score are equally 
weighted computer calculations of relative company performance, the 
benchmark being the Asset4 company universe. These ratings are Z-scored 
and normalized to position the score between 0 and 100%. The Z-score is a 
relative measure comparing one company with a given benchmark. It expresses 
the value in units of standard deviation of that value from the mean value of all 
companies. Among other things, this allows to create more distinction between 
values that otherwise might be very close together (Asset4 document). A 
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number of prior studies adopted Asset4 ESG dataset to measure firms’ 
environmental, social and governance performance (e.g., Ioannou and Serafeim, 
2012; Kocmnova et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2012; Lam et al., 2012; Cheng et al., 
2012; Wimmer, 2012). 
Table 2.3 provides the definition and measurements of board attributes and 
CSR strategy variables used in Chapter 6. 
Table 2.3 A break-down of governance pillar (Asset4 data fields) 
Category Definition/Measurement DS Code 
 
 
 
Board 
Structure 
and 
composition 
variables 
Percentage of Independent Board Members (%) Percentage 
expressed numerically of independent board members as 
reported by the company (whereas the company stipulates 
that there is no significant institutionalised interest link 
between the company or the executives and the 
independent board members). 
 
 
CGBSO07V 
 
Board Diversity (%) -Percentage of women on the board of 
directors. 
CGBSO17V 
CEO-Chairman Separation (Y/N) Does the CEO 
simultaneously chair the board? 
CGBSO09V 
 
Audit Committee Expertise (Y/N) Does the company have 
an audit committee with at least three members and with 
one of those members being considered a "financial expert" 
within the meaning of Sarbanes-Oxley given his or her 
extensive experience in accounting and auditing matters? 
 
 
CGBFO03V 
 
 
 
 
CSR related 
vision and 
strategy 
variables 
Integrated Vision and Strategy Challenges and 
Opportunities (Y/N) Is the company openly reporting about 
the challenges or opportunities of integrating financial and 
extra-financial issues, and the dilemmas and trade-offs it 
faces? 
 
CGVSDP016 
 
CSR Sustainability Committee (Y/N) Does the company 
have a CSR committee or team? 
CGVSDP005 
 
CSR Sustainability Report Global Activities (Y/N) Does the 
company's extra-financial reporting take into account the 
global activities of the company? 
CGVSDP029 
 
CSR Sustainability External Audit (Y/N) Does the company 
have an external auditor of its CSR/H&S/Sustainability 
report? 
CGVSDP030 
 
GRI report guidelines (Y/N) Is the company’s CSR report 
published in accordance with the GRI guidelines? 
CGVSDP028 
 
2.6 Conclusions 
In conclusion, this chapter provides an introduction and some background 
knowledge about environmental and social responsibility. Relevant theoretical 
underpinnings and regulatory frameworks/policy guidelines are described. 
Furthermore, ESD and ESP measures used in this thesis are introduced. The 
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interrelationship among corporate environmental and social responsibility, 
governance systems and financial performance are reviewed in Chapter 3. 
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Chapter 3: Environmental and social responsibility, corporate 
governance and firm performance 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I discussed the theoretical frameworks and policy 
guidelines relating to environmental and social responsibility. I review in this 
chapter first, the extant empirical literature on the link between environmental 
and social responsibility and firm financial performance (which are the topics 
studied in the empirical chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis). I then review the 
studies grounded in the management and corporate governance literature, on 
the link between environmental and social performance and the board of 
director characteristics (the topic that I investigate in Chapter 6).   
3.2 Environmental and social responsibility and firms’ financial 
performance 
A substantial body of literature has examined the link between ‘being green’ (i.e., 
being environmentally and socially responsible) and ‘generating green’ (i.e., 
generating profits), such as recent studies by Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2004), Clarkson 
et al. (2011), Callan and Thomas (2009), Brammer and Millington (2008), 
Dowell et al. (2000) and McWilliams and Siegel (2001). Yet, the evidence 
concerning this link remains inconclusive at theoretical and empirical levels. For 
example, Margolis and Walsh (2001) review 122 published studies between 
1971 and 2001 and revisit the relation between corporate social responsibility 
and financial performance. Their review reveals that prior studies use many 
different approaches such as structural equation modelling, event study, 
regression analysis and case study. They find when CSR is an independent 
variable in 80 of the 95 studies, the majority of results point to a positive 
relationship between CSR and financial performance, namely 42 positive 
studies (65%), 4 negative studies (6%) and 19 neutral studies (29%). When 
CSR is a dependent variable in 19 of 95 studies, the majority of results point to 
a positive relationship, with 13 positive studies (68%), 3 neutral studies (16%) 
and 3 mixed result studies (16%).  
Siegel (2009) argues that environmental and social responsibility should be 
viewed as an investment decision, and thus should be evaluated in a rational, 
calculative fashion. Siegel posits that managers should not adopt green 
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management practices because of societal pressure alone, but rather because 
it advances their organisation’s strategic goals such as increase of their market 
values. In other words, firms should choose to be socially responsible to align 
their shareholders’ interests with other stakeholders’ interests, which in turn will 
increase firms’ productivity, share price and market share, reduce potential 
competition and enhance human capital/work quality. Based on Siegel’s 
argument, firms should choose to be ‘green’ only if it yields more ‘green’. Indeed, 
Clarkson et al. (2011) find that it pays to be ‘green’.  
There are a number of limitations in the ‘green’ literature that might explain the 
mixed results of prior work. First, as Clarkson et al. (2010) point out, work in this 
area suffers from measurement and methodological problems. In terms of 
measurement, given the absence of clear mandatory guidelines as to what firms 
should report in terms of their corporate social responsibility (CSR), how studies 
measure CSR in this area varies greatly (Callan and Thomas, 2009). Second, 
given the data limitations of most prior work in this area: 1) using either cross-
sectional samples (e.g., Callan and Thomas, 2009; Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004); 2) 
limited industry samples (e.g., Clarkson et al., 2011 covering only 4 industries); 
3) samples selected on the basis of meeting certain threshold criteria (e.g., Al-
Tuwaijri et al., 2004, requiring companies in their sample to meet certain criteria 
relating to exposure to future environmental costs); not only does generalisation 
remain difficult, but even causality testing remains a challenge. Finally, as a 
number of authors including Ullmann (1985), and more recently Gray et al. 
(1995) comment, the literature remains unclear at a theoretical level as to why 
environmental and social responsibility, given that they are largely non-financial 
in nature, should matter for various measures of a firm’s financial performance. 
For example, Ullmann (1985) provides a systematic review of the relations 
among social performance, social disclosure and economic performance, and 
indicates that inconsistent findings result from a lack of theory, inappropriate 
definition of key terms and deficiencies in empirical data currently available. 
In the following section, prior studies regarding the three sets of relations as 
mentioned by Ullmann 1985 are reviewed. First, the link between environmental 
and social performance (ESP) and corporate financial performance (CFP) is 
discussed. Second, research on the relationship between ESP and ESD is 
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addressed. Finally, existing literature about the association between ESD and 
CFP is reviewed.  
3.2.1 Relations between ESP and corporate financial performance (CFP) 
The most dominant CSR research perhaps is the investigation of the link 
between ESP and CFP. Different methodologies have been used in prior 
studies. Generally speaking, existing literature indicates three different methods. 
First, event studies examine the mean stock returns of firms around release of 
CSR news. Second, portfolio studies compare firms’ financial performance 
between CSR responsible firms and non-responsible firms. Third, regression 
analyses investigate the relation between ESP and CFP. Although studies use 
regression analyses (i.e., the third type), different ESP and CFP measures are 
used. For example, some studies test the influences of environmental and 
social performance on market based financial performance such as Q ratio or 
cost of capital (e.g., Clarkson et al., 2010). Some other studies apply 
accounting-based measurement of financial performance such as ROA, ROE 
and ROS (e.g., Callan and Thomas, 2009). The measurements of 
environmental and social performance also vary. For most US and Canadian 
studies, KLD is the main data source to measure firms’ ESP. In the UK, there is 
limited ESP data available such as EIRIS and Asset4. In this thesis, I use 
Asset4 environmental and social scores to measure a firm’s environmental and 
social performance.  
In the following paragraphs, I will review separately the link between ESP and 
operating profitability, as well as ESP and market related performance in 
chronological order (although some studies use both as financial performance 
measures). Then review prior studies related to causality of this link. 
3.2.1.1 Prior studies on the ESP-CFP link 
ESP and operating profitability 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, a number of studies over the 
years have examined the link between various measures of environmental and 
social performance and operating profitability. The most recent studies are 
reviewed below. 
67 
 
Callan and Thomas (2009) use KLD data to examine the relationship between 
corporate social performance and its financial performance including four 
different financial performance measures, namely ROA, ROS, ROE and Tobin’s 
Q i.e., Q ratio. When financial performance is the dependent variable, they find 
a positive link between financial performance (measured as ROA, ROS or 
Tobin’s Q) and corporate social performance. They suggest that ROE is more 
suitable for long-term analysis, while Tobin’s Q appears to be a useful measure 
of financial performance in CSR analyses. In chapter 4, I use ROS and ROE as 
profitability measures (independent variables) and in chapter 5 Q ratio is used 
as market performance measure (dependent variable).   
Evans and Peiris (2010) examine the relationship between environmental social 
governance (ESG) factors and financial performance (both operating profitability 
and market performance) of US listed companies. Consistent with stakeholder 
theory, they find aggregated ESG rating is positively related to both ROA and 
MTB ratio. At disaggregated level, they find a significant positive link between 
particular ESG rating criteria and both return on assets and market to book 
value measures. In particular, they find that employment conditions are a more 
relevant influence than other stakeholder criteria, and a company’s involvement 
in more general non-stakeholder related social issues (e.g., community relations) 
contributes negatively to both operating performance and stock return. Based 
on their findings, employee (key stakeholder) related social performance 
appears to be important for a company, as it can lead to higher operating profit 
and market return. 
Guenster et al. (2011) investigate the association between firms’ eco-efficiency 
and their financial performance measured as ROA and Tobin’s Q. Using a new 
database of eco-efficiency scores (the eco-efficiency score reflects a firm’s 
environmental performance) from 1997 to 2004, they find that eco-efficiency is 
positively related to operating performance and market value. Furthermore, they 
argue that the use of Tobin’s q is adequate when analyzing corporate 
environmental performance, as it reflects reputational effects, investor trust and 
investor risk. 
Busch and Hoffmann (2011) investigate the link between climate change/carbon 
emissions and financial performance measured by ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q 
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respectively. Focusing on climate change, they developed a set of questions 
that cover a firm’s carbon emissions and carbon management strategies. They 
use a firm’s carbon intensity, measured as the ratio of the total GHG emissions 
(Scope 1 and Scope 2 in tons) to a firm’s sales (in US$), as the outcome based 
environmental performance measurement. Regarding the process-based 
environmental performance measurement, they use the aggregated score of 13 
questions from the questionnaire. They find a negative relation (with respect to 
Q ratio or ROE) when using carbon management as a process-based 
measurement. However, as an output-based measurement, environmental 
performance is positively linked with Q ratio.  
Using longitudinal data from 1990-2003 for the four most polluting industries in 
the US, Clarkson et al. (2011) study the determinants and consequences of 
proactive environmental strategies. First, they investigate the factors effect a 
firm’s decision to adopt a proactive environmental strategy. Second, they 
examine whether pursing proactive environmental strategies can lead to better 
financial performance (ROA). Finally, by using 3SLS regression analysis, they 
test potential endogeneity between a firm’s environmental performance and 
financial performance (equivalent to Q ratio). Clarkson et al. (2011) adopt 
resource-based view of the firm and argue that firms with unique scarce 
resources such as superior managerial capability and financial resources can 
gain sustainable competitive advantage. Managerial capability is captured by 
R&D intensity, sales growth and enterprise value to assets, and financial 
resources are measured by ROA, operating cash flows and leverage. They find 
that positive changes in firms’ financial resources in the prior periods lead to 
significant improvements in firms’ relative environmental performance in the 
subsequent periods. Furthermore, they find that significant improvements in 
environmental performance in prior periods can lead to improvements in 
financial performance (ROA) in the subsequent years after controlling for the 
influence of Granger causality. The result of 3SLS test shows that there is 
endogeneity between environmental performance and financial performance (Q 
ratio). Finally, they suggest that it pays to be green; however, only firms with 
sufficient financial resources and management capabilities can pursue a 
proactive environmental strategy.  
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To sum up, prior studies examining the link between corporate social 
performance and operating performance, show mixed results (e.g., Busch and 
Hoffmann, 2011). Moreover, there are some methodological limitations of the 
above studies. For example, some use either cross-sectional samples (e.g., 
Callan and Thomas, 2009) or limited industry samples (Clarkson et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, most prior studies focus on environmental performance only (e.g., 
Guenster et al., 2011; Busch and Hoffmann, 2011). However, the link between 
ESP and operating performance is widely studied, while the link between ESD 
and firm financial performance is under examined. In Chapter 4 I not only 
examine the link between ESD and firm operating profitability, but also use a 
pooled cross-sectional and time series sample including all non-financial 
industries to investigate the link between a firm’s environmental (as well as 
social) disclosure and its operating performance. Hence, I address the under-
researched link between ESD and profitability as well as address the 
methodological limitations of the ESP-CFP literature. 
ESP and market related performance 
The question of whether being socially responsible has any capital market 
implications, has been addressed by a number of studies. According to Ullmann 
(1985), socially responsive firms should outperform nonresponsive or less 
responsive ones, in terms of better market performance which should be 
reflected in the firm's stock price and attached systematic risk. In the following 
paragraphs, a number of prior studies examining the link between ESP and 
market related performance (including firm risk, cost of capital, annual return 
and Q ratio) are reviewed.  
 Firm risk and cost of capital 
Prior empirical studies attempt to investigate the relationship between corporate 
social performance and various firm risks. For example, Orlitzky and Benjamin 
(2001) define firm risk in terms of the variability of returns and they find a 
negative relation between social performance and subsequent firm risk.  
There are two types of risk associated with a firm’s stock: systematic risk and 
unsystematic or business risk (Weston and Brigham, 1981). Normally, business 
risk is irrelevant to financial theory, because a diversified portfolio of securities 
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can reduce and even eliminate business risk. However, a firm that successfully 
manages its business risk can provide above-normal returns to shareholders in 
the form of increased cash flows (Amit and Wernerfelt, 1990). Husted (2005) 
finds that the more proactive the CSR projects of the firm, the lower the ex-ante 
downside business risk of the firm. Husted’s finding helps firms deal with ex 
ante downside business risk, which is dramatically different from most prior 
CSR-risk studies. 
Lee and Faff (2009) examine the relationship between corporate sustainability 
performance and idiosyncratic risk from a global perspective. They find that 
firms with better corporate social performance exhibit significantly lower 
idiosyncratic risk which is priced by the broader global equity market. 
Petersen and Vredenburg (2009) attribute the positive ESP-CFP link to four 
general areas: risk mitigation, generating market opportunities, accruing capital 
market advantages and serving as a proxy for quality management. Regarding 
risk mitigation, they state that CSR performance can be a form of insurance to 
hedge risks, reducing the exposure of the respective firms to specific risks. The 
mitigation of these risks is considered as value adding and therefore has a 
positive impact on financial performance.  
Salama et al. (2011) use a sample of UK FTSE 350 firms covering 1994-2006 
to investigate the link between corporate environmental performance and firm 
risk. Firm risk is measured by using beta, and corporate environmental 
performance is measured by using the Community and Environmental 
Responsibility Ranking from the ‘Britain’s Most Admired Companies’ survey. 
They find that a firm’s environmental performance is inversely related to its risk 
– an increase of 1.0 in a firm’s environmental performance score is associated 
with a 0.02 reduction in its risk.    
Recently, Gregory et al. (2011) adopt Linder Lydenberg Domini (KLD) data as 
CSR performance measure and find better CSR firms have a lower cost of 
capital and may have a lower expected adverse cash flow shocks. Their 
analysis of realized returns provides some evidence of lower beta and book-to-
market exposure among high CSR stocks.  
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 Annual return and Q ratio 
Some researchers theorize that firms with unique scarce resources such as 
superior managerial capability (e.g., with ability to develop superior CSR 
strategies) and financial resources can enhance their competitiveness, which 
could lead to better market performance (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Lo and Shue, 
2007; Clarkson et al., 2011). 
Based on this logic, Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2004) examine the relations among 
environmental disclosure, environmental performance and economic 
performance. Following Ullmann’s (1985) suggestion that management’s overall 
strategy can affect economic performance, environmental performance and 
environmental disclosure simultaneously, Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2004) recognize the 
potential for endogenous relations among these three constructs, and use a 
simultaneous equations approach to explore these relations. Economic 
performance is measured as industry-adjusted annual return (market price per 
share as sensitivity analysis). Environmental disclosure is based on information 
reported in SEC Forms 10-K and focuses on pollution-related information in four 
areas: 1) the total amount of toxic waste generated and transferred or recycled; 
(2) financial penalties resulting from violations of 10 federal environmental laws; 
(3) Potential Responsible Party (PRP) designation for the clean-up 
responsibility of hazardous-waste sites; and (4) the occurrence of reported oil 
and chemical spills. Environmental performance is measured as the ratio of 
toxic waste recycled to total toxic waste generated. They find a positive and 
significant relation between environmental performance and economic 
performance (dependent variable), as well as a positive and significant link 
between environmental performance and environmental disclosure (dependent 
variable).  
Lo and Shue (2007) investigate the relationship between corporate 
sustainability and firm value using large US non-financial companies from 1999-
2002. Firm value is measured by using Tobin’s Q (dependent variable), and 
sustainability is measured as a dummy variable (1 if a firm is listed in the DJSGI 
USA in the current year or zero otherwise). Using both pooled and fixed effects 
regression analyses; they find a positive and significant relation between 
corporate sustainability and a firm’s market value. Furthermore, they also find a 
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strong interaction effect between corporate sustainability and sales growth on 
firm value. Their findings indicate that companies with remarkable sustainable 
development strategies are more likely to be rewarded by investors with a 
higher valuation in the financial markets.  
As reviewed earlier, both Callan and Thomas (2009) and Guenster et al. (2011) 
find a positive and significant link between ESP and Q ratio (dependent 
variable). Furthermore, using 3SLS regression analysis, Clarkson et al. (2011) 
find that there is a two-way relationship between environmental performance 
and economic performance (both positive). The link between environmental 
disclosure and economic performance (dependent variable) is found to be 
positive and significant. No endogeneity is found between environmental 
disclosure and economic performance.  
To sum up, prior studies show that firms with better environmental and social 
performance have lower firm risk or cost of capital, but higher annual return or 
Q ratio. For example, Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2004), Callan and Thomas (2009) and 
Clarkson et al. (2011) find a positive relationship between a firm’s market 
performance (annual return or Q ratio) and its corporate social performance. 
However, Brammer et al. (2006) argue that expenditure on some corporate 
social activities can be largely destructive of shareholder value. From an 
aggregated level, they find a negative relation between CSR composite score 
and market returns. From a disaggregated level, they find environmental and 
community indicators are negatively associated with market returns, while 
employment aspect is weakly positively related. Hence, they suggest that the 
various aspects of corporate social behaviour should be examined separately in 
order to achieve an accurate picture of their impacts on market returns. 
Moreover, Nelling and Webb (2009) fail to find any significant link between a 
firm’s corporate responsibility measures and their stock market performance. 
Hence, the evidence on ESP and market performance of a firm remains 
inconclusive at an empirical level.  
Moreover, while the link between ESP and market performance is well 
established, the link of ESD with market performance needs to be explored. In 
Chapter 5, I will examine the relationship between a firm’s ESD and its market 
performance.  
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3.2.1.2 Causality 
There are a number of studies examining the link between CSR performance of 
a firm and its financial performance. The rationale for this link is unclear at a 
theoretical level, leading to inconsistent empirical results. On a conceptual level, 
while some researchers theorize that being environmentally and socially 
responsible, albeit in a strategic manner, could enhance a firm’s 
competitiveness and lead to superior profits i.e., instrumental/strategic CSR 
(Porter and van der Linde, 1995; Porter and Kramer, 2006); others drawing 
upon the resource based view of the firm (Hart, 1995; Russo and Fouts, 1997), 
argue that firms having unique scarce resources such as superior managerial 
and financial resources i.e., higher profits could afford to be environmentally 
and socially responsible. At this point, it is worth mentioning the slack resource 
theory. Slack resource theorists argue that better financial performance 
potentially results in the availability of slack (financial and other) resources 
which could provide the opportunity for firms to invest in socially responsible 
activities such as environment, community relations and employee relations. In 
other words, if slack resources were available, better social performance would 
result from the allocation of these resources into the social activities. McGuire et 
al. (1988) provide some empirical evidence of slack resources theory, and find 
that a firm's prior performance (both stock-market returns and accounting-based 
measures) is more closely related to corporate social performance than is 
subsequent performance. Furthermore, Hammond and Slocum Jr. (1996) state 
that slack resources such as excess profits provide opportunities for a firm to 
invest in more socially responsible behaviours that satisfy stakeholder 
expectation. Those firms without slack resources are at an economic 
disadvantage and have fewer resources available to invest in social 
responsibility related activities. Thus better financial performance could be a 
predictor of better environmental and social performance. 
Depending upon the theoretical stance adopted, empirical work has tested both 
of these theoretical propositions. However, it is not clear in the literature, 
whether CSR performance leads to better financial performance or the other 
way around (reviewed by Margolis and Walsh, 2001&2003). The potential 
causality remains unclear (as mentioned by Siegel and Vitaliano, 2007 and 
Siegel, 2009).   
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Makni et al. (2008) use simple Granger causal model to examine the causal 
relationship between corporate social performance and financial performance. 
Their empirical analyses are based on a sample of 179 publicly listed Canadian 
firms covering 2004 and 2005. Social performance data is collected from 
Canadian Social Investment Database, and financial performance is measured 
by using ROA, ROE and market returns. They find no significant relationship 
between the composite measure of CSP and corporate financial performance 
(except for market returns). However, using individual measures of CSP, they 
find a robust and significant negative impact of the environmental aspect of 
CSP on all financial performance measures. They state that from a short-term 
perspective, this is consistent with trade-off theory and negative synergy 
hypothesis. The trade-off hypothesis supposes a negative impact of CSP on FP, 
supports that socially responsible behaviour will net few economic benefits but 
its numerous costs will reduce profits and shareholder wealth.  The negative 
synergy hypothesis supposes that higher levels of CSP lead to decreased FP, 
which in turn limits the socially responsible investments. 
Callan and Thomas (2009) assume the relation to run from corporate social 
performance to financial performance. Drawing upon the collective consensus 
of a number of previous studies, as reviewed by Margolis and Walsh (2001), 
they argue for and find a positive relation between corporate social performance 
and corporate financial performance. However, their sample being cross-
sectional does not allow for causality testing.  
Nelling and Webb (2009) adopt Granger causality models to examine the 
relation between CSR performance and financial performance using KLD data. 
Their findings suggest that strong stock market performance leads to greater 
firm investment in aspects of CSR programme related to employee relation, but 
social responsibility activities do not affect financial performance.  
Emerging evidence presented in recent studies (e.g., Clarkson et al., 2011 and 
Arora and Dharwadkar, 2011) suggests that more profitable firms (i.e., those 
having sufficient financial resources/slacks) are more likely to engage in CSR 
activities. Clarkson et al. (2011) adopt the resource based view of the firm 
theory and find that positive changes in firms’ financial resources in the prior 
periods lead to significant improvements in firms’ relative environmental 
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performance in the subsequent periods. Furthermore, they find that significant 
improvements in environmental performance in prior periods can lead to 
improvements in financial performance (ROA) in the subsequent years after 
controlling for the influence of Granger causality. The result of 3SLS test shows 
that there is endogeneity between environmental performance and financial 
performance (Q ratio). 
To sum up, while some prior work (including Callan and Thomas, 2009) 
assumes the causality to run from corporate social performance to corporate 
financial performance, other studies find mixed results. Furthermore, while the 
causality between ESP and CFP has been tested, the corresponding analysis 
for ESD and CFP is lacking. In this regard, Brammer and Pavelin (2008) 
suggest that future research should investigate the causality between ESD and 
CFP. Accordingly, the causality between ESD and CFP will be studied in 
Chapter 4.  
3.2.2 Research on the link between ESP and ESD 
Another stream of literature examines the relationship between ESP and ESD. 
Environmental and social disclosures can be a means of communicating and 
offering accountability to the various stakeholders about how a firm has 
addressed its environmental and social responsibility. Debate on whether these 
disclosures do indeed reflect a firm’s actual environmental and social 
performance or whether they are just an attempt at green washing, has also 
been on-going in the literature. While there is a body of theoretical and empirical 
work on this topic which suggests that disclosures have been largely an attempt 
at green washing, driven by a response to public and policy pressure and aimed 
at legitimizing a firm’s operations (e.g., Patten, 1991, 2002a, 2002b; Cho and 
Patten, 2007); others have also argued and shown a positive link between a 
firm’s disclosures and its environmental performance (e.g., Al-Tuwaijri et al., 
2004; Clarkson et al., 2008, 2011). In the following two sections, I review the 
empirical evidence on the link between ESD and ESP based on the two 
competing theoretical arguments discussed in the preceding chapter.  
Empirical research based on legitimacy theory 
As reviewed in Chapter 2, Legitimacy theory implies a reactive or proactive 
approach of companies to provide voluntary ESD. On the one hand, firms can 
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voluntarily disclose any positive environmental and social information to inform 
stakeholders about their intentions to improve their environmental and social 
performance. On the other hand, when firms’ environmental and social activities 
threaten their legitimacy, they can provide extra environmental and social 
information to influence stakeholders’ perceptions about their negative 
performance without changing actual behaviour. Hence, firms can use 
disclosure as a legitimizing tool, implying a negative relationship between ESD 
and ESP. 
Patten (2002a) examines the relationship between environmental disclosure 
and environmental performance for a sample of 131 US companies. 
Environmental disclosure (dependent variable) is based on firms’ annual reports 
in 1990 (i.e., content analysis of 8 indicators and also report line counts). 
Environmental performance is measured as the ratio of a firm’s specific amount 
of toxics released to revenue (both data are for the year 1988). After controlling 
for firm size and industry classification, Patten finds a negative and significant 
link between environmental disclosure and environmental performance. 
However, Patten also finds that the disclosure level of firms from non-
environmentally sensitive industries is more affected by toxic release levels than 
is the disclosure of firms from environmentally sensitive industries.  
Contrary to Patten’s finding, Campbell (2003) selects 10 firms (out of the FTSE 
100 companies) from 5 different industries between 1974 and 2000, and 
examines the intra- and inter-sectional effects on environmental disclosure 
drawing on legitimacy theory. The findings show that firms that are more 
environmentally sensitive tend to disclose more environmental information in 
their corporate reports than firms that are less environmentally sensitive. 
Furthermore, the findings indicate that firms within sectors broadly agree on the 
approximate level and direction (increase, decrease or no change) of 
environmental disclosure, but agreement is rarely resolved at the year-to-year 
level. Campbell’s study has provided limited evidence of legitimacy theory 
related arguments to environmental disclosure. However, small sample size and 
limited industry groups are key limitations of this study.  
Cho and Patten (2007) criticised previous studies for not controlling for firm size 
and industry classification. They use size-matched groups based on industry 
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membership (environmentally sensitive versus non-environmentally sensitive) 
and environmental performance (worse performers versus better performers) to 
test for differences in the use of monetary and non-monetary non-litigation 
related environmental disclosure. Environmental performance is based on KLD 
2002 environmental concern ratings (firms with no environmental concern are 
labelled as better environmental performers). Similar to Patten (2002a), 
environmental disclosure is based on 2001 10-K report for each firm (content 
analysis of 8 indicators with two sub-components: monetary and non-monetary 
indicators). Their findings reveal a significant and negative relationship between 
voluntary environmental disclosure and environmental performance, which is 
consistent with legitimacy-based theory (i.e., use disclosure as a legitimizing 
tool).  
Empirical research based on economics voluntary disclosure theory 
Economics based voluntary disclosure theory indicates that firms should be 
willing to provide voluntary ESD (particularly hard and objective information) for 
investors to differentiate their firm types. In other words, good firms should be 
willing to provide more ESD (that is costly), which is difficult for poor firms to 
mimic.  
As reviewed earlier, Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2004) examine the relations among 
environmental disclosure, environmental performance and economic 
performance. After controlling for endogeneity, they find a positive and 
significant link between environmental performance and environmental 
disclosure (dependent variable).   
Clarkson et al. (2008) draw on both economics based voluntary disclosure 
theory and socio-political theories and investigate the relation between firms’ 
environmental performance and environmental disclosure to see which theory is 
supported. Environmental disclosure data is collected from firms’ sustainability 
reports or websites. A refined disclosure index is developed based on GRI 
guidelines published in 2002. They focus on purely discretionary disclosure (i.e., 
data is collected from voluntary disclosure sources such as sustainability 
reports or websites), which is helpful in analysing the propensity and quality of 
voluntary disclosure. Environmental performance is measured by the total toxic 
waste that is treated, recycled or processed as a percentage of the total toxic 
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waste generated by each firm (% recycled), as well as the ratio of TRI to firm 
sales. Using a sample of 191 firms from the five most polluting industries in the 
US, Clarkson et al. (2008) find a positive association between environmental 
performance and the level of discretionary environmental disclosures. Overall, 
their findings support economics based voluntary disclosure theory, but with 
little support for socio-political theories. In other words, they find that firms with 
better environmental performance tend to disclose more ‘hard and objective’ 
voluntary environmental information, which is difficult for poor environmental 
performance firms to mimic (i.e., disclosures differentiate firm types).  
In addition, by using 3SLS regression analysis, Clarkson et al. (2011) find a 
two-way relation between environmental disclosure and environmental 
performance. In other words, firms with more environmental disclosure tend to 
be better environmental performers, and better environmental performers tend 
to disclose more environmental information.  
These latest findings are in line with recent suggestions in the literature that 
society’s views about corporate accountabilities have changed with concomitant 
changes in corporate disclosure policies (Deegan, 2004). Recently, Jones and 
Solomon (2010) find some empirical evidence from interviews with CSR 
representatives from 20 UK listed companies on whether they consider social 
and environmental reporting assurance (SERA) to be necessary, which is the 
first research into the SERA that adopts an interview method. They find that half 
of the respondents believe external SERA would enhance credibility and trust, 
while the other half believed that external SERA was not necessary but internal 
assurance was sufficient. They find the reason is that the respondents saw 
SERA as predominantly a managerial tool for checking the efficiency of internal 
management control systems, rather than as a mechanism for enhancing 
corporate accountability to stakeholders and building credibility and trust. 
However, they suggest that perhaps SERA should act as a means of furthering 
the dialogic relationship between companies and their stakeholders. 
Furthermore, if the SERA function involves stakeholders in verifying companies’ 
environmental and social responsibility, then a closer and more accountable 
relationship will be nurtured through SERA.   
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To sum up, mixed results have been found in previous literature examining the 
link between voluntary environmental disclosure and environmental 
performance (e.g., Patten, 2002a; Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Cho and Patten, 2007; 
Clarkson et al., 2008). Chapter 5 will further test this link, namely the 
relationship between environmental disclosure and a firm’s carbon eco-
efficiency, the latter used as a measure of environmental performance. In 
addition, a test between social disclosure and social performance as measured 
by employee productivity will also be carried out.  
As indicated by prior studies, the availability of environmental or social 
disclosure data is a key constraint in disclosure literature, which has resulted in 
a smaller sample size or sample selection bias in prior studies. For example, 
when disclosure data is collected by hand, only large firms are included such as 
FTSE 100 (Henriques, 2010), or heavy polluting industries are selected such as 
oil & gas, utilities and chemicals industries (Clarkson et al., 2008), or even 
smaller sample of firms are included such as two firms from five industrial 
sectors (Campbell, 2003). Furthermore, Brammer and Pavelin (2008) also 
suggest that “Our study, in common with much of the empirical work in the area 
conducted in the UK, would benefit from improved availability of data, 
particularly regarding corporate environmental performance” (p.134). Brammer 
and Pavelin (2008) choose the ratio of aggregated level of fines incurred for 
environmental transgressions over 4 years’ period to firms’ total assets as 
environmental performance measurement. However, Clarkson et al. (2008) 
argue that the proxies for environmental performance are more appropriate, as 
they are the actual pollution discharge data published by local Environmental 
Protection Agency. In chapter 5, I adopt similar environmental performance 
measurement as Clarkson et al.’s (2008) (i.e., the ratio of carbon emission to 
total sales). Social performance is captured by employee productivity (based on 
the theoretical arguments of Siegel, 2009). From an economic/strategic 
perspective on green management practices, Siegel (2009) argues that firms 
can use environmental and social related tactics to achieve their strategic goals 
such as increase of employee productivity and share price. One such tactic 
could be the use of social disclosures to improve employee morale and 
productivity. Hence, I test the link between social disclosures and employee 
productivity.  
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3.2.3 Research on the link between ESD and CFP  
From an economics perspective, producing high quality objective disclosures 
entail costs (Brammer and Pavelin, 2008; Buhr, 2002; Li and McConomy, 1999). 
However, in line with the predictions of the voluntary disclosure theory 
(Verrecchia, 1983), recent research shows that they also entail benefits 
particularly in the form of reducing the information asymmetry between the firm 
and its investors (Cormier et al., 2011). To date however, research has failed to 
establish a clear link between a firm’s environmental and social disclosures and 
various measures of its financial performance. In Chapter 4 and 5, I will re-
investigate this link.  
The measurement of corporate environmental and social disclosures is 
important when examining the relation between ESD and CFP. Since 
environmental and social disclosures are voluntary, there is no unifying format 
of reporting. Index approach is a common method used to codify ESD, 
especially for environmental disclosure measurement (e.g., Wiseman, 1982; 
Patten, 2002a; Clarkson et al., 2008; Cormier et al., 2011). There are 
arguments about the choices of disclosure indicators and scoring bias. However, 
focusing on the quality of firms’ voluntary disclosures, this seems to be an 
appropriate method. For example, Clarkson et al. (2008) use GRI guidelines 
and develop a comprehensive environmental disclosure index which enables 
them to examine disclosure quality (i.e., disclosure of individual indicator). Gray 
et al. (1995) use an index approach and construct a research database 
including social and environmental information provided by UK firms covering 
21 years (1979-1999). Due to time and labour constraints, their data is only 
available up to year 1999. As mentioned in the previous chapter, in this study, a 
more recent database namely Bloomberg disclosure scores is used for 
measuring corporate environmental and social disclosures. In the following 
section, prior studies regarding the ESD-CFP link (both with operating 
profitability and market measures of performance) are reviewed in chronological 
order.  
ESD and operating profitability  
Exploring the determinants of a firm’s environmental disclosures, a number of 
studies have examined the link between a firm’s environmental disclosures and 
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its profitability (e.g., Freedman and Jaggi, 1988; Patten, 1991; Brammer and 
Pavelin, 2008) with overall inconclusive results. 
Freedman and Jaggi (1988) examine the relationship between pollution 
disclosure and economic performance for four highly polluting industries. 
Economic performance is measured by using six profitability measures 
including ROA, ROE and other operating performances. A pollution disclosure 
index is developed to measure the extensiveness of disclosures. No significant 
relation is found regarding this link for full sample of companies. However, when 
the sample is segmented by industry group, they find a significant and positive 
correlation between pollution disclosure and operating performance for oil 
industry. Furthermore, they also find that large firms with poor operating 
performance provide more pollution information. For smaller firms, no 
association between the two variables is found.  
Patten (1991) investigates whether the voluntary social disclosures included by 
companies in their annual reports are related to either public pressure or firm 
profitability. The sample consists of 128 Fortune 500 listed companies from 
eight industries in 1985. Social disclosure (dependent variable) is based on 
firms’ annual reports in 1985. Public pressure is captured by firm size and 
industry classification. Profitability is measured by using ROA, ROE, five year 
average ROE, one year lagged ROA, and a dummy variable indicating firms 
reporting a decrease in net income from the previous period. Patten finds that 
firm size and industry classification (public pressure variables) are significant 
explanatory variables of voluntary social disclosures. However, profitability 
variables are not significantly linked with social disclosures.   
Recently, Brammer and Pavelin (2008) investigate the influences of different 
factors on the quality of firms’ environmental disclosure for a sample of 447 UK 
companies, including the relationship between environmental performance and 
environmental disclosure. Disclosure data is collected from the PIRC 
Environmental Reporting 2000 survey. Environmental performance is measured 
as the ratio of aggregated level of fines incurred for environmental 
transgressions over 4 years’ period to firms’ total assets. They find a firm’s 
record of environmental fines has no significant effect on its propensity to 
disclose an environmental policy, but it does exert a significant positive effect on 
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the likelihood that a firm will disclose improvements, targets and environmental 
audit information. In other words, poor performers tend to disclose more 
environmental information related to their environmental improvements, targets 
and audit. They also find firm size is positively and significantly linked with all 
components of environmental disclosure, and media exposure is positively and 
significantly associated with some aspects of environmental disclosure. No 
significant relation is found with respect to other factors such as leverage or 
firms’ profitability. While Brammer and Pavelin (2008) include various control 
variables and lagged variables to avoid endogeneity problem, they recommend 
that future studies should use longitudinal data and examine the causality 
between these variables particularly profitability and disclosures. In Chapter 4, I 
will first examine the association between ESD and operating profitability and 
then examine potential causality between ESD and operating profitability.  
ESD and market based financial performance 
From a capital market’s perspective, public disclosures of how a firm addresses 
its environmental and social challenges can have significant financial 
implications. To the extent that these disclosures reveal a firm’s current 
environmental and social performance as well as its future potential, investors 
can gauge how well the firm is currently managing its environmental and social 
risks, and how well it is equipped to tackle these in the future. Hence, investors 
can value the firm accordingly. Scholars have examined the link between ESD 
and measures of market performance using different methodologies. 
One group of studies uses event study methodology to assess financial impact, 
when firms engage in either socially responsible or irresponsible acts and 
provide relevant information. For example, Shane and Spicer (1983) study the 
stock market reaction to the negative environmental publicity received by firms 
which feature in the Council of Economic Priorities (CEP) reports in the US. 
Consistent with their expectations, they find a negative abnormal return for 
these firms on day t-1 and t-2 of the event date t. Moreover, Lorraine et al. 
(2004) examine whether publicity (either good or bad) about environmental 
performance (i.e., fines for environmental pollution and commendations about 
good environmental achievements) affects companies’ share prices for a 
sample of 32 events in the UK. They find that while the market ignores good 
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news, it does react to news about fines particularly to relatively high fines, for up 
to one week post release of the news. In addition, Freedman and Patten (2004) 
examine the reaction of the market to revisions in the Clean Air Act in 1989 in 
US, and find that companies which disclosed higher levels of size-adjusted toxic 
releases into the air suffered more negative market reactions than companies 
with better performance. However, they also find that this effect is mitigated for 
firms which made larger financial report environmental disclosures (i.e., this 
negative impact is reduced for firms which make higher and detailed 
environmental disclosures in their annual reports). 
Murray et al. (2006) carry out a longitudinal study using an environment and 
social disclosure database (covering 1988-1997) provided by CSEAR to 
investigate the relationship(s) between environmental and social disclosures 
and UK largest firms’ financial performance. They find no direct relationship 
between share returns and environmental and social disclosures. However, 
they reveal a convincing relationship between consistently high returns and the 
predilection to high disclosure. There is some empirical evidence showing that 
firms with higher environmental (social) disclosures tend to have lower analysts’ 
forecast dispersion. Aerts et al. (2008) investigate the information dynamics 
between corporate environmental disclosure (both print-based and web-based 
information), financial markets (as proxied by financial analysts' earnings 
forecasts) and public pressures (as proxied by a firm's media exposure). The 
sample consists of companies from continental Europe and North America. 
Using 3SLS regression analysis (i.e., controlling for endogeneity), they find that 
enhanced environmental disclosure can lead to more precise earnings forecasts 
by analysts, suggesting that such disclosures reduce the information asymmetry 
between the firm and the stock market participants. Such effect is reduced for 
companies with extensive analyst following and in environmentally sensitive 
industries. Moreover, these relationships are shown to be starker in Europe 
than in North America. They find most observed relationships hold for either 
print- or web-based disclosure, except for North America in which web-based 
disclosure seems to have no influence on analysts' forecasting work. 
Ducassy and Jeannicot (2008) examine how CSR information affects investor’s 
behaviour using an event study approach. They find a significant market 
response to the publication of social reporting rankings generated by the CFIE 
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(Centre Français d'Information des Entreprises). The most significant impact is 
observed not for high-ranking firms, but for those having risen or regressed the 
most in rank since the prior year. Their findings indicate the importance that 
investors attribute to firms’ CSR dynamics. Furthermore, Becchetti et al. (2009) 
use a sample of 278 US firms from the Domini 400 Social Index between 1990 
and 2004. The results show that the impact of social responsibility-related 
information (e.g., additions and deletions from the Domini Index) has risen over 
time. The abnormal returns around the event data are significantly negative in 
case of exit from the Domini Index. The result is robust to the adoption of 
different (non)parametric methods – after considering stock market seasonality, 
changes in the estimation window or the event window, changes in the model 
used for estimating abnormal returns (i.e., market model and CAPM multi-factor 
model), and after controlling for financial distress shocks. 
Clarkson et al. (2010) examine the impact of voluntary environmental disclosure 
on cost of equity and firm value, controlling for firms’ environmental 
performance. Using a sample of firms from five most polluting industries in the 
US, they find voluntary environmental disclosure is incrementally informative for 
investors and show a negative association between TRI emission6 and firms’ 
valuation. However, the relation between firms’ cost of equity capital and 
voluntary environmental disclosure is not significant. They run robustness tests 
and suggest that voluntary environmental disclosure plays an important role in 
predicting expected future cash flows (profitability) but not for assessing the 
riskiness of these cash flows i.e., the cost of equity capital. Furthermore, 
Clarkson et al. (2011) use 3SLS regression analysis and find a positive and 
significant association between environmental disclosure (dependent variable) 
and economic performance (equivalent to Q ratio). However, they do not give a 
clear theoretical rationale for why environmental disclosures should be affected 
by the market value of the firm rather than the other way round.  
Dhaliwal et al. (2011) investigate the relationship between corporate social 
reporting and cost of equity capital. They find that firms with higher cost of 
equity capital in prior year tend to initiate disclosure of social responsibility 
activities in the current year, and the initiating firms with superior social 
responsibility performance have lower cost of equity capital in the subsequent 
                                                          
6
 Toxic emissions data, the higher TRI indicates worse environmental performance. 
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year. They also find some evidence that firms initiating social responsibility 
disclosure with superior social performance attract dedicated institutional 
investors and analyst coverage. 
Studies discussed above suggest that environmental disclosures do have 
capital market implications, however not only are the results of various studies 
mixed but are biased towards a negative reaction to adverse environmental 
disclosures. These results are quite contrary to the expectations that higher and 
more objective factual disclosures should help reduce the information 
asymmetry between a firm and its investors. The first study to offer some 
evidence consistent with this argument is by Cormier et al. (2011). Specifically, 
Cormier et al. (2011) investigate whether social disclosure and environmental 
disclosure reduce information asymmetry between managers and stock market 
participants, and if so, are they complement or substitutes in reducing this 
asymmetry. The measurement of social and environmental disclosure is based 
upon a coding instrument that makes some explicit assumptions about the 
value and relevance of information (39 indicators divided into six categories). 
Information asymmetry is captured by share price volatility and bid-ask spread. 
Their findings suggest that social disclosure and environmental disclosure 
reduce the information asymmetry and act as substitutes. They suggest that 
future research should distinguish between social and environmental 
disclosures. In this thesis, I extend Cormier et al.’s (2011) work by analysing the 
impact of environmental and social disclosures on firm market value, arguing 
that if such disclosures do reduce information asymmetry then they should have 
a positive link with firm market value. Moreover, in line with Cormier et al.’s 
(2011) suggestions, I analyse the impact of environmental and social 
disclosures separately on firm value.  
In the following section, relevant studies investigating the relationship between 
environmental and social responsibility and corporate governance will be 
reviewed. This review sets the context for the analysis of Chapter 6, which 
examines the link between board attributes, board CSR strategy and corporate 
environmental and social performance. 
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3.3 Environmental and social responsibility and corporate 
governance 
Orlitzky et al. (2011) provide a review of recent theoretical and empirical 
evidence on strategic implications of CSR, including the link between leadership 
and CSR, and the association between CSR and economic/financial 
performance. They suggest that strategic leadership should be incorporated into 
CSR research. They review three theoretical approaches to strategic corporate 
social responsibility, namely cost-benefit analysis, transaction cost economics 
and recourse-based view of the firm, and posit that voluntary CSR actions can 
enhance a firm’s competitiveness and reputation. Hence, the end result of CSR 
activities should be an improvement in financial and economic performance. 
Based on an overview of recent empirical evidence, they conclude that 
economic theories of strategic CSR have the greatest potential for advancing 
CSR studies. In the following paragraphs, first, the link between corporate 
governance (CG) and CSR is introduced. In this context, strategic CSR is 
further explored; particularly the roles of boards of directors in leading firms’ 
CSR strategy and performance are reviewed. Finally, the association between 
firms’ CSR strategy and their environmental and social performance is 
discussed.    
Link between CG and CSR  
With the widening remit of corporate governance to include corporate 
responsibilities towards not only the shareholders but also other stakeholders of 
the firm (Aguilera et al., 2007; [UK] Companies Act, 2006; Jensen, 2010; UK 
Corporate Governance Code, 2010), a few studies in recent years have 
examined the link between various governance mechanisms and corporate 
social responsibility.  
A notable study by Jamali et al. (2008) examines the link between corporate 
governance (CG) and corporate social responsibility, using in-depth interviews 
with top managers from eight companies in Lebanon. They develop three sets 
of interview questions based on prior literature review: 1) about corporate 
governance, 2) about corporate social responsibility, and 3) about the 
conception of CG-CSR relationship. From broader conception of corporate 
governance, Jamali et al. (2008) find that there is a clear overlap between CG 
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and stakeholder conception of CSR. Both CG and CSR call on companies to 
assume their fiduciary and moral responsibilities towards stakeholders. They 
also find that there is a two-way relationship (i.e., CG and CSR should not be 
considered and sustained independently). CG is not entirely effective without a 
sustainable CSR drive, because a company has to meet various stakeholders’ 
needs in order to create value for its shareholders. Furthermore, they find that 
good CG is increasingly considered as a necessary and foundational pillar for a 
genuine and sustainable CSR orientation.  
Recently, Jo and Harjoto (2012) investigate the causal effect of corporate 
governance on corporate social responsibility, using a large sample of US 
companies during the period from 1993 to 2004.  They propose two hypotheses, 
namely the overinvestment hypothesis based on agency theory and the conflict 
resolution hypothesis based on stakeholder theory. Jo and Harjoto (2012) use 
KLD data to measure CSR and IRRC governance data to measure CG 
including insider blockholder ownership, board independence, outside 
institutional ownership, and the number of analyst following a firm. Using both 
Heckman (1979) two-stage estimation procedure and instrumental regression 
methods, they find that while the lag of CSR does not affect CG variables, the 
lag of CG variables positively affects firms’ CSR engagement, after controlling 
for various firm characteristics. This finding suggests that direction of causality 
is likely to run from CG to CSR rather than the other way round. Furthermore, 
after correcting for endogeneity bias, they find that CSR engagement is 
positively linked with CFP, which supports the conflict resolution hypothesis 
based on stakeholder theory rather than the CSR overinvestment hypothesis. 
Overall, their findings suggest that good governance leads to positive CSR 
which is also beneficial for a firm’s long run economic sustainability. In the 
following section, I review in greater detail the literature on the role of one 
specific governance mechanism, that is the board and its link with corporate 
social performance. 
3.3.1 Board attributes and firms’ environmental and social performance 
Studies examining the link between various board attributes and corporate 
social performance have generally drawn upon management and corporate 
governance literature, particularly from the stakeholder and legitimacy 
perspective (Webb, 2004; Aguilera et al., 2006) and the resource dependency 
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perspective (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Hillman et al., 2000) respectively. From 
legitimacy perspective, the reputation of company’s directors in the community 
and among stakeholders enables the company to carry on its business and 
actions, mobilise external support and resources, and enhance organisational 
legitimacy (Provan, 1980; Deephouse, 2000).  
Based on resource dependence theory, boards can be a solution to external 
CSR challenges. Hence, by establishing external ties with stakeholders and the 
wider society, directors are able to attract and retain precious resources to 
enhance the organisational legitimacy (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). According to 
Hillman et al. (2000), most research on corporate directors has focused on two 
roles: agency and resource dependence. From the agency theory perspective, 
the board of directors, particularly the outside directors on the board, can be 
seen as the monitors with the role to oversee that the company is run effectively 
to achieve long term financial success. From the resource dependency 
perspective, the board of directors can be seen to itself provide, as well as help 
a firm secure access to critical resources that enable it to meet external 
challenges including the environmental and social challenges. Using a sample 
of US airline firms, Hillman et al. (2000) examine the resource dependence role 
of directors. That is, examine how board composition changes with the 
changing resource dependence needs of the firm. They find that board’s 
function as a link to external environment is an important one, and firms 
respond to significant changes in their external environment by changing board 
composition. 
Johnson and Greening (1999) investigate the effects of corporate governance 
captured by the number of outside directors on a company’s board and the 
institutional ownership types on two dimensions of corporate social performance; 
namely, people dimension (women and minorities, community and employee 
relations) and product quality dimension (product and environment). Johnson 
and Greening argue that because outside directors are hired to act as control 
experts and to help manage external constituencies, they are likely to act in the 
best long-term interests of shareholders by encouraging the development of 
quality products and by helping a company to maintain a positive environmental 
reputation. Indeed, they find evidence that outside director representation is 
positively linked with both people and product dimensions of CSR. Furthermore, 
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they also find various types of institutional ownership have different effects on 
corporate social performance. For example, top management equity is only 
positively linked with the product quality dimension of CSP. They suggest future 
research should use disaggregated measure of CSP, as the influences of 
governance mechanisms on each CSP dimension may be different. Thus 
environmental and social responsibility is divided into two separate dimensions 
of CSR in this thesis. 
Webb (2004) investigates the structure of the board of directors at socially 
responsible firms. Using two-sample paired t-test and regression analyses, she 
finds a few (out of 16) board structure characteristics are significant at socially 
responsible firms compared to a matched sample. Particularly, the percentage 
of outside directors, women on the board and board size are significantly 
different between social responsible and non-responsible firms. Webb (2004) 
also finds that socially responsible boards are more likely to have a CEO who is 
not also the chairman of the board.  
Mallin and Michelon (2011) investigate the relationship between board attributes 
and corporate social performance using a sample of 100 US companies listed in 
the Business Ethics 100 Best Corporate Citizens from 2005-2007. Drawing 
upon the legitimacy and resource dependence theories, they argue that boards 
as providers of both human and relational capital enhance a firm’s reputation, 
by having relationships with external environment and by providing insightful 
advice to top management about stakeholders’ expectations. Using KLD data 
(to measure corporate social performance) and several governance-related 
variables, including board independence, board diversity (as measured by 
percentage of women on board), duality, presence of CSR committee, and 
number of directorships of non-executive directors (as measure of their 
community influence), they find a positive link between a number of board 
variables including board independence, board diversity and corporate social 
performance. Furthermore, they also find negative effects of CEO duality and 
the number of directorship of community influentials on CSP. 
More recently, Post et al. (2011) investigate the link between boards of directors’ 
composition and environmental corporate social responsibility. Using disclosed 
company data and the natural environmental ratings data from KLD for 78 
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Fortune 1000 companies, they find that firms with higher proportion of outside 
board directors and with boards composed of three or more female directors 
tend to have higher KLD strengths scores. That is, firms with more independent 
and diverse board members tend to have better environmental performance. 
While prior studies on board attributes and measures of corporate social 
performance have found rather consistent results with respect to some board 
attributes particularly the presence of independent directors and women on the 
board, these studies are constrained by sample size (e.g., Webb, 2004) as well 
as selection (e.g., Mallin and Michelon, 2011). Also most prior studies ignore 
the issue of endogeneity between the board attributes-firm performance link 
(Adams et al., 2010) which is likely to constrain the interpretation of such 
studies. In chapter 6, using a much larger and diverse sample of firms, the link 
between a wide array of board attributes and firms’ environmental and social 
performance is tested while controlling for the potential endogeneity of this link.  
3.3.2 Board role in leading CSR strategy 
The way boards are structured is vital to addressing strategic issues, 
developing policies and ultimately governing firms (Galbreath, 2010). 
Developing and implementing the appropriate vision and strategy of firms, 
including their environmental and social strategy, is the function of corporate 
board (Ho, 2005; Mackenzie, 2007). As also stated by the Combined Code 
(2003) on Corporate Governance (s 172), directors should consider both 
shareholders and other stakeholders to meet their expectations. Goodstein and 
Boeker (1991) propose that boards of directors may directly and indirectly affect 
strategic decisions on a firm’s products and services. One common 
denominator is an emerging view that a board's failure to address important 
CSR concerns may increase a firm's financial and reputational risk. Recognizing 
the role of the board in setting the strategic vision and direction of the company, 
including in terms of addressing wider stakeholder expectations, a few studies 
recently have started exploring both on a theoretical as well as empirical level, 
the remit of corporate governance in terms of corporate social responsibility. 
Ho (2005) examines the link between corporate governance and corporate 
competitiveness. Using a holistic approach, Ho finds the more a firm conforms 
to good corporate governance, the stronger is the firm’s competitiveness. 
91 
 
Corporate competitiveness is captured by 18 financial indicators such as sales 
per employee, ROA and market capitalization etc. Corporate governance is 
captured by using a questionnaire of 116 indicators on a 7-point Likert scale 
(that is board structure, stewardship, strategic leadership, capital concentration, 
managing capital market pressure, discharging social responsibilities, and all 
factors). Data is collected from top executives of international companies (about 
their conformance to good corporate governance practices and their 
perceptions of the competitive conditions of the companies). Ho argues 
corporate governance attributes are inter-related. Based on the results of 
correlation analysis, Ho presents the inter-relationships among governance 
variables related to board structure, strategic leadership and corporate social 
responsibility: 1) there is a positive and significant relation between board 
structure and strategic leadership; 2) a positive and significant link between 
board structure and discharging social responsibilities; and 3) a positive and 
significant association between strategic leadership and discharge social 
responsibilities. It is worth noting that Ho assumes that social responsibility is 
part of corporate governance.  
Mackenzie (2007) draws on the economic literature i.e. market failure (e.g., 
information asymmetry, absence of competition and costs of a transaction are 
external to the company) and internal incentives structure (e.g., board’s failure 
to address/change his performance objectives) to analyse the primary causes of 
CSR breaches. Mackenzie posits company boards are key participants in 
ensuring firms meet CSR standards. By collecting survey data of board practice 
(including roundtable discussions by board directors, interviews with board 
directors, company secretaries and CSR managers, and observations of actual 
board meetings) from 20 large UK FTSE 100 listed companies, Mackenzie finds 
that company boards could ensure compliance with CSR standards by 
addressing incentive problems from market failure and their own 
incentives/performance management systems, especially the roles that CSR 
committees play in the process. Mackenzie suggests that boards should re-
orientate their activities in terms of establishing board policies supporting 
government action on relevant CSR issues and overseeing implementation of 
these policies. For example, Mackenzie (2007) finds some boards have started 
to balance financial incentives with incentives to support responsible behaviour, 
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e.g., introducing occupational health and safety targets into executive incentives 
or adopting a more systematic balanced scorecard approach to executive 
remuneration, which indicate a significant shift in focus away from short-term 
financial goals to long-term value creation. “After all, the central point of the 
economics arguments about market failure is that exploiting market failure is a 
strategic opportunity for business. So a board discussion motivated solely by 
strategic considerations may very well lead a company to exploit market failures 
and resist regulatory interventions, rather than to exercise self-restraint” 
(Mackenzie, 2007, p.941). Hence, Mackenzie’s (2007) findings suggest that 
firms’ boards play an important role in directing their CSR vision and strategy. 
Galbreath (2010) uses a cross-country Ceres (Coalition for Environmentally 
Responsible Economies) data on 100 firms (76 US and 24 non-US), and 
examines the relation between board structure variables and a company’s 
proactive strategic posture in terms of corporate governance practices towards 
addressing the challenge of climate change. Board variables in his analysis 
include board size, CEO duality, director age, gender proportion, and outsider 
representation. Governance practices addressing climate change cover five 
aspects: 1) board oversight (i.e., whether a board committee has explicit 
oversight responsibility for environmental affairs); 2) management execution 
(i.e., whether executive officers’ compensation is linked to attainment of 
environmental goals and Green House Gas (GHG) targets); 3) public disclosure 
(i.e., whether securities filings identify material risks and opportunities posed by 
climate change, and whether sustainability report offers comprehensive, 
transparent presentation of company response measures); 4) emission 
accounting (i.e., whether company has third party verification process for GHG 
emission data); and 5) strategic planning (i.e., whether company pursues 
business strategies to reduce GHG emissions, minimize exposure to regulatory 
and physical risks, and maximize opportunities from changing market forces 
and emerging controls). Galbreath finds evidence that some board variables 
including board size and independent board chair are associated with firms 
having better governance practices related to climate change. Given the limited 
sample size and the exploratory nature of his study, he suggests future 
research should explore further the relationships between corporate 
governance practices, climate change, institutional environments and board 
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structure, particularly in industries other than energy, manufacturing and 
transport.  
Focussing on the board’s strategic role in addressing the challenges of climate 
change in the electric utilities industry in US, Ortiz-de-Mandojana et al. (2012) 
examine how director interlocks affect a firm’s ability to adopt a proactive 
environmental strategy, using a sample of 90 US electric utilities companies in 
2005. Proactive environmental strategy is defined as the decision to make 
voluntary investments in renewable systems of energy generation. Director 
interlocks variable is captured by the number of interlocking ties with other 
companies. Consistent with the resource dependency argument, Ortiz-de-
Mandojana et al. (2012) find that director interlocks with firms providing green 
equipment and business knowledge-intensive services are positively linked with 
the possibility to adopt a proactive environmental strategy; while director 
interlocks with suppliers of financial resources and fossil fuels tend to 
discourage adoption of a proactive environmental strategy. Furthermore, Ortiz-
de-Mandojana et al. call for a more in-depth analysis of the influences of board 
characteristics (e.g., board size, professional and educational backgrounds of 
individual directors) on a firm’s sustainable strategy. 
To sum up, research suggests that boards of directors can play an important 
role in leading CSR strategy. The ability of a company’s boards to foresee the 
impact of climate change/social responsibility on its business reflects its ability 
to understand its business activities in the light of longer-term and systematic 
risks. Firms that are able to make short-term decisions in the light of such a 
longer-term view are much more likely to be cognisant of the systematic risks 
that they face, and can be better prepared to face the challenges and 
unforeseen circumstances such as the financial crisis (Greenwald, 2009). There 
are some limitations of these prior studies. First, CSR strategy is not directly 
measured (Ho, 2005; Mackenzie, 2007). Even if it is measured, only one 
variable is used (e.g., Ortiz-de-Mandojana et al., 2012). Furthermore, prior 
research is constrained by cross-sectional study (Galbreath, 2010). In chapter 6, 
CSR strategy is directly measured by using a composite score of a number of 
relevant CSR variables. Furthermore, I conduct a longitudinal study to examine 
the influences of various board attributes on a firm’s multi-pronged CSR 
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strategies. Moreover, the sample covers a wide array of industries across 
several years making the analysis more representative of industries. 
3.3.3 CSR strategy and firms’ environmental and social performance 
In an attempt to explain the positive association between measures of a firm’s 
environmental performance and financial performance, some studies drawing 
upon the notion of CSR as a competitive strategy (cf: Porter and Kramer, 2006; 
Porter and Van der Linde, 1995) and adopting the resource based view of the 
firm (Hart, 1995; Rousso  and  Fouts, 1997) have posited that it is the superior 
environmental strategy and the unobserved managerial capability, unique 
resources and competitive advantage that a firm possesses which can enable it 
to achieve superior environmental and financial performance.  
Hart (1995) theorized that proactive investments in environmental strategies 
including pollution prevention and product stewardship could confer both 
environmental and economic benefits to firms, and emphasized the importance 
of communicating these environmental strategies to external stakeholders. Hart 
also states that for firms to sustain their competitive advantages in the field of 
environment, it is important to consistently build upon their internal human and 
organisational capabilities and resources, as these may otherwise erode over 
time as competitors catch up.  
Russo and Fouts (1997) empirically tested the predictions of RBV, and found a 
positive link between environmental performance and firm operating profitability. 
They assumed this link to be mediated by the unobserved superior 
environmental strategy which they conjectured to be based on unique 
combinations of intangible (such as human, reputation, technology), and 
tangible (such as financial reserves and physical equipment) assets. Russo and 
Fouts also stress the importance of nurturing and building resources through 
sustained actions for creating and maintaining a pro-environmental internal 
capabilities and external reputation.  
Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2004) argue that the reason for the positive link between a 
firm’s environmental and financial market performance is the unobservable 
managerial quality. In other words, they imply that better managers are able to 
design superior environmental strategies, which in turn lead to superior 
environmental performance and disclosures. Clarkson et al. (2011) also argue 
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that it is the superior managerial capability that can allow a firm to develop a 
proactive environmental strategy. They measure a firm’s proactive 
environmental strategy and its superior managerial capability by the firm’s 
investments in R&D, its sales growth and its enterprise value to assets (EV). So 
measured, they find a positive link between a firm’s proactive managerial 
environmental strategy and its environmental and economic performance.  
While both Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2004) and Clarkson et al. (2011) posit the 
environmental strategy to be responsible for superior environmental 
performance, neither study explicitly incorporates relevant CSR related board 
attributes. Furthermore, one important limitation of these studies is that they 
either assume the (unobserved) superior CSR strategy to drive CSR 
performance (as in the case of Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004) or use indirect measures 
to capture a firm’s strategic stance towards its CSR obligations. Given that 
developing the appropriate corporate strategy including CSR strategy is a 
function of the board (UK Code of Corporate Governance, 2010), both board 
attributes and CSR strategy may affect a firm’s environmental and social 
performance. 
3.3.4 Within-equilibrium or out-of-equilibrium phenomenon 
Figure 3.1 provides a brief summary of existing literature and the omissions in 
this literature about the link among board attributes, CSR strategy and 
corporate social performance. 
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Figure 3.1: Existing Literature (Two Main Streams) 
 
 
 
Stream 1: Resource Dependency Theory (RDT) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stream 2: Resource based view of the firm (RBV) 
It can be seen from Figure 3.1 that one stream drawing upon the corporate 
governance literature, particularly the resource dependency theory (RDT), has 
focused on studying the relation between board structure and composition, and 
corporate social performance (section 3.3.1). Of interest in this literature has 
been the link between various board attributes particularly director attributes 
and corporate social performance (e.g., Johnson and Greening, 1999; 
Galbreath, 2010 and Mallin and Michelon, 2011; Webb, 2004). However, as 
mentioned earlier the underlying assumption in these studies is that board 
attributes are exogenous. Also while some studies in this literature (covered in 
section 3.3.2) consider the role of the board in CSR strategy setting, the latter 
variable is not well defined (e.g., Mackenzie, 2007) nor is the link between 
board attributes and CSR strategy directly analysed.  
Another stream drawing upon the competitive strategy literature and adopting 
the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm (Hart, 1995; Rousso and Fouts, 
1997), suggests that firms possessing unique (CSR conducive) resources, both 
human and financial capital are able to develop superior CSR strategies that 
translate into superior, CSR-related performance. However, CSR strategy is 
considered as an omitted/unobserved variable in this literature (e.g., Al-Tuwaijri 
et al., 2004; Clarkson et al., 2011). Also while this literature acknowledges the 
role of management capability in determining firm CSR strategy (e.g., Al-
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Corporate Social 
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Management 
Capability 
Corporate Social 
Performance 
CSR Strategy 
(Omitted variable) 
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Tuwaijri et al., 2004 and Clarkson et al., 2011), it ignores the fact that 
developing and implementing the appropriate CSR vision and strategy of firms 
is the function of corporate board (Ho, 2005; Mackenzie, 2007).  
It is widely acknowledged within the corporate governance literature (e.g., 
Adams et al., 2010; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998, 
2003) that board of director characteristics and firm performance are 
endogenous outcomes. According to Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), the board 
of directors of a company is an endogenously determined institution, which 
implies that the choice of directors on a board would be a within-equilibrium 
phenomenon determined by the company’s own characteristics including its 
(CSR related) strategies and financial/non-financial performance (such as CSR 
performance). Figure 3.2 shows Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) theoretical 
model establishing the link between board of directors and firm performance.  
Figure 3.2 Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) theoretical model with respect to 
boards of directors: The joint-endogeneity problem plaguing work on boards of 
directors 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) 
As a within-equilibrium phenomenon, CSR performance may also affect board 
choices. Furthermore, Hillman et al. (2007) find that the presence of women on 
boards is consistent with resource dependence theory. They posit that large 
firms face legitimacy pressures, firms operating in industries that are heavily 
dependent on female employees, and firms with ties to companies with female 
board members are likely to have women directors on their board. Hence, they 
argue the composition of boards could mirror the environmental constraints 
faced by firms, and propose that firms can strategically select board members 
as a means to reduce uncertainty. Therefore, it can be argued that CSR 
performance may affect board attributes. Prior studies examining the link 
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98 
 
between board characteristics and CSR performance treating board attributes 
as exogenous may lead to misleading interpretation of findings. In Chapter 6, I 
adapt Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) theoretical model in the context of CSR 
study and test the links between board attributes, board CSR strategies and a 
firm’s environmental and social performance using structural equation modelling, 
which allows to control for the possible endogeneity of these links.  
3.4 Conclusions 
In this chapter, prior literature about environmental and social responsibility is 
reviewed. First, research about the link between environmental and social 
responsibility and firms’ financial performance is discussed. Although prior 
studies provide mixed results regarding this link, it is important to distinguish 
ESP and ESD. In Chapter 4 and 5, I will investigate the link between ESD and 
firms’ financial performance (both operating profitability and market 
performance). Furthermore, In Chapter 5, I will test the association between 
ESD and ESP.  
I also review in this chapter existing literature about the relation between 
environmental and social responsibility (including related strategy and 
performance) and corporate governance. In Chapter 6, I will examine the 
relationship between corporate governance (in particular board attributes and 
related CSR strategy) and ESP. In the next i.e., the first empirical chapter, the 
link between environmental and social disclosures and firm profitability will be 
examined. 
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Chapter 4: Environmental and social disclosures and firm 
profitability 
4.1 Introduction 
Environmental and social disclosures are a means through which a firm informs 
its stakeholders, particularly its investors, as to how it has addressed its 
environmental and social responsibility. Given the voluntary nature of these 
disclosures, research scholars approaching from the accounting and economics 
perspective have taken a keen interest in exploring the determinants and the 
consequences of such disclosures. From an economics perspective, producing 
high quality objective disclosures entail costs (Brammer and Pavelin, 2008; 
Buhr, 2002; Li and McConomy, 1999). However, in line with the predictions of 
the voluntary disclosure theory (Verrecchia, 1983), recent research shows that 
they also entail benefits particularly in the form of reducing the information 
asymmetry between the firm and its investors (Cormier et al., 2011). To date 
however, research has failed to establish a clear link between a firm’s 
environmental and social disclosures and its profitability and market value (will 
be examined in the next chapter) – a gap that this study attempts to fill.  
Exploring the determinants of a firm’s environmental disclosures, a number of 
studies have examined the link between a firm’s environmental disclosures and 
its financial performance including profitability (Brammer and Pavelin, 2006, 
2008; Clarkson et al., 2008; Cormier et al., 2011; Freedman and Jaggi, 1988; 
Patten, 1991). However, all find no link between environmental disclosures and 
various measures of a firm’s profitability. Discussing the limitations of their own 
work, and that of others, Brammer and Pavelin (2008) suggest that future work 
should use longitudinal data and try to resolve causality concerns. However, 
given the cross sectional nature of most prior studies, it has only been possible 
to establish correlation, but not causation. Recent studies have also either 
assumed the endogeneity of this link, especially with respect to measures of 
market performance of a firm and its environmental performance (e.g., Al-
Tuwaijri et al., 2004 and Clarkson et al., 2011), or even where explicitly tested 
(again with respect to market measure of performance), causation has not been 
established (see Nelling and Webb, 2009). One exception is the work of 
Clarkson et al. (2011) who do find evidence that improvements in financial 
resources precede improvements in environmental performance. However, to 
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the best of my knowledge, no prior study investigates the causality between 
profitability and ESD. In this chapter, I will address both issues. Using 
longitudinal data (2005-2009), first I establish the contemporaneous association 
between environmental and social disclosures and firm profitability, and then 
drawing upon Nelling and Webb’s (2009) application of Granger causality test I 
address the issue of causality between these variables.   
Accordingly, two research questions are explored in this chapter: (1) does firms’ 
operating performance affect their environmental and/or social disclosure? This 
question is addressed while controlling for other factors that might affect firms’ 
environmental and/or social disclosure. (2) If profitability is associated with 
higher and more comprehensive disclosures, which way does the causality run? 
This study makes a number of contributions to the prior literature on 
environmental and social disclosures and a firm’s financial performance. First, it 
uses a new, longitudinal data set, namely Bloomberg environmental and social 
disclosure scores, which provides a comprehensive measure of a firm’s 
environmental and social disclosures. These scores unlike the limited 
environmental measures used by some prior studies (e.g., Hart and Ahuja, 
1996, using emission reduction and Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004, using specific 
pollution measures) use a large array of ESG-related factors to develop a firm’s 
E, S, and G score. Next, using this data set, it tests and finds a clear positive 
link between different measures of a firm’s profitability and its environmental 
and social disclosures. Furthermore, given the longitudinal nature of the dataset, 
it is possible to directly test for causality between environment (E) and social (S) 
scores and firm operating profitability. The causality test suggests that the link 
runs from profitability to ES and S disclosures. In addition, given that the 
dataset covers a wide cross section of industries, the results are not limited in 
terms of applicability to specific industries (e.g., Clarkson et al., 2011) or only to 
firms meeting certain financial value-relevant criteria (e.g., Al-Tuwaijri et al., 
2004). 
4.2 Hypothesis development 
According to Lee and Hutchison (2005), there are three main types of factors 
that affect CSR disclosure: firm or industry factors (e.g., firm size, industry and 
financial ratios), societal factors (e.g., media exposure and stakeholder groups) 
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and individual factors (e.g., governance, attitudes and controls). Figure 4.1 
displays the factors affecting the decision to disclose environmental or social 
information. In this study, I use various firm/industry factors and societal factors 
(as used in prior literature) in determining the decision to disclosure 
environmental and social information. 
Figure 4.1: Factors affecting the decision to disclose environmental or social 
information 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adapted from Lee and Hutchison (2005) 
Based on prior literature, I explain the predicted sign with respect to each 
variable that may affect firms’ environmental and/or social disclosures in the 
following paragraphs7.  
 
 
                                                          
7
 Based on Lee and Hutchison’s disclosure framework and Brammer and Pavelin’s (2008) study, it is interesting to 
explore further other factors that may have an effect on a firm’s ESD such as firm size and media exposure. Hence, I 
develop hypotheses with respect to the control variables rather than simply include them as addition controls in the 
empirical models.  
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Firm/Industry Factors 
4.2.1 Profitability, slack recourses and ESD 
Empirical evidence suggests that there has been a significant change in social 
disclosure behaviour of UK listed firms, with a trend towards improvement in the 
quality of disclosures (Gray et al., 1995). Despite the improvements in the 
quantity and quality of environmental and social disclosures, relatively little 
research has examined the link between corporate social/environmental 
disclosures and firm financial performance, particularly profitability. Pointing to 
the paucity of research on this link, Lee and Hutchison (2005) comment that the 
role of profitability in environmental disclosures is incompletely explained.  
From an accounting and economics perspective, production and distribution of 
voluntary environmental and social information entails costs, even if it is likely to 
confer benefits (Verrecchia, 1983). For example, Brammer and Pavelin (2008) 
suggest that there are two types of costs involved in making disclosures: “the 
costs of measuring, verifying, collating and publishing environmental information, 
and the loss of strategic discretion associated with making public commitments 
to verifiable future actions and/or performance” (p.122).  
Yet, Prior studies find no link between profitability and environmental 
disclosures (Brammer and Pavelin, 2006, 2008; Cormier et al., 2011; Freedman 
and Jaggi, 1988; Patten, 1991). One possible reason for the failure of prior 
research to clarify this link could be the cross sectional nature of prior studies, 
but more importantly, the largely limited and qualitative nature of the information 
used to measure disclosure in prior work. Hence, while Freedman and Jaggi 
(1988) use disclosures related only to pollution control, Patten (1991) uses 
number of pages in the annual reports devoted to such disclosures. Even more 
recent work by Brammer and Pavelin (2008) uses five measures of disclosures, 
all dummy variables, based on a firm’s policy stance towards its environmental 
responsibility. Hence, one can argue that the failure of prior research to reveal 
any meaningful link between environmental and/or social disclosures and firm 
profitability could be the limited and largely qualitative nature of the disclosures 
used. In this study, I use comprehensive and objective measures of 
environmental and social disclosures based on what Clarkson et al. (2008) 
consider ‘hard’ quantitative data that would be difficult for poor environmental 
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performers to mimic. I then analyse the link between the environmental and 
social disclosures of a firm and its profitability.  
Moreover, the slack resource theory (Penrose, 1956), suggests that the 
existence of surplus financial resources or “company slack” should play an 
important role in corporate strategic decision making. There is research which 
shows that the availability of resources influence the production and timing of 
disclosures. For instance, Li and McConomy (1999) find that the disclosure of 
provisions related to removal and site restoration costs by mining and oil and 
gas companies was related to the financial health of the companies. Buhr (2002) 
investigates the initiation of environmental reports by two Canadian pulp and 
paper firms, and notes that profitability was an issue in the timing of the 
production of the report by one firm, given that its production was an expense.  
Hence, while related empirical evidence suggests that profitability and 
availability of resources should matter for making higher and ‘hard’ 
environmental (and social) disclosures, direct evidence testing this link fails to 
identify this relation. In this study, I revisit this link using various measures of 
profitability and environmental and social disclosure scores from Bloomberg. 
Thus drawing upon the costs and benefits analysis (Verrecchia, 1983) and slack 
resources theory (Penrose, 1959; Bourgeois, 1981), it can be predicted that 
more profitable firms and/or those with more financial slack resources, would 
tend to have higher environmental and/or social disclosure scores. Accordingly, 
I hypothesise that, 
H1: Firms with higher operating profitability/slack tend to have higher 
environmental and/or social disclosure scores. 
It is important to note that in the above hypothesis the causality is assumed to 
run from profitability to environmental and social disclosures. Given the cross 
sectional nature of prior studies (e.g., Brammer and Pavelin, 2008), to date it 
has only been possible to establish correlation, but not causation. In this study, 
drawing upon Nelling and Webb’s (2009) application of Granger causality, it 
explicitly tests the causality between the sample firms’ profitability and the level 
of their environmental and social disclosures. 
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4.2.2 Firm size and ESD 
Hillman and Keim (2001) posit that size matters because it may be related to 
the urgency and salience of stakeholder relations. Size captures various factors 
motivating firms to issue environmental and social reports such as public 
pressure or financial resources (Lang and Lundholm, 1993). Prior studies find a 
strong positive relation between firm size and environmental and social 
disclosure/performance (Brammer and Pavelin, 2008; Cormier et al., 2011; 
Dhaliwal et al., 2011). Based on the economics based disclosure theory, 
Clarkson et al. (2008) state that most voluntary disclosure studies control for 
firm size as larger firms would have economies of scale with respect to 
information production costs. In other words, it is cheaper for larger firms to 
provide more disclosure/information. From another perspective, the so called 
socio-political theory, larger firms tend to be more visible to public and face 
greater pressure from a variety of external stakeholders (Patten, 2002b; 
Deegan, 2002), thus larger firms may be driven to make more environmental 
and/or social disclosure to legitimize their activities (Brammer and Pavelin, 
2006). From both perspectives a positive relation between size and disclosure 
is expected. Thus the hypothesis is, 
H2: Bigger firms tend to have higher environmental and/or social 
disclosure score. 
4.2.3 Firm leverage and ESD 
From an economics perspective, producing high quality objective disclosures 
entail costs (Brammer and Pavelin, 2008; Buhr, 2002; Li and McConomy, 1999). 
Brammer and Pavelin (2006) find a negative relationship between 
environmental disclosure and leverage. They argue that firms with higher level 
of leverage may face more pressure from creditor(s) and it could be more 
difficult to raise funds to invest in environmental activities and disclosure. So 
firm would have less ability to invest in environmental and social activities and 
hence would make lower environmental and social disclosures. In other words, 
debt holders as monitors are also concerned about firm’s ability to repay its debt. 
More the funds invested in environmental and social activities and disclosures, 
less of the firm’s profit will be devoted to repay interest and debt to creditors. 
Therefore, a negative relation is predicted between a firm’s leverage and its 
ESD.  
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H3: Firms with higher leverage tend to have lower environmental and/or 
social disclosure score. 
4.2.4 Financial activities and ESD 
It is argued that less (internally) profitable firms in terms of having the need to 
raise external finance will spend less money on environmental and social 
activities, and hence will make less ESD. Ioannou and Serafeim (2012) use 
debt issuance and equity issuance separately over total assets to measure 
firms’ financing and find a strong negative relationship between equity and/or 
debt issuance and environmental and social score respectively. Conversely, 
one can also argue that firms raising financing in debt and equity markets have 
a higher propensity for voluntary disclosure to lower their cost of capital 
(Clarkson et al., 2008, Dhaliwal et al., 2011).  Clarkson et al. (2008) use the 
ratio of total amount of debt and/or equity financing raised in fiscal year 2004 to 
total assets at the end of fiscal year 2002 to measure firms’ capital financing. 
They find a weak positive relationship between hard environmental disclosure 
(i.e., criteria that are difficult for poor performers to mimic such as carbon 
emission and water usage) and financial activities, and a strong positive 
relationship between soft environmental disclosure (such as policy statement 
and environmental initiatives) and financial activities in the inter-industry 
analysis. Given the mixed prior evidence, no directional predictions are made 
between environmental and/or social disclosure and financial activities. Hence, 
it is hypothesised (in null form), 
H4: Firms’ financial activities (in terms of raising capital by issuing equity 
and/or debt) are not correlated with their environmental and/or social 
disclosure score. 
4.2.5 Ownership structure and ESD 
Ownership structure can affect the level of monitoring and the extent of 
voluntary environmental and social disclosures. Based on principle-agent model, 
when ownership is dispersed, shareholders, having little by way of direct 
authority over managers, must monitor their activities. In the absence of an 
ability to effectively monitor management, the consequent degree of information 
asymmetry between the organisation and its shareholders may bring an 
adverse investor reaction. Hence, one would expect a diffused ownership 
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structure to carry with it an incentive for a firm to voluntarily provide information 
to shareholders through disclosures (Brammer and Pavelin, 2008). Furthermore, 
firms with dispersed ownership are expected to be responsive to public 
investors’ information costs (assume that shareholders want relevant ESD), 
because no dominant shareholders typically have access to the information 
they need (Cormier et al., 2011). In other words, the higher the percentage of 
strategic shareholdings, the lower the dispersion of shares and lower the 
information asymmetry between strategic shareholders and the firm. Hence, 
lower the companies’ ESD will be. Therefore, a negative relation is expected 
between ESD and strategic shareholdings. 
H5: Firms with higher strategic shareholdings tend to have lower 
environmental and/or social disclosure score. 
4.2.6 Industry specific and fixed year effects 
Most existing research suggests consideration of environmental sensitivity issue 
across industries (Ingram and Frazier, 1980; Wiseman, 1982; Al-Tuwaijri et al., 
2004; Brammer and Pavelin, 2008; Clarkson et al., 2008; Hershcovis et al., 
2009). It is argued that industries play an important role in determining firms’ 
ESD. Brammer and Pavelin (2006) find that industries with a higher 
environmental impact tend to make more environmental disclosures. A number 
of prior studies associate the following industries – Chemical, Energy, Oil and 
Gas, Mining and Utilities with high environmental impact (Clarkson et al., 2008; 
Brammer and Pavelin, 2008), and attempt to control for fixed industry effect by 
using industry dummies (i.e., score one for those industries with high 
environmental impact). Brammer and Pavelin (2008) find that firms in 
Chemicals and Utilities tend to disclose more environmental information, while 
financial companies are not willing to disclose their environmental information. 
In this study, industry dummies are also used to control for fixed industry effect 
in all regression models. Time fixed effect is also controlled for by creating year 
dummies for each year. 
Societal Factors 
4.2.7 Media exposure and ESD 
Based on the legitimacy perspective, a positive relationship is expected 
between media exposure and environmental and social disclosures. In other 
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words, higher levels of media exposure increase public concerns (i.e., 
companies face more public pressure). Thus firms choose to react through 
more environmental or social disclosure to change investors’ perception.   
A number of studies use media exposure as a control variable and find similar 
results, although the measurements of media exposure are slightly different. 
Cormier et al. (2011) find a strong positive relationship between environmental 
news exposure and environmental disclosure, as well as a strong positive 
relationship between environmental news exposure and social disclosure. In 
their paper, the environmental news content is obtained from the ABI/Inform 
Global database based on three different sources – business publications, 
journals and Canadian newsstand. Brammer and Pavelin (2006) use Factiva 
database to measure the incidence of news covered by media and find a 
positive relationship without controlling for industry effect. Similarly, Clarkson et 
al. (2008) adopt Janis-Fadner coefficient to measure media coverage and 
extract data from Factiva database in year 2002, and only find a positive 
relationship between soft environmental disclosure and J-F coefficient in the 
intra-industry OLS analysis. Hence, it can be hypothesised that, 
H6: Firms with more media exposure tend to have higher environmental 
and/or social disclosure score. 
4.3 Models, methodology and variables 
4.3.1 Models tested 
The following model is developed to test above-mentioned hypotheses (H1-H6).  
ES/E/S Scorei,t = β0 + β1Profitabilityi,t + β2Slacki,t + β3Sizei,t + 
β4Leveragei,t + β5Financial activitiesi,t + β6Strategic holdingsi,t + β7Media 
exposurei,t + [Industry Dummies] + [Year Dummies] + εi,t                    (4-1) 
In the above model, the dependent variable is the environmental and social 
disclosure score (and its components) as developed by Bloomberg. Return on 
sales (ROS) and return on equity (ROE) are used as the measures of firm 
profitability in this study. The availability of financial slack is another important 
explanatory variable. As already discussed above, based on related literature, a 
wide array of control variables are used including: firm size, leverage, financial 
activities, strategic shareholdings, media exposure, industry and year fixed 
effects.  
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To test for causality between a firm’s operating profitability and its ES/E/S 
disclosure score, Granger causality test is conducted following Nelling and 
Webb’s (2009) approach8. The models tested are as follows: 
ES/E/S Scorei,t = β0 + β1ES/E/S Scorei,t-1 + β2Profitabilityi,t + 
β3Profitabilityi,t-1 + β4Slacki,t + β5Sizei,t + β6Leveragei,t + β7Financial 
activitiesi,t + β8Strategic holdingsi,t + β9Media exposurei,t + [Industry 
Dummies] + [Year Dummies] + εi,t                                                       (4-2) 
Profitabilityi,t = β0 + β1Profitabilityi,t-1 + β2ES/E/S Scorei,t + β3ES/E/S 
Scorei,t-1 + β4Slacki,t + β5Sizei,t + β6Leveragei,t + β7Financial activitiesi,t + 
β8Strategic holdingsi,t + β9Media exposurei,t + [Industry Dummies] + [Year 
Dummies] + εi,t                                                                                     (4-3) 
In equation (4-2), ES/E/S score is a function of lagged ES/E/S score, current 
profitability and lagged profitability, while in equation (4-3), profitability is a 
function of lagged profitability, and current and lagged ES/E/S score. All 
variables are defined in the same way as in equation (4-1). If the coefficients β2 
and β3 of profitability are significant in equation (4-2), then it can be concluded 
that firms’ profitability ‘Granger causes’ ES/E/S score. Similarly, if the 
coefficients β2 and β3 in equation (4-3) are significant, it can be said that firms’ 
ES/E/S score ‘Granger causes’ profitability. The coefficients only represent the 
sign of the relation not the magnitude (Nelling and Webb, 2009). Both operating 
profitability measures are tested in the Granger causality analyses, but only the 
results with respect to ROS are reported, as this is the measure found to be 
significant.  
When estimating econometric models using pooled sample, it is important to 
control for model residuals. It is likely that the residuals for each firm may be 
correlated across years, as well as correlated across firms within a single year. 
Therefore, both industry and year dummies are controlled for. Furthermore, to 
avoid serial correlation, the standard errors are clustered by individual firm 
identity. In line with appropriate methodology for limited dependent variables, 
Tobit regressions are used whenever ES/E/S is the dependent variable i.e., in 
Equation (4-1) and Equation (4-2); and OLS regression is used in Equation (4-
3).  
                                                          
8
 A dynamic model has been considered as an alternative method. However, based on the suggestions from prior 
studies (e.g., Nelling and Webb, 2009), Granger causality test has been widely used. Furthermore, by including both 
current and lagged variables, it is possible to examine the direction of causality with respect to both variables.  
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4.3.2 Measurement of variables 
The measurement of each variable is explained as follows: 
ES/E/S: ES is the sum of environmental and social disclosure score for each 
firm for every year. E (S) score refers to the environmental (social) disclosure 
score.  
Profitability: measured by ROS and ROE which are widely used in related 
literature (Freedman and Jaggi, 1988, 1992). ROS is the ratio of earnings 
before interest and taxes (18191) to net sales (01001). ROE denotes the ratio of 
net income before preferred dividends minus preferred dividend requirement to 
last year's common equity.  
Slack: slack resource is defined as the natural logarithm of the sum of cash & 
short-term investments (02001) and total receivables (02051) (Arora and 
Dharwadkar, 2011). 
Size: firm size is measured by the natural logarithm of employee number 
(07011) (Hershcovis et al., 2009; Padgett and Galan, 2010; Arora and 
Dharwadkar, 2011). As suggested by Arora and Dharwadkar (2011), most 
previous research measures size according to total sales and total assets, they 
prefer to use number of employees as size measure. They state other variables 
like ROA or R&D intensity involves total assets or sales in the denominator, a 
size measure based on assets or sales could cause multicollinearity problems. 
Thus they suggest that use of the number of employees avoids this problem 
without loss of information. Furthermore, different size measures such as 
natural logarithm of total assets and net sales have been used to test above 
hypotheses. Consistent with Arora and Dharwadkar’s (2011) argument, the 
results indicate that there is potential multicollinearity problem with respect to 
some independent variables when using either size measure. For example, the 
correlation between size (log of employee number) and media is 0.48, while the 
correlations is 0.68 by using log of total assets or 0.67 by using log of sales. 
Similarly, the correlations between firm size and slack are 0.65 (firm size is 
measured as log of employee number), 0.87 (measured as log of sales) and 
0.89 (measured as log of total assets) respectively. The correlations indicate 
that natural logarithm of employee number is more suitable as size measure in 
this study, compared to the other two measures which are highly correlated with 
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other independent variables. Hence, natural logarithm of employee number is 
used as firm size measure in this study. 
Leverage: total debt (03255) divided by total assets (02999). 
Financial activities: this variable is captured by the ratio of net proceeds from 
sale/issue of common and/or preferred stock (04251) during the year to total 
assets (02999) at the beginning of the year.  
Strategic shareholdings (NOSHST): it is measured as the percentage of total 
shares in issue held strategically and not available to ordinary shareholders. 
Holdings of 5% or more are counted as strategic.  
Media exposure: it represents a firm’s media sensitivity to environmental issues, 
which is measured as the number of news exposed by Nexis@UK 9  that 
provides searchable archives of news content from global sources. The number 
of environmental news is obtained by searching a firm’s name and any one of 
the following terms “environment sustainability”, “waste management”, “pollution” 
and “environmental award” (as used by Cormier et al., 2011) within all English 
language news published over the world. One year period is specified to be 1 
January 200X to 31 December 200X. Furthermore, moderate similarity of 
duplicate options10 is allowed. Since there is big variation of news exposed, the 
media exposure variable is transformed by taking natural logarithm. However, 
there are many firms with zero piece of news. I add one to the number of news 
exposed for each firm before taking the logarithm. One limitation of this 
measure is that the number of news exposed varies slightly across time. To 
brief the explanation, media exposure denotes the number of news exposed by 
Nexis@UK11. 
                                                          
9
 This database gives access to both news and company information. News coverage contained in this database 
comes from national and local newspapers, press releases, transcripts of TV broadcasts, newswires, statistical 
bulletins, magazines and trade journals. Company option provides access to financial reports and company profiles 
from around the World. 
10
 Duplicate options let you choose whether or not you want to use similarity analysis to process your search results. 
Similarity analysis analyses a results list, identifies documents that have similar content, and groups the similar 
documents together. Moderate similarity means documents with relatively less similarity can be included in the 
same group of similar documents. (LexisNexis@help) 
11
 The variables used to capture media exposure are derived from Cormier et al.’s (2011) measurement. However, it 
can be argued that a more complicated measurement can be used. For example, the Factiva database can be used 
to measure the incidence of news covered by media (e.g., Brammer and Pavelin, 2008). When I collect the data for 
media exposure variable, the Factiva database cannot be accessed. Hence, I use some variables (as also used by 
Cormier et al. 2011) to capture media exposure and manually collect firms’ environmental news from Nexis@UK 
database. 
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Industry (ICBIC) and year dummies: based on FTSE/DJ Industry Classification 
Benchmark (ICB) 2008 industry classification, firms are grouped in one of the 
following industries: Oil&Gas (0001), Basic materials (1000), Industrials (2000), 
Consumer goods (3000), Health care (4000), Consumer services (5000), 
Telecommunications (6000), Utilities (7000) and Technology (9000). Financials 
(8000) are not included in this study. The industry (year) dummy variables take 
a value of one if a firm operates in that sector (year); zero otherwise.  
4.4 Sample and data  
The sample is a pooled cross-section and time series data over five years 
(2005-2009), and consists of FTSE350 companies excluding financial 
institutions12  which need to follow different environmental and social related 
regulations like the ‘Equator Principles’ (see Macve and Chen (2010) about 
bank voluntary disclosure, i.e. environmental and social issues in project 
financing). By absolute number, there are 327 out of the FTSE all share 
constituents that provide some sort of ESG data. However, firms without full 
ESG data are dropped out in this study. Hence, based on the availability of full 
ESG data, the final sample consists of 152, 214, 165, 87 and 11 for the year 
2009, 2008, 2007, 2006 and 2005 respectively. In total, there are 629 firm-year 
observations. Every effort has been made to collect all firms with ESG data 
available over the five years.  
Industries are classified by using FTSE/DJ single-digit Industry Classification 
Benchmark (ICB) March 2008 version. This leads to 9 single-digit industry 
classifications in the sample: Oil & Gas, Basic Materials, Industrials, Consumer 
Goods, Health Care, Consumer Services, Telecommunications, Utilities and 
Technology. Table 4.1 gives the break-down of industries covered in the sample 
over the five-year period. As Table 4.1 shows general industrials and consumer 
services account for the bulk of companies in the sample. Within industrials fall 
mostly heavy manufacturing industries like construction and building materials, 
defence and aerospace, and other industrial engineering industries like 
electrical components and equipment and electronic equipment. Consumer 
services include food and drug retailers, general retailers, media, and travel and 
                                                          
12 I have analysed a few sustainability reports of some financial companies such as HSBC and Barclays, and found 
their disclosure formats and content are dramatically different from other non-financial companies. Moreover, 
some financial companies (especially smaller ones) do not provide relevant information about their ESD or control 
variables. Thus, financial companies are excluded for this study. 
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leisure industries. In short, the sample represents a wide range of industries 
over five years.     
Table 4.1 Number of sample companies in each sector by year 
Industry 
Code 
Industry 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
0001 Oil & Gas 2 9 11 16 12 50 
1000 Basic Materials 2 9 11 17 14 53 
2000 Industrials 2 27 52 65 37 183 
3000 Consumer Goods 2 9 19 25 20 75 
4000 Health Care 0 3 5 5 5 18 
5000 Consumer Services 3 17 47 59 43 169 
6000 Telecommunications 0 3 4 5 3 15 
7000 Utilities 0 4 8 10 6 28 
9000 Technology 0 6 8 12 12 38 
  Total 11 87 165 214 152 629 
 
The disclosure data is obtained from Bloomberg. Bloomberg assigns 
environmental, social and governance disclosure scores to firms based on data 
points (100 different data points including 60 environment, 26 social and 14 
governance related data points) collected by analysts via multiple sources 
including annual reports, standalone sustainability reports and company 
websites. The disclosure data is available from 2005 (generally goes back to 
2007, sometimes 2006 and occasionally 2005). Within each E, S and G 
category, the score of individual firm is then expressed in percentage, so as to 
make data comparable across firms and sectors. The score is also tailored to 
be industry specific, so that each firm is evaluated only in terms of the data that 
is relevant to its industry sector. E.g., gas flared is only used to score firms in oil 
and gas industry. A data point like phones recycled is only used to score firms 
in the telecommunication industry. Furthermore, the data points are also 
weighted in terms of importance by ESG practitioners. For example, Green 
House Gas emissions or number of independent directors would be weighted 
more heavily than other data points. Hence, the scores not only capture the 
quantity but the quality of environmental, social and governance disclosures. 
See Appendix 2 for full detail of the data points collected under each E, S, and 
G category. All Accounting data is collected from Worldscope and financial data 
is from Datastream. Environmental news data is obtained from Nexis@UK. 
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4.5 Results 
4.5.1 Descriptive and correlation statistics 
Table 4.2 provides the descriptive statistics for all variables used in the 
analyses, while Table 4.3 provides the correlations between these variables. 
Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics 
Variable Observation Median Mean S.D. Min Max 
ES 617 49.00 54.38 23.85 11.10 124.39 
E 619 19.51 22.02 13.53 2.33 63.57 
S 627 28.07 32.10 12.87 4.69 70.18 
ESt-1 380 51.12 55.91 24.33 11.90 124.39 
Et-1 381 20.93 22.72 13.76 2.33 62.79 
St-1 388 28.07 32.84 13.16 4.69 70.18 
Slack 607 6.07 6.20 1.53 2.21 11.11 
ROS 622 0.12 0.15 0.27 -1.28 5.42 
ROE 600 0.17 0.24 0.46 -1.10 5.02 
ROSt-1 620 0.13 0.16 0.28 -1.93 5.42 
ROEt-1 605 0.19 0.26 0.43 -2.41 4.71 
Size_emp 622 9.34 9.29 1.62 2.56 13.30 
Leverage 627 0.23 0.25 0.19 0 1.33 
Fin_acts 627 0.002 0.02 0.07 -0.01 0.85 
Str_holds 629 0.16 0.20 0.17 0 0.83 
Media 629 1.39 1.61 1.53 0 6.53 
Notes: ES denotes the sum of environmental and social disclosure scores; E denotes environmental 
disclosure; S denotes social disclosure; ESt-1, Et-1 and St-1 refer to one year lagged ES, E and S score 
respectively; Slack is measured as the natural logarithm of the sum of cash & short term investment and 
total receivables; ROS denotes the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to net sales; ROE denotes 
the ratio of net income before preferred dividends minus preferred dividend requirement to last year's 
common equity; ROSt-1 and ROEt-1 refer to one year lagged ROS and ROE; Size_emp denotes firm size 
and is measured as the natural logarithm of employee number; Leverage is defined as the ratio of total 
debt to total assets; Fin_acts is defined as financial activities and measured as the ratio of net proceeds 
from sale/issue of common and/or preferred stock during the year to total assets at the beginning of the 
year; Str_holds refers to strategic shareholdings and is measured as the percentage of total shares in 
issue held strategically and not available to ordinary shareholders (holdings of 5% or more are counted as 
strategic); Media denotes media exposure and is measured as the natural logarithm of the number of 
environmental news exposed by media plus one.  
Table 4.2 shows that the mean value of ES, i.e., the summed E and S scores, is 
54% (about 56% for lagged ES score). The summed ES score is the simple 
summation of the individual E and S scores of the firms, and could be 
interpreted as the average aggregate E and S disclosure of the firm. As for the 
individual scores, S has an average score of 32%, and E of 22%. The mean 
values of lagged E and lagged S are 23% and 33% respectively. The average 
slack is 6.2, equivalent to the mean value of GBP 494 million. Average ROS 
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and ROE are 15% and 24% respectively. The mean value of lagged ROS and 
lagged ROE are 16% and 26%. Average firm size is 9.29 (i.e., about 10851 
employees). The average leverage is 25%. The mean values of strategic 
shareholdings and financial activities are 20% and 2% respectively (i.e., 20% of 
total shares in issue are held by strategic shareholders, and 2% of total assets 
are generated from sales or issue of common and/or preferred stock during the 
year). The mean of the log of media exposure is 1.6. In other words, the 
average number of environmental news to which a firm is exposed in one year 
is 5. All median values are very closed to mean values, which indicates that the 
sample is not affected by outliers. The median values are normally distributed. 
Full definition of variables used and their data sources are given in Appendix 3. 
Of note, the number of observations for each variable varies slightly, based on 
the availability of data for the variable.  
The pair-wise correlation matrix is displayed in Table 4.3. Table 4.3 shows a 
high correlation among ES, E, and S score and their lagged values, which 
implies stickiness of E and S scores across years. In other words, it seems that 
once a firm sets a precedence of voluntary reporting in a particular area, it tends 
to continue doing so in subsequent periods (consistent with the costs of 
commitment argument). It is worth mentioning the relationship between 
profitability and environmental/social score. It can be seen that there is a 
positive link between ROS and E score, while lagged ROS is positively 
correlated with E, ES and lagged E scores. Although there is no significant link 
between profitability and social score, the sign with respect to this relationship is 
positive. As mentioned in the section 4.3.2 ‘measurement of variable’, there is 
moderately high correlation between firm size and slack (0.65) as well as 
between firm size and media exposure (0.67). Hence, I performed variance 
inflation factor (VIF) checks for all regression analyses to ensure that there are 
no multicollinearity concerns, and all values of VIF tests are less than 10 (VIFs 
exceeding 10 are signs of serious multicollinearity requiring correction).  
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Table 4.3 Pair-wise correlation matrix 
Notes: : ES denotes the sum of environmental and social disclosure scores; E denotes environmental disclosure; S denotes social disclosure; ESt-1, Et-1 and St-1 refer to one 
year lagged ES, E and S score respectively; Slack is measured as the natural logarithm of the sum of cash & short term investment and total receivables; ROS denotes the 
ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to net sales; ROE denotes the ratio of net income before preferred dividends minus preferred dividend requirement to last year's 
common equity; ROSt-1 refers to one year lagged ROS; Size_emp denotes firm size and is measured as the natural logarithm of employee number; Leverage is defined as the 
ratio of total debt to total assets; Fin_acts is defined as financial activities and measured as the ratio of net proceeds from sale/issue of common and/or preferred stock during 
the year to total assets at the beginning of the year; Str_holds refers to strategic shareholdings and is measured as the percentage of total shares in issue held strategically 
and not available to ordinary shareholders (holdings of 5% or more are counted as strategic); Media denotes media exposure and is measured as the natural logarithm of the 
number of environmental news exposed by media plus one. *, **, *** indicates significance at the .10, .05, .01 levels respectively.   
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
1 ES 1.00               
2 E 0.91*** 1.00              
3 S 0.90*** 0.64*** 1.00             
4 ESt-1 0.92*** 0.84*** 0.84*** 1.00            
5 Et-1 0.83*** 0.88*** 0.62*** 0.91*** 1.00           
6 St-1 0.85*** 0.63*** 0.91*** 0.90*** 0.64*** 1.00          
7 Slack 0.60*** 0.52*** 0.56*** 0.64*** 0.57*** 0.59*** 1.00         
8 ROS 0.05 0.07* 0.01 0.07 0.08 0.02 0.02 1.00        
9 ROE 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.20*** 1.00       
10 ROSt-1 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.05 0.08 0.10** 0.02 0.04 0.28*** 0.03 1.00      
11 Size_emp 0.44*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.45*** 0.42*** 0.41*** 0.65*** -0.21*** 0.00 -0.20*** 1.00     
12 Leverage 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.04 0.01 0.14*** 0.06 0.12*** 1.00    
13 Fin_acts 0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.06 0.02 -0.08** -0.08* 1.00   
14 Str_holds -0.26*** -0.28*** -0.18*** -0.29*** -0.30*** -0.22*** -0.31*** 0.04 0.02 0.03 -0.22*** -0.08** -0.09** 1.00  
15 Media 0.55*** 0.49*** 0.51*** 0.59*** 0.52*** 0.55*** 0.66*** 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.48*** 0.07* -0.02 -0.22*** 1.00 
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4.5.2 Regression analysis 
Table 4.4 shows the results of testing H1-H6 using two profitability measures ROS 
and ROE13.  
Table 4.4 Tobit regressions explaining ES/E/S score (Equation 4-1) 
 
Predicted  
Sign 
Dependent variable 
ES E S 
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Intercept   -7.53 
(-0.97) 
-6.30 
(-0.78) 
-9.59** 
(-2.02) 
-7.73 
(-1.56) 
2.14 
(0.49) 
1.39 
(0.32) 
ROS + 2.18 
(0.80) 
 3.55*** 
(2.52) 
 -1.49 
(-0.96) 
 
ROE +  3.75* 
(1.63) 
 2.09** 
(1.99) 
 1.85 
(1.22) 
Slack + 3.47** 
(2.44) 
3.52*** 
(2.60) 
1.51** 
(2.00) 
1.66** 
(2.23) 
1.85** 
(2.23) 
1.78** 
(2.27) 
Size_emp + 3.21** 
(2.32) 
3.09** 
(2.27) 
1.77** 
(2.38) 
1.50** 
(1.95) 
1.55* 
(1.91) 
1.70** 
(2.22) 
Leverage - -2.65 
(-0.42) 
-6.09 
(-0.81) 
-3.04 
(-0.86) 
-3.87 
(-0.86) 
-0.42 
(-0.11) 
-3.45 
(-0.89) 
Fin_acts +/- -8.95 
(-0.64) 
-10.55 
(-0.73) 
0.78 
(0.08) 
-0.71 
(-0.08) 
-9.30 
(-1.42) 
-9.34 
(-1.35) 
Str_holds - -13.50** 
(-1.95) 
-14.13** 
(-2.12) 
-11.54*** 
(-2.92) 
-11.93*** 
(-3.01) 
-2.23 
(-0.57) 
-2.53 
(-0.70) 
Media + 2.97*** 
(2.88) 
2.73*** 
(2.65) 
1.59*** 
(2.69) 
1.45** 
(2.41) 
1.42*** 
(2.50) 
1.31** 
(2.36) 
Industry 
effect 
 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year 
effect 
 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  592 566 594 568 601 575 
        
Pse-R2  7.09% 7.05% 6.24% 6.06% 6.92% 7.12% 
F-test  16.77*** 16.02*** 12.48*** 11.46*** 14.42*** 15.34*** 
Notes: ES denotes the sum of environmental and social disclosure scores; E denotes environmental disclosure; 
S denotes social disclosure; ROS denotes the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to net sales; ROE 
denotes the ratio of net income before preferred dividends minus preferred dividend requirement to last year's 
common equity; Slack is measured as the natural logarithm of the sum of cash & short term investment and total 
receivables; Size_emp denotes firm size and is measured as the natural logarithm of employee number; 
Leverage is defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets; Fin_acts is defined as financial activities and 
measured as the ratio of net proceeds from sale/issue of common and/or preferred stock during the year to total 
assets at the beginning of the year; Str_holds refers to strategic shareholdings and is measured as the 
percentage of total shares in issue held strategically and not available to ordinary shareholders (holdings of 5% 
or more are counted as strategic); Media denotes media exposure and is measured as the natural logarithm of 
                                                          
13
 I check the impact of missing observations on the results. First, I generate a new variable as the sum of all variables used 
on Table 4.4. If any value of the above variables is missing, then the new variable will have a missing value. Then I recode 
the new variable as a dummy variable i.e., if there is any missing value, it will be 1; if there is no missing value, it will be 0. 
Hence, 1) I check the number of observations left with non-missing values; 2) I run a summary statistics and compare with 
the original descriptive table; and 3) Re-run all regressions on Table 4.4 with non-missing values, and compare the results. 
The results show that there are 565 observations left with non-missing values. The summary statistics (e.g., mean values) 
are very closed to the original table. Finally, all results with non-missing values are similar to the results on Table 4.4. 
Therefore, the results are not affected by any missing values, and the descriptive statistics provided earlier are reliable to 
carry out the above analysis. 
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the number of environmental news exposed by media plus one. The dependent variables are ES, E and S scores 
as indicated by the columns. Profitability measured as ROS is used in Model (1), and ROE is adopted in Model 
(2). T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates significance at the .10, .05, .01 levels respectively. 
Standard errors are computed with procedure allowing for clustering across observations corresponding to the 
same firms for different years. 
As Table 4.4 shows, when E score is the dependent variable, the coefficients on 
ROS and ROE are both positive and significant (p<0.05). When ES is the dependent 
variable, the coefficient on ROE is positive and marginally significant (p<0.1). 
However, no significant relation is found between operating profit and S score. 
Perhaps firms with higher ROS tend to make more proactive environmental 
investments and provide more environmental information in the current year. Social 
disclosures which pertain more to employee relations may not require significant 
current cash outlays, hence, may not be currently profit-sensitive. These findings 
largely support H1, and are consistent with both the actual as well as the opportunity 
costs hypotheses. First, consistent with the actual costs argument, it is found that 
profitable firms are better able to afford making higher and better environmental 
disclosures. Moreover, the findings of a positive link of both E and S disclosures with 
slack resources, suggests that such firms can also bear the opportunity costs of 
commitment implied by such disclosures. Managers in firms with more slacks are 
more likely to have access to resources which would allow them to honour their 
environmental and social commitments – thus lowering their opportunity costs of 
making such disclosures. Taken together, these findings are consistent with the 
economics based arguments that profitable firms with superior financial resources, 
particularly slack resources, tend to be in a better position to bear both the actual as 
well as the opportunity costs of making specifically higher environmental disclosures. 
Furthermore, these results are consistent with slack resources theory, which 
suggests that firms with more slack resources are more ‘willing’ and ‘able’ to invest in 
environmental and social areas including E and S reporting. This behaviour of firms 
is consistent with the suggestions of Heal (2005) that to make the greatest impact, 
firms not only need to undertake CSR but also need to be ‘seen’ to be doing so – 
hence the need for relevant disclosure.  
With respect to other variables, the results are found to be consistent with my 
expectations. Consistent with prior findings (Brammer and Pavelin, 2006 and 
Cormier et al., 2011), there is a positive relation of E and S disclosure scores with 
both size (H2) and media exposure (H6) in all regressions. These findings suggest 
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that larger firms with greater exposure to public media tend to provide more 
environmental and social information. This result is also consistent with the socio-
political and legitimacy theory based arguments, implying that larger firms which are 
more in the public eye tend to legitimize their operations by providing more 
environmental and social information (Cho and Patten, 2007). Again, consistent with 
prior findings (Cormier et al., 2005), a negative relation is found between strategic 
shareholdings and ES and E disclosures (H5). This finding suggests that firms 
having more concentrated shareholdings with implied lower information asymmetry 
between the firm and its investors tend to disclose less ES and E information. It may 
also mean that firms with concentrated shareholdings are less stakeholder-oriented 
and tend to invest less in CSR related activities, hence, have less to report in these 
areas. Leverage (H3) and financial activities (H4) are not found to be related to either 
E or S disclosures.  
Prior empirical evidence has emphasized industry effect. For example, Cho and 
Patten (2007) reveal that firms operating in environmentally sensitive industries such 
as oil exploration, paper manufacturing, chemical and allied products, petroleum 
refining and metals, disclose more non-litigation-related environmental information in 
order to achieve social legitimacy. Although the results with respect to industry 
effects are not reported, there are some significant results worth mentioning. 
Consistent with existing literature - those industries with a high environmental impact 
tend to make more environmental disclosure (Brammer and Pavelin, 2008), the 
findings of this study also suggest that industry effects matter for firms’ 
environmental and social disclosures. Generally speaking, companies in the Basic 
materials, Consumer goods, Health care and Utilities industries provide more 
environmental and social related information, while companies in the 
Telecommunications and Technology industries provide less environmental and 
social related information. The VIF tests of all regressions are less than 10, thus 
there is no multicollinearity issue for above results. 
Table 4.5 reports the results of Granger causality test with respect to ES, E and S 
score and firm profitability. There is no evidence of causality either ways using ROE 
as a profitability measure, which may be due to potential multicollinearity between 
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ROE and lagged ROE14. However, there is some evidence of causality using ROS as 
a profitability measure, which is reported as follow:  
Table 4.5 Granger causality test (Equation 4-2 and 4-3) 
 Dependent variable 
ES ROS E ROS S ROS 
Intercept -4.56 
(-1.21) 
0.45* 
(1.77) 
-3.98 
(-1.57) 
0.56*** 
(2.54) 
-1.60 
(-0.66) 
0.58** 
(2.30) 
ES  -0.001 
(-1.02) 
    
ESt-1 0.93*** 
(35.19) 
0.002 
(1.04) 
    
E    0.001 
(0.85) 
  
Et-1   0.88*** 
(26.93) 
0.002 
(0.44) 
  
S      -0.005 
(-1.57) 
St-1     0.86*** 
(23.37) 
0.003 
(1.47) 
ROS -1.22 
(-1.25) 
 0.47 
(0.69) 
 -1.58 
(-1.42) 
 
ROSt-1 1.66*** 
(2.59) 
0.14 
(1.29) 
0.76 
(0.82) 
0.13 
(1.06) 
0.91* 
(1.63) 
0.14 
(1.34) 
Slack -0.46 
(-0.74) 
0.01 
(0.85) 
-0.49 
(-1.23) 
0.01 
(0.84) 
0.13 
(0.33) 
0.02 
(1.12) 
Size_emp 1.47*** 
(2.69) 
-0.05 
(-1.47) 
1.05*** 
(2.91) 
-0.05 
(-1.62) 
0.69* 
(1.80) 
-0.04 
(-1.59) 
Leverage 1.96 
(0.74) 
0.08 
(1.37) 
0.93 
(0.49) 
0.08 
(1.42) 
2.29 
(1.35) 
0.10* 
(1.91) 
Fin_acts -0.59 
(-0.12) 
-0.09 
(-0.92) 
3.33 
(0.83) 
-0.09 
(-0.93) 
-4.29 
(-1.44) 
-0.14 
(-1.30) 
Str_holds 1.45 
(0.50) 
0.08 
(0.76) 
-0.60 
(-0.27) 
0.09 
(0.75) 
1.63 
(0.96) 
0.07 
(0.72) 
Media -0.38 
(-0.74) 
0.01 
(0.60) 
0.06 
(0.17) 
0.01 
(0.57) 
-0.33 
(-1.13) 
0.01 
(0.67) 
Industry 
effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year 
effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 365 365 366 366 372 372 
Clusters 175 175 175 175 177 177 
Pre-R2 
/(R2) 
22.04% 16.19% 19.79% 16.96% 22.36% 17.17% 
F-test 245.28*** 20.45*** 139.19*** 19.70*** 142.80*** 24.96*** 
Notes: This table reports the results of causality models with Tobit specifications when dependent variable is ES, 
E or S score. ES denotes the sum of environmental and social disclosure scores; E denotes environmental 
disclosure; S denotes social disclosure; ESt-1, Et-1 and St-1 refer to one year lagged ES, E and S score 
respectively; ROS denotes the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to net sales; ROSt-1refers to one year 
                                                          
14
 The pair-wise correlation between ROE and lagged ROE is 0.37 (p=0.00). Nelling and Webb’s (2009) findings imply that 
current ROA and lagged ROA are highly correlated. When both of them are included as independent variables in the 
regression to test causality between ROA and CSR score, no significant result is found between lagged ROA and CSR score. 
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lagged ROS; Slack is measured as the natural logarithm of the sum of cash & short term investment and total 
receivables; Size_emp denotes firm size and is measured as the natural logarithm of employee number; 
Leverage is defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets; Fin_acts is defined as financial activities and 
measured as the ratio of net proceeds from sale/issue of common and/or preferred stock during the year to total 
assets at the beginning of the year; Str_holds refers to strategic shareholdings and is measured as the 
percentage of total shares in issue held strategically and not available to ordinary shareholders (holdings of 5% 
or more are counted as strategic); Media denotes media exposure and is measured as the natural logarithm of 
the number of environmental news exposed by media plus one. T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates 
significance at the .10, .05, .01 levels respectively. Standard errors are computed with procedure allowing for 
clustering across observations corresponding to the same firms for different years. 
Table 4.5 shows that when ES score is the dependent variable, a positive and 
significant relationship is found between ES score and lagged ROS. In other words, 
lagged ROS ‘Granger causes’ ES score, which implies that firms with higher ROS in 
prior year provide more ES information in current year. Similar result is generated 
with respect to social disclosure. However, when ROS is the dependent variable; 
neither ES/E/S score nor lagged ES/E/S score is significant, which indicates that 
causality tends to run from profitability to ES and S disclosures. These findings are 
quite interesting when compared to the findings in Table 4.4. Taken together, these 
findings suggest that while current operations and current operating performance 
matter for current environmental disclosures, past operating performance drive 
current social disclosures. To explain these results, one could reason that current 
operations impact current environmental performance and current environmental 
disclosures, while results of past operating performance and past investments in 
social responsibility arena such as investments in employee training (whose effects 
only become subsequently evident) are subsequently reported. All VIF tests are less 
than 10. 
4.5.3 Robustness test 
Additional control: stakeholder sensitive governance  
Drawing upon the ideas of stakeholder theory, first proposed by Freeman (1984) and 
recently built upon by Jensen (2010), it can be argued that firms with boards which 
better reflect governance and stakeholder-sensitivity are likely to have higher 
environmental and social disclosures. Jensen (2010) argues that environmental and 
social strategy is designed at the board level. In order to maximise value of a firm, 
boards not only need to satisfy but enlist the support of all corporate stakeholders, 
including employees, suppliers, customers, and local communities. Sharing relevant 
information with these stakeholders via higher disclosures including environmental 
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and social disclosures is important in enlisting this support. Accordingly, the extent to 
which the board reflects this commitment to key stakeholders by for example, 
complying with GRI criteria (i.e., comprehensive guidelines about a firm’s 
environmental and social reporting); by disclosing its political donations; and by 
including women on the board (it is argued that women are concerned primarily with 
the welfare of other people, helpfulness, kindness, sympathy, sensitivity, nurturing 
and gentleness Eagly et al., 2003), would have a significant impact on its 
environmental and social disclosures.  
There is also a suggestion in the disclosure literature that firms which have better 
quality of corporate governance are likely to be more transparent and accordingly 
make higher and better quality environmental and social disclosures (Brammer and 
Pavelin, 2008; Rankin et al., 2011; Cormier et al., 2011). For example, Rankin et al. 
(2011) find the quality of corporate governance relates to the decision to disclose 
GHG information. They argue that a firm with an environmental committee is more 
likely to publicly disclose their emissions levels, and presents more credible 
disclosure in a voluntary disclosure regime to indicate its commitment to climate 
change. Indeed, they find firms that had instituted an environmental committee are 
more likely to provide more credible disclosures about climate change. In addition, 
Cormier et al. (2011) find a positive association between board size and 
environmental and social disclosures, as well as a positive relation between audit 
committee size and social disclosure.  
To test this, the aggregated governance ‘G’ disclosure score from Bloomberg is 
added in Equation (4-1), while keeping all other variables the same. The G score 
from Bloomberg captures the governance related disclosures of a firm, and is value 
weighted with higher weights assigned to factors like board independence and other 
such disclosures of good governance practices. The ‘G’ score as one of the 
independent variable covers some key board recommendations that the UK code of 
corporate governance recommends firms to comply with, including ‘independent’ 
director representation and separation of CEO and chair position. It also covers 
aspects that clearly reflect a board’s own stakeholder orientation. These include 
commitment to: board diversity, as measured by the presence of women on board; 
promoting transparency and trust, via disclosing details of political donations; and 
demonstrating overall stakeholder sensitivity, via disclosing ethics policy and 
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importantly adherence to GRI criteria related to environmental and social reporting. 
Hence, based on the data points covered in the G score it is reasonable to assume, 
that the higher a firm’s G score, the more stakeholder committed the firm’s board is 
likely to be.  
It is found the G score to be highly positively significant in all models, that is those 
modelling ES, E and S, suggesting that firms making higher governance disclosures 
(i.e., more stakeholder sensitive governance), are also more likely to make higher 
environmental and social disclosures. These findings not only support the theoretical 
arguments of Jensen (2010), but also lend further support to the empirical findings of 
Cormier et al. (2011) who emphasize the role of governance in promoting 
environmental and social disclosures. By using an aggregated measure of 
stakeholder sensitive governance, the results indicate overall governance score of a 
firm has a positive effect on its environmental and social disclosures. However, the 
main results are reported without G, as it was found to be a source of 
multicollinearity problem in causality tests. Hence, to keep the main results and 
causality test results comparable, main results are reported without G in Table 4.4. 
4.6 Discussion and conclusions 
In this chapter, the link between a firm’s environmental and social disclosures and its 
operating profitability is examined. Consistent with H1, it is found that more profitable 
firms tend to make more environmental and social disclosures. These findings are 
consistent with the accounting and economics based arguments that environmental 
and social disclosures are a real as well as an opportunity cost that more profitable 
firms with higher slack resources are better able to afford. Moreover, the result of 
Granger causality test reveals that while current operating performance (which is 
relevant for current environmental impact) matter for current environmental 
disclosures; it is the past operating performance that drives current social 
disclosures. The reason for the latter finding could be that effects of past profitability 
and presumably past investments in social arena (like investments in employee 
training) become apparent only in the subsequent period, which is then reported. 
From an aggregated level, a firm’s environmental and social disclosure is driven by 
its prior operating profitability. To the best of my knowledge, this empirical chapter is 
the first UK study using Granger causality methodology to examine the causal 
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relation between ESD and operating profitability, and provides some empirical 
evidence that causality runs from prior profitability to ESD.  
It is important to point out two limitations of the analysis in this chapter. One is 
whether higher disclosures imply better underlying environmental and social 
performance. While some earlier studies such as Patten (2002a) suggests that poor 
environmental performers tend to disclose more environmental information, in order 
to gain socio-political ‘legitimacy’ for their operations; there is now a growing body of 
research that shows a positive relation between higher environmental disclosures 
and better environmental performance (e.g., Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Clarkson et al., 
2008; and Clarkson et al., 2011) – hence support for the assumption. The second 
issue to consider is whether more is better in itself. In other words, do higher 
disclosures convey more relevant information or do they serve to confound 
stakeholders? As Bloomberg scores are based largely on objective and industry 
relevant environmental and social measures, higher scores should reflect an effort 
on the part of firms to promote accountability, transparency and trust between itself 
and its various stakeholders. Hence, the assumption is that the more environmental 
and social disclosure is better. In addition, a subsample of year 2009 has been 
analysed. Based on Clarkson et al. (2008) disclosure framework, I create eight CSR 
disclosure indicators, manually collect the information from firms’ sustainability 
reports or websites, read and codify the information. The aggregated score has also 
been used as a replacement of CSR strategy measurement in Chapter 6. 
In the next chapter, the link between a firm’s environmental and social disclosures 
and its market value, employee productivity and carbon eco-efficiency are examined. 
The analysis of disclosures with employee productivity and carbon eco-efficiency 
provides some support for the assumption (in this chapter) of a positive link between 
social and environmental disclosures and corresponding performance.    
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Chapter 5: Environmental and social disclosures and firms’ market 
values, employee productivity and carbon eco-efficiency 
5.1 Introduction 
As shown in Chapter 4, the link between firms’ ESD and their operating profitability 
has been tested within the context of the determinants of ESD disclosure. However, 
less is known about the link between firms’ ESD and their market values. Moreover, 
prior analysis in Chapter 4 assumes ESD to reflect superior E and S performance. In 
this chapter, I provide some support for this assumption by testing the link between 
ESD and employee productivity and carbon eco-efficiency, as measures of S and E 
performance respectively.  
With increasing pressure on businesses from socially responsible investors as well 
as from other stakeholders to address their environmental and social related 
responsibilities, developing a better understanding of the economic relevance of 
environmental and social disclosures becomes imperative. From a capital market’s 
perspective, public disclosures of how a firm addresses its environmental and social 
challenges can have significant financial implications. To the extent that these 
disclosures reveal a firm’s current environmental and social performance as well as 
its future potential, investors can gauge how well the firm is currently managing its 
environmental and social risks, and how well it is equipped to tackle these in the 
future.  
Based on above arguments, some studies have examined the link between a firm’s 
environmental disclosures and its market performance (e.g., Freedman and Patten, 
2004; Lorraine et al., 2004; Shane and Spicer, 1983; Stevens, 1984). All of these 
studies find a negative stock market response to the release of environmental 
information. These findings however, are quite contrary to the expectations based on 
voluntary disclosure theory (Verrecchia, 1983) that higher and better quality 
environmental (and social) disclosures should help reduce information asymmetry 
between the firm and its investors (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Brammer and Pavelin, 
2008). Recent work in this area however, has been more in line with this theoretical 
reasoning. For example, Cormier et al. (2011) find that environmental and social 
disclosures help reduce the information asymmetry (as measured by the stock’s bid-
ask spread and its share price volatility) between the firm and its investors. Hence, it 
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can be argued that higher and better quality of environmental and social disclosures 
can be a reflection of superior environmental and social performance (Verrecchia, 
1983), which leads to lower information asymmetry between a firm and its investors, 
and lower its firm risks, thus higher its market value. In this chapter, I extend this 
analysis by examining the link between a firm’s environmental and social disclosures 
and its market value.  
In this chapter, I attempt to explore the relation between a firm’s environmental and 
social disclosures and its market value (i.e., whether a firm’s environmental and/or 
social disclosures affect its market value is examined). As mentioned in Chapter 3, I 
also test the link between ESD and ESP from two aspects (i.e., whether more 
environmental (social) disclosure reflects better environmental (social) performance). 
One is the link between a firm’s social disclosure and its employee productivity; the 
other is the association between a firm’s environmental disclosure and its carbon 
eco-efficiency. A longitudinal dataset on UK listed firms for the years 2005-2009 is 
used to test these three sets of relationships in this study.  
This study makes a number of contributions to existing literature. First, it finds a 
positive association between combined ES and S disclosures and a firm’s market 
value. The finding in some ways is surprising, given the preponderance in the 
corporate social responsibility literature on studying the association between 
environmental performance and economic performance. The findings suggest that 
contrary to environment, it is the social disclosures that the market values. In other 
words, investors seem to care not about the environment alone per se, but the 
overall approach that the firm takes towards its key stakeholders (particularly the 
employees), as revealed by its social disclosures. Moreover, the results of sub-tests 
provide further evidence of the economics based disclosure theory, that is, more 
environmental (social) disclosure reflects better environmental (social) performance 
captured by a firm’s better carbon eco-efficiency (higher employee productivity).    
5.2 Hypotheses development 
According to Jensen’s (2010) enlightened stakeholder theory, in order to maximize a 
firm’s market value, managers who play a critical role in leading and sustaining the 
firm’s strategic vision, must not only satisfy, but also enlist the support of all 
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corporate stakeholders. In other words, meet other stakeholders’ needs such as 
employees and the environment to assure the long-term sustainability of the firm.  
5.2.1 ESD and firms’ market values 
With the growing investor demand for better disclosures, Lee and Hutchison (2005) 
comment that for gaining credibility, investors require disclosures to be externally 
audited. It appears that firms are now increasingly responding to the growing societal 
and shareholder pressures, by making higher and better quality environmental and 
social disclosures.  
From a capital market’s perspective, public disclosures of how a firm addresses its 
environmental and social challenges can have significant financial implications. To 
the extent that these disclosures reveal a firm’s current environmental and social 
performance as well as its future potential, investors can gauge how well the firm is 
currently managing its environmental and social risks, and how well it is equipped to 
tackle these in the future. Based on the argument that environmental disclosures can 
have significant financial implications such as cash flow outlays related to pollution 
abatement costs and/or investments in environmentally friendly technologies 
(Freedman and Patten, 2004), some studies have examined the link between a 
firm’s environmental disclosures and its share price performance (Freedman and 
Patten, 2004; Lorraine et al., 2004; Shane and Spicer, 1983; Stevens, 1984). All find 
a negative stock market reaction to release of environmental information. These 
findings are quite contrary to the expectations based on voluntary disclosure theory 
(Verrecchia, 1983) that higher and better quality i.e., hard environmental (and social) 
disclosures should help reduce information asymmetry between the firm and its 
investors (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Brammer and Pavelin, 2008; Cormier et al., 2011). 
Perhaps, the specific disclosure items or regulatory events used to measure 
disclosure in most such studies, as pointed out by Aerts et al. (2008) could be 
responsible for the negative stock market impact documented. For example, Shane 
and Spicer (1983) study the stock market reaction to the negative environmental 
publicity received by firms which feature in the Council of Economic Priorities (CEP) 
reports in the US. Consistent with their expectations, they did find a negative 
abnormal return for these firms on day t-1 and t-2 of the event date t. Lorraine et al. 
(2004) focus on the market reaction to publicity about environmental fines and 
environmental awards for a sample of 32 such events. They find that while the 
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market ignores good news, it does react to news about fines particularly to relatively 
high fines, for up to one week post release of the news. Along similar lines, 
Freedman and Patten (2004) who examine the reaction of the market to revisions in 
the Clean Air Act in 1989 in US, find that companies which disclosed higher levels of 
size-adjusted toxic releases into the air suffered more negative market reactions 
than companies with better performance. However, they also find that this effect is 
mitigated for firms which made larger financial report environmental disclosures. In 
sum while prior evidence using event type methodology, documents a largely 
negative stock market reaction to specific disclosure items, there is some early 
evidence which suggests that this impact is reduced for firms which make higher and 
detailed environmental disclosures in their annual reports (Freedman and Patten, 
2004).  
More recent work using comprehensive and objective measures of a firm’s 
environmental and social disclosures is more in line with the predictions of the 
voluntary disclosure theory and the arguments that better and higher quality 
disclosures should help reduce information asymmetry between the firm and its 
investors. For instance, Cormier et al. (2011) use measures of environmental and 
social disclosures which are classified into ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ disclosure items along the 
lines of Clarkson et al. (2008). They then develop disclosure ratings based on a 
system which assigns higher weight to hard quantitative items. Using these 
disclosure ratings, they find evidence that these disclosures help reduce the 
information asymmetry between the firm and its investors, as measured by the firm’s 
share price volatility and its bid-ask spread. They also find evidence that social and 
environmental disclosures reinforce each other, even substituting each other in 
reducing this information asymmetry. Yet, it is important to note that social 
disclosures, to date have received relatively scant attention in this literature.  
While the capital market implications of environmental disclosures have received 
considerable attention, the corresponding work on social disclosures is relatively rare 
(some notable exceptions being Cormier et al., 2009; Cormier et al., 2011; 
Freedman and Stagliano, 1991). While all of these studies find that markets do react 
to social disclosures, the evidence is mixed. Freedman and Stagliano (1991) find a 
negative reaction of the market to disclosures related to pollution abatement costs 
for health and safety reasons in the cotton industry in US in 1981. Cormier et al. 
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(2009) find that while social disclosures help reduce the information asymmetry 
between the firm and its investors, they find no such link with the firm’s market value 
as measured by its Tobin’s Q. Similar role in reducing information asymmetry is 
found by Cormier et al. (2011). It is important to note here that all of these studies 
find the market to react mainly to hard quantitative disclosures.  
In line with the market’s expectations, increasingly, firms are making objective and 
hard social disclosures which convey important information about how well the firm is 
addressing the expectations of its key stakeholders particularly its employees. A 
strong reputation in the social arena, as reflected by higher and better quality social 
disclosures, can help a firm attract and retain quality employees (Cormier et al., 
2011), enhance employee morale and hence productivity (Siegel, 2009), and help 
reduce the distributional conflicts with these key stakeholders (Heal, 2005). Hence, 
reporting responsible social behaviour can help reduce the perceived social risks of 
the firm, with associated positive link with its market value. Social (and 
environmental) risks if not managed appropriately have the potential to cause severe 
damage to the firm’s reputation; some well-known examples being those of Nike and 
Walmart (Heal, 2005) and that of the Bhopal disaster which research shows to have 
led to a major shift in the concerned firm’s disclosure policies (Deegan, 2004).  
Based on the preceding arguments, this chapter extends the analysis of Cormier et 
al. (2011) by analysing the impact of environmental and social disclosures on firm 
value. If as Cormier et al. (2011) find, environmental and social disclosures, reduce 
information asymmetry and hence perceived environmental and social risk, this 
should be reflected in higher valuation of firms making higher and better quality 
disclosures. Accordingly, it can be hypothesised in alternative form as follow: 
H1: Ceteris paribus, firms with higher environmental and/or social disclosure 
scores tend to have higher market values. 
5.2.2 Social disclosure and employee productivity 
As mentioned earlier, this chapter also tests the link between social (environmental) 
disclosure and social (environmental) performance measured by employee 
productivity (carbon eco-efficiency). First, as discussed above, it can be argued that 
by making higher social disclosure, firm would increase its trustworthiness among its 
key stakeholders particularly employees which in turn would be reflected in higher 
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employee productivity (Siegel, 2009). Furthermore, as the social disclosure score 
developed by Bloomberg mostly captures objective measures of social performance; 
it can be argued that higher social disclosure can reflect a firm’s superior social 
performance in relation to employee productivity. 
Prior studies provide some theoretical arguments of a positive link between social 
disclosure and employee productivity. According to Perrini et al. (2009),  
“CSR contributes to the bottom line via its favourable influence on a firm’s 
relationships with its relevant stakeholders. Higher and better CSR 
disclosures can increase the trustworthiness of a firm and strengthen the 
relationships with stakeholders (e.g., increased employee satisfaction), 
which can decrease transaction costs and so lead to financial gain (e.g., 
decreased employee turnover, more eager talent pool, and strike 
avoidance)” (p.9).  
Heal (2005) states a comprehensive list of the benefits that commentators have 
linked to CSR programs, including risk mitigation, waste reduction, improvement of 
relations with regulators, cost of capital reduction and improvement of human 
relations and increase of employee productivity. Furthermore, based on stakeholder 
analysis, Waddock and Graves (1997) propose that a tension exists between a firm's 
explicit costs (e.g., payments to bondholders) and its implicit costs to other 
stakeholders (e.g., product quality costs, environmental costs). They indicate a firm 
that attempts to lower its implicit costs by socially irresponsible actions will incur 
higher explicit costs, resulting in competitive disadvantage. However, for instance, an 
enlightened employee relations policy may have a very low cost, but can lead to 
substantial gains in morale and productivity, actually yielding a competitive 
advantage in comparison to less responsible firms. In addition, from an 
economic/strategic perspective on green management practices, Siegel (2009) 
argues that firms can use environmental and social related tactics to achieve their 
strategic goals such as increase of productivity and share price etc. Therefore, it can 
be hypothesized that;  
H2: Ceteris paribus, firms with higher social disclosure scores tend to have 
higher employee productivity. 
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5.2.3 Environmental disclosure and carbon eco-efficiency 
Prior literature examining the link between environmental disclosure and 
environmental performance provides mixed results. From economic based 
disclosure theory, Clarkson et al. (2008 and 2011) find a positive relation. From 
socio-political based disclosure theory (e.g., stakeholder theory or legitimacy theory), 
Brammer and Pavelin (2006 and 2008) find a negative association between the 
quality of environmental disclosure and environmental performance measured as the 
amount of environmental fine (i.e., the ratio of aggregated level of fines incurred for 
environmental transgressions over 4 years’ period to firms’ total assets). 
Furthermore, Patten (2002a) uses legitimacy theory but a different measure of 
environmental performance measurement (i.e., Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) data, 
normalized by sales) to proxy for environmental performance. Using a sample of 131 
US firms from 24 different industries, and a modified Wiseman index measure and 
line count of environmental disclosures in 1990 annual reports, Patten finds that 
TRI/sales are positively linked with both measures of environmental disclosures, 
suggesting a negative relation between a firm’s environmental performance and 
environmental disclosures.  
However, Clarkson’s et al. (2008) adapt previous research and use similar 
environmental performance measurements (i.e., the ratio of total toxic waste treated, 
recycled or processed to total toxic waste generated, and the ratio of TRI to firm 
sales). Environmental disclosure score is based on an environmental disclosure 
Index developed from GRI guidelines. Consistent with economic based disclosure 
theory, they find a positive relationship between environmental disclosure and 
environmental performance. The proxies for environmental performance of Clarkson 
et al. (2008) seem to be more appropriate, as they are the actual pollution discharge 
data published by local Environmental Protection Agency (argued by Clarkson et al., 
2008). In this chapter, carbon eco-efficiency (i.e., carbon intensity) is measured in 
the similar way as Clarkson et al. (2008), that is, the ratio of carbon emission (Scope 
1 and Scope 2) to total sales. It can be argued that firms with higher environmental 
disclosure scores would be better environmental performers, in other words, would 
tend to have better eco-efficiency (i.e., lower carbon intensity). Thus consistent with 
economics based disclosure theory and Clarkson et al.’s (2008) findings, it can be 
hypothesized that, 
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H3: Ceteris paribus, firms with higher environmental disclosure scores tend to 
have lower carbon intensity. 
5.3 Data, sample and methodology 
5.3.1 Sample and data 
In this study, the same dataset as used in the analysis in Chapter 4 is used (i.e., a 
pooled cross-section and time series dataset). The sample consists of FTSE 350 
index companies covering 2005-2009 excluding financial institutions. Based on the 
availability of environmental and social disclosure data, the final sample consists of 
629 firm-year observations. FTSE/DJ single-digit industry classification benchmark 
(ICB) is adopted, thus there are 9 industry classifications in the sample. The sample 
represents a wide range of industries over five years. As mentioned in Chapter 4, 
environmental and social disclosure scores are obtained from Bloomberg. Some new 
variables are included in this study such as market value Q ratio, employee 
productivity, carbon intensity measures and analyst coverage. Accounting data is 
from Worldscope and financial data is from Datastream. Analyst coverage is 
collected from IBES. It is worth pointing that firms’ carbon emission data is collected 
from the Carbon Disclosure Project website and published reports. Due to data 
availability issue, only year 2008 and 2009 emission data is available for the sample 
companies. 
5.3.2 Models tested and variables 
To test H1, that is the link between a firm’s market value (dependent variable) and its 
ES/E/S disclosure score (independent variables), the OLS regression model is 
specified as follows; 
Market valuei,t = β0 + β1ES/E/S Scorei,t + β2Sizei,t + β3ROAi,t + 
β4Leveragei,t + β5Financial activitiesi,t + β6Strategic holdingsi,t + 
β7Analyst coveragei,t + [Industry Dummies] + [Year Dummies] + εi,t                                                          
(5-1) 
 
In Equation (5-1), the dependent variable is market value measured by Tobin’s Q. It 
is argued by Weir et al. (2002) that Q is a proxy for how closely shareholder and 
manager interests have been aligned. They state higher the value of Q, the more 
effective the governance mechanisms and the better the market’s perception of the 
company’s performance. Tobin’s Q is measured as the ratio of total assets (02999) 
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plus market value of equity (MV) minus book value of equity (03501) to total assets 
(02999). The independent variable is ES/E/S disclosure score. The expected sign 
between the dependent variable and independent variable is positive. ‘G’ score is not 
included in this analysis, as governance-market performance link is already widely 
tested (e.g., Brown and Caylor, 2004; Gompers et al., 2003) and the relationship is 
considered to be endogenous (Adams et al., 2010; Gompers et al., 2003; Agrawal 
and Knoeber, 1996).  
Based on prior evidence, I control for firm size measured as log of sales (negative, 
see Lo and Sheu, 2007 and Weir et al., 2002), ROA (positive, see Adams and 
Mehran, 2005; Clarkson et al., 2011 and Guenster et al., 2011), leverage (negative, 
see Weir et al., 2002), financial activities (given lack of prior empirical evidence, no 
directional predictions are made in this regard), strategic shareholdings (negative, 
see Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996) and analyst coverage (positive, see Chung and Jo, 
1996). Chung and Jo (1996) find that analyst coverage (number of analysts issuing 
earnings forecasts for the firm) as an effective monitoring device reduces agency 
costs and increases the firm value measured as Tobin’s Q. Industry and time fixed 
effects are controlled in Equation (5-1). See Appendix 3 for definition and 
measurement for each control variable. 
To test H2 and H3, accordingly the OLS regression models are developed as follows;  
Employee Productivityi,t = β0 + β1S Scorei,t-1 + β2Gi,t + β3Sizei,t + β4ROSi,t + 
β5Leveragei,t + β6Capexi,t + [Industry Dummies] + εi,t                                   (5-2)                                
Carbon Intensityi,t = β0 + β1E Scorei,t-1 + β2Gi,t + β3Sizei,t + β4ROSi,t + 
β5Leveragei,t + β6Capexi,t + [Industry Dummies] + εi,t                                   (5-3)           
In equation (5-2), the dependent variable is employee productivity which is measured 
as the natural logarithm of sales per employee ratio (as also used by Huselid, 1995; 
Huselid et al., 1997; Hillier et al., 2007). It is worth mentioning that there are different 
ways of measuring employee productivity such as survey based employee 
productivity measurement. However, as argued by Huselid (1995),  
“The logarithm of sales per employee is a widely used measure of 
organizational productivity and was adopted to enhance comparability 
with prior work. The primary advantages of this measure are that it 
provides a single index that can be used to compare firms’ productivity as 
well as to estimate the dollar value of returns for investments in High 
Performance Work Practices” (p.651).  
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Further, as reviewed by Ho (2005), the variable ‘sales per employee’ has been used 
in past literature (Buckley et al., 1988; Bhagat and Black, 1999). Thus in this study, 
the logarithm of sales per employee ratio is used to measure employee productivity. 
The independent variable is the lagged S score. The reason to include lagged S 
variable is that past investments in social arena are likely to manifest in 
improvements in performance in the future.  
A number of variables are controlled in equation (5-2) including stakeholder sensitive 
governance, firm size, operating profitability, leverage and capital expenditure15. It 
can be argued that a firm with stakeholder sensitive governance tends to care more 
about its employees, which can affect employee morale and hence increase 
employee productivity. Huselid (1995) finds a positive and significant link between 
employee motivation and productivity. Thus a positive relation is predicted between 
stakeholder governance and employee productivity. Huselid (1995) investigates the 
impact of human resource management practices on turnover, productivity and 
corporate financial performance. In the productivity regression model, consistent with 
Huselid (1995)’s findings, I also control for firm size measured as logarithm of total 
employee number (negative) and capital intensity (positive). Huselid (1995) also 
argues that ‘productivity is not synonymous with profitability, however; a firm can go 
bankrupt maximizing sales per employee while ignoring current costs’ (pp.651-652). 
Thus a negative relation is predicted between profitability and employee productivity. 
It can also be argued that firms with higher leverage tend to have less money 
available to invest in employee related benefits and welfare (e.g., costs related to 
employee training and development, health and safety issues), which may negatively 
affect employee morale and productivity. Hence, a negative association is expected 
between leverage and employee productivity. Industry dummies are included 
(Delmas and Pekovic, 2012).   
In equation (5-3), the dependent variable is carbon intensity which is measured as 
the ratio of carbon emission (scope 1 and scope 2) to sales (as also used by 
                                                          
15
 Capital expenditure is measured as the ratio of capital expenditures (04601) to total sales (01001). It represents the 
funds used to acquire fixed assets other than those associated with acquisitions, including but is not restricted to additions 
to property, plant and equipment and investment in machinery and equipment. This ratio also proxies a company’s asset 
newness to some extent, since more funds used to acquire additional property, plant and equipment imply that the newer 
assets are used in the company. 
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Hoffmann and Busch 16 , 2008; Busch and Hoffmann, 2011). The independent 
variable is the lagged E score. Similarly, I control for stakeholder sensitive 
governance, firm size, operating profitability, leverage and capital expenditure. 
It can be argued that firms with stakeholder sensitive governance tend to care more 
about its stakeholders including its environmental performance. Hence, a positive 
link is predicted between G and environmental performance. Clarkson et al. (2011) 
use similar measure to capture environmental performance. Based on Clarkson et 
al.’s findings, firm size is negatively linked with environmental performance. The 
association between leverage (capital expenditure) and environmental performance 
is found to be negative (positive) but insignificant. Profitability measured as ROA is 
positively related to environmental performance. Clarkson et al. (2011) argue that 
firms with sufficient financial resources measured as profitability (ROA), liquidity 
(operating cash flow) and leverage, tend to have better environmental performance. 
However, it can be argued that firms with more sales related profitability (i.e., ROS) 
have higher environmental impact (i.e., emit more carbon). Thus the link between 
ROS and environmental performance is expected to be negative. It can also be 
argued that the more money spent on newer equipment and technologies in 
production (i.e., capital expenditure), the lower would be the environmental impact of 
the firm. In other words, firms with newer, cleaner technologies are likely to have a 
superior environmental performance. Hence, a positive relation is expected between 
capital expenditure and environmental performance. In equation (5-3) environmental 
performance is measured as carbon intensity ratio (i.e., higher carbon intensity, 
worse environmental performance or less carbon eco-efficient). Accordingly, the 
predicted sign (i.e., inversed relations) with respect to each control variable is stated 
as follows: G (negative), firm size (positive), ROS (negative), leverage (positive) and 
capital expenditure (negative). Industry dummies are also included in equation (5-3). 
Petersen (2009) two-way standard errors clustering (firm and year) approach is used 
to test H2 and H3.  
 
 
                                                          
16 Carbon intensity relates to a company’s physical carbon performance and describes the extent to which its business 
activities are based on carbon usage for a defined scope and fiscal year (Hoffmann and Busch, 2008 p.509). 
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5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Descriptive and correlation statistics 
Table 5.1 provides the descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analyses.  
Table 5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Variable Observation Median Mean S.D. Min Max 
Q ratio 627 1.55 1.88 1.35 0.38 18.93 
Productivity 621 5.03 5.17 0.96 2.18 9.65 
Carbon 
intensity 169 0.07 0.44 1.42 0 17.3 
E 619 19.51 22.02 13.53 2.33 63.57 
S 627 28.07 32.10 12.87 4.69 70.18 
G 629 51.79 51.56 8.50 5.36 76.79 
Et-1 381 20.93 22.72 13.76 2.33 62.79 
St-1 388 28.07 32.84 13.16 4.69 70.18 
ROA 627 0.11 0.13 0.14 -0.46 1.31 
ROS 622 0.12 0.15 0.27 -1.28 5.42 
Size_emp 622 9.34 9.29 1.62 2.57 13.30 
Size_sales 622 14.38 14.47 1.54 10.31 19.56 
Leverage 627 0.23 0.25 0.19 0 1.33 
Capex 622 0.04 0.09 0.20 0 3.36 
Fin_acts 627 0.002 0.02 0.07 -0.01 0.85 
Str_holds 629 0.16 0.20 0.17 0 0.83 
Analyst 
coverage 626 13 13.76 6.05 1 35 
Notes: Q ratio is defined as total assets plus market value of equity minus book value of equity divided by 
total assets; Productivity refers to employee productivity and is measured as natural logarithm of sales per 
employee ratio; Carbon intensity is measured as the ratio of carbon emission (scope 1 and scope 2) to 
sales; E denotes environmental disclosure; S denotes social disclosure; G is defined as stakeholder 
sensitive governance disclosure; Et-1 and St-1 refer to one year lagged E and S score respectively; ROA 
is defined as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets at the beginning of the year; 
ROS denotes the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to net sales; Size_emp denotes firm size 
measured as natural logarithm of employee number; Size_sales denotes firm size measured as natural 
logarithm of total sales; Leverage is measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets; Capex is defined as 
the ratio of capital expenditures to net sales; Fin_acts denotes financial activities and is measured as the 
ratio of net proceeds from sale/issue of common and/or preferred stock during the year to total assets at 
the beginning of the year;  Str_holds refers to strategic shareholdings and is measured as the percentage 
of total shares in issue held strategically and not available to ordinary shareholders (holdings of 5% or 
more are counted as strategic); Analyst coverage denotes  number of analysts following firms’ earning.  
 
As Table 5.1 shows the mean values of Q ratio is 1.88. The average employee 
productivity is 5.17 after taking logarithm (i.e., equivalent to 175037 GBP per 
employee) and the average carbon intensity is 0.44 (equivalent to 440 tonnes of 
carbon emission per 1 GBP of sales). As many variables are described in the 
‘descriptive statistics’ section in Chapter 4, they are not discussed here. The mean 
value of ROA is 13%. The average firm size measured as natural logarithm of sales 
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is 14.47, which approximates 1.9 billion GBP of sales. On average, there are 14 
analysts issuing earnings forecasts for a firm. Most median values are closed to 
mean values, which indicates that the sample is not affected by outliers and is 
normally distributed 17 . A plot of E/S/ES disclosure distribution is attached in 
Appendix 4. Of note, the number of observations for each variable varies slightly 
based on the availability of data for the variable18. 
The pair-wise correlation matrices for testing H1, H2 and H3 are displayed in Table 
5.2a, 5.2b and 5.2c respectively. As Table 5.2a, 5.2b and 5.2c shown, 
multicollinearity is not likely to be an issue for testing H1, H2 and H3. 
 
Table 5.2 a Pair-wise correlation matrix for testing H1 
Notes: ES denotes the sum of E and S scores; E denotes environmental disclosure; S denotes social disclosure; 
Q ratio is defined as total assets plus market value of equity minus book value of equity divided by total assets; 
ROA is defined as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets at the beginning of the year; 
Size_sales denotes firm size measured as natural logarithm of total sales; Leverage is measured as the ratio of 
total debt to total assets; Fin_acts denotes financial activities and is measured as the ratio of net proceeds from 
sale/issue of common and/or preferred stock during the year to total assets at the beginning of the year; 
Str_holds refers to strategic shareholdings and is measured as the percentage of total shares in issue held 
strategically and not available to ordinary shareholders (holdings of 5% or more are counted as strategic); 
Analyst coverage denotes  number of analysts following firms’ earning. *, **, *** indicates significance at 
the .10, .05, .01 levels respectively.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
17
 It is worth pointing out that the mean value of carbon intensity is 0.44, while the median value is 0.07. This indicates that 
the mass of my data is concentrated on the right hand side of the frequency curve chart (i.e., the distribution is skewed). 
Because there is a large value (checked and it is not an outlier) of carbon intensity (carbon emission to sales ratio =17.3) 
and some 0 values, which may affect the mean value. To cope with this, I take natural logarithm of carbon intensity 
variable plus one (to maintain the same number of observations). The skewness decreases from 10.17 to 2.98. The mean 
value of the new variable is 0.25. Then I rerun the regression with respect to carbon intensity using Petersen two-way 
clustering approach, which provides similar results.  
18
 The descriptive statistics provided on Table 5.1 are appropriate, as the number of each variable is used in different 
regressions. For example, the sample size of regression model explaining Q ratio or productivity is more than 600, and the 
results with non-missing values are similar to the original ones and will be explained further under the results of Table 5.3. 
Although the number of carbon intensity is 169, it is only used in the carbon intensity regression and is not affected by 
other variables. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
1 ES 1.00          
2 E 0.91*** 1.00         
3 S 0.90*** 0.64*** 1.00        
4 Q ratio -0.06 -0.09** -0.01 1.00       
5 ROA -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 0.53*** 1.00      
6 Size_sales 0.61*** 0.56*** 0.54*** -0.33*** -0.16*** 1.00     
7 Leverage 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.08* -0.03 0.04 1.00    
8 Fin_acts 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.17*** -0.01 -0.11*** -0.08* 1.00   
9 Str_holds -0.26*** -0.28*** -0.18*** 0.06 0.10*** -0.30*** -0.08** -0.09** 1.00  
10 Analyst 
coverage 
0.49*** 0.44*** 0.44*** -0.04 -0.02 0.62*** 0.11*** -0.05 -0.27*** 1.00 
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Table 5.2b: Pair-wise correlation matrix for testing H2 
         Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1 Productivity 1.00       
2 St-1 0.24*** 1.00      
3 G 0.19*** 0.56*** 1.00     
4 Size_emp -0.38*** 0.41*** 0.28*** 1.00    
5 ROS 0.13*** 0.02 0.05 -0.21*** 1.00   
6 Leverage -0.14*** 0.01 -0.12*** 0.12*** 0.01 1.00  
7 Capex 0.15*** 0.04 0.06 -0.27*** 0.28*** 0.06 1.00 
Notes: Productivity refers to employee productivity and is measured as natural logarithm of sales per employee 
ratio; St-1 refers to one year lagged S score; G is defined as stakeholder sensitive governance disclosure; 
Size_emp denotes firm size measured as natural logarithm of employee number; ROS denotes the ratio of 
earnings before interest and taxes to net sales; Leverage is measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets; 
Capex is defined as the ratio of capital expenditures to net sales. *, **, *** indicates significance at 
the .10, .05, .01 levels respectively.   
 
 
Table 5.2c: Pair-wise correlation matrix for testing H3 
         Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1 Carbon 
intensity 
1.00       
2 Et-1 0.01 1.00      
3 G 0.07 0.53*** 1.00     
4 Size_emp -0.06 0.41*** 0.30*** 1.00    
5 ROS 0.12 0.00 0.02 -0.19*** 1.00   
6 Leverage 0.07 0.03 -0.10* 0.16*** 0.03 1.00  
7 Capex 0.05 0.14** 0.08 -0.26*** 0.25*** 0.03 1.00 
Notes: Carbon intensity is measured as the ratio of carbon emission (scope 1 and scope 2) to sales; Et-1 refers 
to one year lagged E score; G is defined as stakeholder sensitive governance disclosure; Size_emp denotes firm 
size measured as natural logarithm of employee number; ROS denotes the ratio of earnings before interest and 
taxes to net sales; Leverage is measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets; Capex is defined as the ratio of 
capital expenditures to net sales. *, **, *** indicates significance at the .10, .05, .01 levels respectively.   
5.4.2 Regression analysis 
Table 5.3 displays the results of testing H1 (i.e., the link between ES/E/S score and 
market value).  
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Table 5.3: OLS regressions explaining market value (Equation 5-1) 
  Q ratio (Dependent variable) 
 Predicted 
sign 
 
ES 
 
E 
 
S 
Intercept  5.59*** 
(8.16) 
5.53*** 
(8.43) 
5.79*** 
(9.50) 
ES + 0.01** 
(2.04) 
  
E +  0.002 
(0.50) 
 
S +   0.01*** 
(3.03) 
Size_sales - -0.31*** 
(-7.33) 
-0.29*** 
(-7.20) 
-0.32*** 
(-7.73) 
ROA + 5.01*** 
(3.72) 
4.99*** 
(3.67) 
5.05*** 
(3.89) 
Leverage - -0.18 
(-0.43) 
-0.20 
(-0.47) 
-0.21 
(-0.51) 
Fin_acts +/- 1.44** 
(2.27) 
1.45** 
(2.31) 
1.49** 
(2.27) 
Str_holds - -0.10 
(-0.30) 
-0.11 
(-0.33) 
-0.18 
(-0.55) 
Analyst 
coverage 
+ 0.02** 
(2.09) 
0.03*** 
(2.71) 
0.02* 
(1.70) 
Industry 
effect 
 Yes Yes Yes 
Year effect  Yes Yes Yes 
N  607 609 617 
Clusters  231 232 233 
R2  51.22% 50.62% 52.15% 
F-test  12.26*** 11.99*** 13.11*** 
Notes: Q ratio is defined as total assets plus market value of equity minus book value of equity divided by total 
assets; ES denotes the sum of E and S scores; E denotes environmental disclosure; S denotes social disclosure; 
ROA is defined as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets at the beginning of the year; 
Size_sales denotes firm size measured as natural logarithm of total sales; Leverage is measured as the ratio of 
total debt to total assets; Fin_acts denotes financial activities and is measured as the ratio of net proceeds from 
sale/issue of common and/or preferred stock during the year to total assets at the beginning of the year; 
Str_holds refers to strategic shareholdings and is measured as the percentage of total shares in issue held 
strategically and not available to ordinary shareholders (holdings of 5% or more are counted as strategic); 
Analyst coverage denotes  number of analysts following firms’ earning; T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** 
indicates significance at the .10, .05, .01 levels respectively. Standard errors are computed with procedure 
allowing for clustering across observations corresponding to the same firms for different years. 
 
As table 5.3 shown (results with respect to Equation 5-1), there is a positive and 
significant association between ES disclosure and a firm’s Q ratio. This result 
suggests that firms which provide higher and better overall E and S information, help 
reduce information asymmetry between the firm and the investors thus reducing the 
perceived risk in these areas (Cormier et al., 2011) which is then reflected in higher 
market values for such firms. At a disaggregated level, similar results are generated 
for social disclosure, though not for E disclosures. In some ways, this finding is quite 
surprising, given the preponderance in literature on capital market implications of 
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environmental performance and environmental disclosures. The findings suggest 
that while the academia has focused more on environmental issues in CSR research, 
for investors it is the social performance and its subsequent disclosure that matters 
more. It seems that investors tend to place a relatively higher value on how firms 
address their social responsibilities particularly towards their employees. Anecdotal 
evidence indicates that prominent distributional conflicts between business and its 
stakeholders have been related to labour issues; well-known examples being Nike 
and Wal-Mart (see Heal, 2005 for further details). It appears that investors have now 
become sensitised to a business’s key stakeholder particularly labour management 
practices and value higher a firm which better communicates its employee related 
practices.  
The relations with respect to control variables in Table 5.3 are as expected and 
consistent with existing literature. There is a negative and significant relationship 
between firm size and Q ratio (Lo and Sheu, 2007 and Weir et al., 2002). ROA is 
positively and significantly related to Q ratio (Clarkson et al., 2011; Guenster et al., 
2011). Financial activities variable is found to be positively and significantly linked 
with Q ratio, implying that firms which raise funds by issuing/selling stocks/bonds 
tend to have higher market values. Lang and Lundholm (1996) find that more 
disclosure leads to more analysts following. Consistent with Chung and Jo’s (1996) 
finding that analyst coverage is an effective monitoring device, which reduces 
agency costs and increases the value of a firm, it is found that the level of analyst 
coverage is positively and significantly related to a firm’s Q ratio.  
It is worth noting that I also check the impact of missing observations on the results. 
First, I check the number of observations left with non-missing values. Second, I run 
a summary statistics and compare with the original descriptive table. Finally, re-run 
all regressions on Table 5.3 with non-missing values, and compare the results. The 
results show that there are 607 observations left with non-missing values. The 
summary statistics (e.g., mean values) are very closed to the original table. All 
results with non-missing values are similar to the results on Table 5.3. Therefore, the 
results are not affected by any missing values, and the descriptive statistics provided 
on Table 5.1 are reliable to carry out the above analysis. 
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Table 5.4 presents the results with respect to Equation 5-2 (i.e., H2: the association 
between S score and employee productivity) and Equation 5-3 (i.e., H3: the relation 
between E score and environmental eco-efficiency).  
Table 5.4 OLS regressions explaining carbon intensity and employee 
productivity 
  Dependent variable 
 Predicted 
sign 
Carbon 
intensity(Eq5-4) 
Predicted 
sign 
Productivity(Eq5-3) 
  Et-1  St-1 
Intercept  1.01 
(0.69) 
 6.65*** 
(13.95) 
Et-1 - -0.01* 
(-1.68) 
  
St-1   + 0.01** 
(2.28) 
G - -0.01 
(-0.42) 
+ 0.02*** 
(3.72) 
Size_emp + -0.02 
(-0.42) 
- -0.28*** 
(-8.16) 
ROS + 0.45*** 
(3.05) 
- -0.23*** 
(-2.66) 
Leverage + -0.17 
(-0.22) 
- -0.18 
(-0.88) 
Capex - -0.04 
(-0.20) 
+ -0.69*** 
(-3.92) 
Industry effect  Yes  Yes 
N  148  384 
R
2
  18.08%  50.90% 
F-test  6.21***  25.33*** 
Notes: Productivity refers to employee productivity and is measured as natural logarithm of 
sales per employee ratio; Carbon intensity is measured as the ratio of carbon emission 
(scope 1 and scope 2) to sales; Et-1 and St-1 refer to one year lagged E and S score 
respectively; G is defined as stakeholder sensitive governance disclosure; Size_emp 
denotes firm size measured as natural logarithm of employee number; ROS denotes the 
ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to net sales; Leverage is measured as the ratio of 
total debt to total assets; Capex is defined as the ratio of capital expenditures to net sales. 
T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates significance at the .10, .05, .01 levels 
respectively. Standard errors are computed using Petersen (2009) two-way clustering (firm 
and year) approach. 
 
With respect to the results of employee productivity (Equation 5-2), there is a positive 
and significant relation between lagged S score and employee productivity (support 
for H2). In other words, it implies that more employee related social disclosure (S 
score developed by Bloomberg is more employee related) increases a firm’s 
trustworthiness among its key stakeholders particularly employees, which in turn is 
reflected in higher employee productivity. This finding is also consistent with 
economics based disclosure theory that more social disclosure in previous year 
reflects better social performance (captured by higher employee productivity) in the 
current year.  
141 
 
It is important to note that there is a positive and significant relation between 
governance and employee productivity, which implies that stakeholder sensitive 
governance matters for employee productivity. In other words, firms with stakeholder 
sensitive governance tend to care more about their employees (a key stakeholder). 
In turn, these firms can benefit from higher employee productivity. This finding is 
consistent with Heal (2005) and Waddock and Graves (1997) arguments that CSR 
programme can improve employee productivity, especially an enlightened employee 
relations policy may have a very low cost, but can lead to substantial gains in 
employee morale and productivity, hence yield a competitive advantage in 
comparison to less socially responsible firms. It is found that firm size is negatively 
and significantly linked with employee productivity, which is as found by Huselid 
(1995) as well as by Delmas and Pekovic (2012). ROS is negatively and significantly 
related to employee productivity, which is consistent with Huselid’s (1995) argument 
that employee productivity is not synonymous with profitability, as well as consistent 
with Waddock and Graves’s (1997) argument that social responsible firms may have 
higher implicit costs to other stakeholders such as employees, hence leads to lower 
profitability (but higher employee productivity). Huselid (1995) finds capital intensity 
(measured by the ratio of gross property, plant, and equipment over total employee 
number) is positively linked with productivity, while R&D expenditures (measured by 
the logarithm of the ratio of R&D expenditures to sales) are negatively associated 
with productivity. However, a negative link between capital expenditure and 
employee productivity is found. This finding may result from the denominator of 
capital expenditure variable (measured as the ratio of capital expenses to total sales 
instead of total employee number). 
Regarding the results of carbon intensity (Equation 5-3), there is a negative and 
significant relation between lagged E score and carbon intensity (support of H3). 
This finding is consistent with economics based disclosure theory that more 
environmental disclosure in prior year can be a reflection of better environmental 
performance in current year. This result implies that firms providing more 
environmental related information in prior year are willing to show their commitment 
to be environmentally responsible by reducing their carbon emission in current year. 
Consistent with my expectation, ROS is positively and significantly linked with carbon 
intensity, which suggests that firms with higher sales tend to have higher 
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environmental impact (i.e., they emit more). It appears that carbon eco-efficiency is 
affected by industry. From the results (not reported), it is can be seen that firms in Oil 
& Gas and Basic Materials industries emit more carbon (Scope 1 and Scope 2) 
compared to other industries. Thus it is not surprising that prior studies tend to focus 
on highly polluting firms, when examining environmental responsibility (Clarkson et 
al., 2008 and 2011).   
5.5 Discussion and conclusions 
To sum up, this study finds that higher overall environmental and social disclosures, 
but particularly social disclosures matter to investors. Investors appear to be placing 
a higher value on the firm seen to be behaving in a socially responsible manner. 
They can evaluate how well the firm is currently managing its environmental and 
social risks, and value such firm accordingly. More responsible behaviour in the 
social arena as reflected by its subsequent disclosure, helps mitigate the information 
asymmetry and hence the perceived social risks of the firm. Therefore, investors 
place higher values on such firms. Since the S score mostly covers aspects related 
to employee and human relations, this finding implies that while firms seem to care 
more about the environment (perhaps in anticipation of impending regulation), 
investors seem to value more how the firms treat their key stakeholders particularly 
the human resources. Furthermore, these results are consistent with the predictions 
of the voluntary disclosure theory (Verrecchia, 1983) and imply that despite being 
costs, firms are willing to provide relevant information voluntarily to the market, if the 
expected benefits of such disclosures are higher than the associated costs.  
The findings of testing the link between social (environmental) disclosure and social 
(environmental) performance are consistent with the economics based disclosure 
theory. In other words, more social (environmental) disclosure in prior year reflects 
better social (environmental) performance captured by higher employee productivity 
(more carbon eco-efficiency) in the current year. Furthermore, more social disclosure 
helps build trust among a firm’s key stakeholders particularly employees, which in 
turn would be reflected in higher employee productivity. This is also consistent with 
Siegel’s (2009) argument that firms tend to use environmental or social related 
tactics (e.g., environmental or social disclosures) to align the interests between their 
shareholders and stakeholders. Thus firms can benefit from providing more 
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environmental or social disclosure in prior year. These findings are also consistent 
with stakeholder theory implying that firms with more stakeholder sensitivity care 
more about their employee related benefits or wellbeing, which could affect 
employee morale and productivity. In short, prior environmental and social 
disclosures can reflect a firm’s current environmental (carbon eco-efficiency or less 
direct costs related to pollution/carbon emission trading) or social performance 
(employee productivity).  
Prior studies tend to focus more on environmental aspect; this study adds 
significance to social disclosure. In other words, social disclosure plays as important 
role as environmental disclosure (perhaps more important). The preceding chapter 
provides some evidence that corporate governance (captured by the G variable) 
matters for a firm’s environmental and social performance. In the next chapter, I will 
examine in detail the links between board attributes, CSR strategy and firms’ 
environmental and social performance.  
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Chapter 6: Board attributes, CSR strategy and firms’ environmental 
and social performance 
6.1 Introduction 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Companies Act 2006 sec. 172 stated that a director 
should consider wider range of stakeholders (e.g., employees, environment, 
customers, community and suppliers) to promote long-term business success. On 
the one hand, Kim and Nofsinger (2007) argue that from the stakeholder perspective, 
corporate governance is the mechanism that ensures corporations take responsibility 
for directing their activities in a manner fair to all stakeholders. On the other hand, 
from the broader conception of corporate governance (CG), Jamali et al. (2008) find 
that there is a clear overlap between CG and the stakeholder conception of CSR. 
Both CG and CSR call on companies to assume their fiduciary and moral 
responsibilities towards stakeholders. This act of accountability is crucial for a 
business to gain and retain the trust of its financial investors and other stakeholders 
(Page, 2005). Indeed, Jamali et al. (2008) conclude that there is a two-way 
relationship. CG and CSR should not be considered and sustained independently. 
CG is not entirely effective without a sustainable CSR drive, because a company has 
to meet various stakeholders’ needs in order to create value for its shareholders. 
Recognizing the important role that boards play in addressing wider stakeholder 
responsibility, a few prior studies have addressed the effects of corporate 
governance (especially board attributes) on CSR (Johnson and Greening, 1999; 
Mallin and Michelon, 2011; Post et al., 2011). Recently, Mallin and Michelon (2011) 
investigate the relation between various board attributes and a firm’s CSR 
performance, and find that board attributes such as board size, independence and 
diversity significantly affect a firm’s CSR performance. Hence, from a strategic 
perspective, developing and implementing the appropriate CSR vision and strategy 
of firms is the function of corporate board (Ho, 2005; Mackenzie, 2007).  
As shown in Figure 3.2, to date, prior studies drawing on the management 
perspective, particularly the resource-based view of the firm, have studied the link 
between a firm’s managerial environmental strategy (though assumed to be 
unobserved or measured indirectly) and its environmental performance (e.g., Al-
Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Clarkson et al., 2011); or from a corporate governance 
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perspective (e.g., resource dependency theory) have studied the link between a 
firm’s board attributes and corporate social performance (Johnson and Greening, 
1999; Mallin and Michelon, 2011). However, prior literature on CSR from both 
management and corporate governance perspectives has tended to suffer from 
conceptual as well as methodological limitations.  
As discussed extensively in Chapter 3 section 3.3.3, studies drawing on the 
management literature hypothesise that superior managerial capabilities and 
superior CSR strategy translate into superior CSR performance. However, neither of 
these two explanatory variables is explicitly accounted for in the research design. As 
also discussed extensively in Chapter 3 section 3.3.1 and 3.3.2, studies from the 
corporate governance perspective, while acknowledging the strategy setting and 
advisory role of the board (e.g., Mallin and Michelon, 2011), neither explicitly 
consider the strategic actions of the board in this regard, nor control for the possible 
endogeneity of the link between board attributes and CSR performance (as is 
implied by Hermalin and Weisbach’s 2003 model). Hence, to date, no prior study 
takes a more integrated approach and examines the link between a firm’s board 
attributes, its CSR strategy and its environmental and social performance.  
In this chapter, using a sample of UK firms included in the FTSE All-Share Index 
from 2002 to 2010, I investigate the relations among board attributes, CSR strategy 
and firm environmental and social performance. Using an aggregated measure of 
CSR strategy and a latent construct capturing board level CSR orientation, I also 
examine the possible endogenous link between board attributes, board CSR strategy 
and firm environmental and social performance.  
This study thus improves on prior literature both conceptually and methodologically. 
Drawing upon two largely independent streams of literature in the field of CSR, 
namely corporate governance literature and CSR as a competitive strategy literature, 
the findings suggest that in order to develop a more complete understanding of firms’ 
CSR performance drivers, it is important to integrate the two streams in such types 
of analyses. Methodologically, it incorporates the influences of both board level CSR 
orientation and strategy on firms’ environmental and social performance; explicitly 
measures CSR strategy; and uses structural equation modelling technique to test 
whether this link is endogenous.   
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6.2 Theoretical model and hypotheses development 
As reviewed in Section 3.3.4, Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) argue that the board of 
directors of a company is an endogenously determined institution. It implies that the 
choice of directors on a board would be a within-equilibrium phenomenon 
determined by the company’s own characteristics including its (CSR related) 
strategies and financial/non-financial performance (such as CSR performance). 
Hence, adapted from Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) theoretical model, Figure 6.1 
displays the adapted theoretical model and relevant hypotheses. 
Figure 6.1: The structural equation model on boards of directors 
Measurement model: 
 
 
 
 
Structural model: 
 
 
 
 
As Figure 6.1 illustrates, the relation between CSR-related board characteristics and 
CSR performance is not only likely to be endogenous, but is likely to be mediated by 
appropriate CSR strategy such as taking the decisions and actions like putting in 
place a CSR committee.  
Adapted from Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) 
H1 
H3 
H2 
H1 
CSR strategy  
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and social 
performance 
Board CSR 
Orientation 
(Endogenous) 
Board CSR 
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While the literature review in sections 3.3.1, 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 respectively makes clear 
the direction and nature of the causal links expected between board CSR attributes, 
CSR strategy and firm environmental and social performance, it does not clarify how 
CSR performance may affect board CSR attributes. In this regard, while consistent 
with the empirical and theoretical work of Hermalin and Weisbach (1998, 2003), it 
can be argued that performance could also affect board attributes. However, no 
prediction is made (either positive or negative) regarding the nature of this relation. 
One can argue that if poor CSR performance leads to addition of CSR-conducive 
board members (in response to say stakeholder pressure, consistent with legitimacy 
theory based arguments), then the link would be negative. For example, appoint 
more independent and/or women directors who are able to bring in precious 
resources to enhance the organisational legitimacy. If however, it is the case that 
superior CSR performers want to further build on this competitive advantage, as 
suggested by RBV theory, then they would respond to superior CSR performance, 
by further strengthening the board level CSR orientation. In this case, the link would 
be positive. Thus it can be an open empirical question.  
In addition, drawing upon prior empirical evidence, I use three board characteristics 
that have been found to have a significant link with a firm’s CSR performance 
namely: board independence (proportion of outside directors), gender diversity and 
audit committee expertise, to capture board level CSR orientation (i.e., a latent 
variable). Based on above theoretical model and prior empirical evidence (as 
reviewed in Chapter 3 sections 3.3.1, 3.3.2 and section 3.3.3), three hypotheses are 
developed as follows: 
H1: Board CSR orientation is positively associated with CSR strategy.   
H2: CSR strategy is positively associated with a firm’s environmental and 
social performance. 
H3: Both a firm’s environmental performance and social performance are 
positively (negatively) associated with board CSR orientation. 
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6.3 Variables and models 
6.3.1 Endogenous variables  
Board CSR orientation 
To capture the latent construct, board’s CSR orientation, I use three board attributes 
as indicators, namely board independence (i.e., proportion of outside director 
representation on board); board gender diversity; and financial expertise on audit 
committee. Below I discuss the rationale for inclusion of each of these variables.  
Board independence: According to Agency theory, to reduce opportunism and 
agency costs, boards should consist of a greater proportion of outside directors (i.e., 
be more independent). With a greater proportion of outsiders, a board is likely to be 
more independent and has greater monitoring potential (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
Outside directors can monitor the behaviour of managers and intervene when 
managers behave opportunistically (Post et al., 2011). For example, inside directors 
may tend to be more attentive than outsiders to short-term economic performance 
goals, while outsiders may consider that attending to the environmental issue is also 
important for the long-term interest of shareholders (Johnson and Greening, 1999). 
Moreover, board independence might be important in governing climate change 
because independence would be expected to inject new insights and perspectives 
related to environmental and social stakeholders, while challenging existing mental 
models in decision making that may be focused exclusively on the economic bottom 
line (Galbreath, 2010). The 2010 Code section B.1.2 recommends that large UK 
listed firms should have at least half of the board composed of independent NEDs. 
According to the Code, a director considered to be independent, he/she should have 
not previously been an employee of the company (within the last five years); have no 
family or business link with the company; do not hold any cross directorship; should 
not represent any significant shareholder; should not receive additional remuneration 
from the company apart from a director’s fee; and should not have been on the 
Board for more than nine years.  
From a resource dependency theory perspective, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) 
suggest that the selection of a greater number of independent directors signals a 
firm’s intent to pay greater attention to its external environment and legitimacy. 
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According to their resource dependence framework, independent directors attract 
valuable resources to a firm’s viability in terms of establishing external links with 
stakeholders and other organisations and enhancing the reputation of the firm. 
Furthermore, the presence of independent directors on the board should increase 
the board’s objectivity and its ability to represent multiple points of view about firms’ 
environment and among stakeholders. Wang and Dewhirst (1992) find outside 
directors are likely to have a stakeholder orientation. In addition, Mallin and Michelon 
(2011) consider outsider directors to be boundary spanners who can attract valuable 
resources to a firm as well as help a firm establish external links with stakeholders 
and other organisations. Thus independent directors are more conscious of 
stakeholders’ expectation. Based on the discussed evidence, it can be argued that 
the more independent a board, the more CSR oriented it is likely to be. Asset4 the 
database used in this study measures board independence by the percentage of 
independent board members as reported by a company. 
Board diversity: There is a growing societal as well as regulatory pressure (see 
Financial Reporting Council, 2011) on companies to become more diverse and 
inclusive. According to a study by Sealy and Vinnicombe (2012) women directors 
made up 11.2% of executive and 33.8% of non-executive directors on FTSE 350 
companies in 2012. In terms of the stakeholder-related values and competencies 
that women bring on board, a study by Singh et al. (2006) finds that women are more 
likely to possess business as well as community related expertise. Furthermore, a 
study by Kramer et al. (2006) finds that the presence of women on boards tends to 
broaden the content of boardroom discussion to include the perspectives of multiple 
stakeholders. A recent comprehensive literature review of women on corporate 
boards also draws the conclusion that most research on the role of women on 
boards is focused around their potential role in building fairer and more inclusive 
business institutions that reflect the expectations of present generation of 
stakeholders (Terjesen et al., 2009). Nielsen and Huse (2010) draw upon theories of 
gender differences and group effectiveness to examine the contribution of women on 
boards of directors. Their findings suggest that women tend to accept others’ 
positions, support and sooth others and contribute to relational and interpersonal 
problems. The Financial Reporting Council (2011) consultation document on gender 
diversity also echoes the expectation that women on boards may help companies 
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build better relationship with its key stakeholders like customers and employees. 
Hence, it is expected that the greater the proportion of women on board, the higher a 
board’s CSR orientation. Asset4 measures board diversity as percentage of women 
on the board of directors. 
Financial expertise on audit committee: The UK Combined Code (2003), consistent 
with the recommendations of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002) in the US (which is 
used by Asset4 for measuring audit committee expertise), suggests that at least 
some members of audit committees should have adequate knowledge of finance and 
financial matters. Audit committees are responsible for internal control and for 
managing both the financial and non-financial risks faced by a firm. As environmental 
risks can have significant financial implications in the form of environmental fines as 
well as potential cash outlays for pollution control and for investments in 
environmentally friendly technologies (Freedman and Patten, 2004), audit 
committees with members having financial expertise are likely to be better equipped 
for developing policies and strategies that can help avoid and manage these risks. In 
this regard, Goodstein and Boeker (1991) state the specific and unique individual 
competencies of board directors contribute differently to the board process and 
priorities; thus motivate management to adopt specific strategies and actions. 
According to resource dependence theory (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978), board directors with financial expertise on audit committees can 
play an effective service role as advisors, boundary spanners, as well as resource 
providers. As advisors and boundary spanners, they can help a firm better assess its 
CSR risks and challenges, and help develop an effective strategic response such as 
encouraging compliance with GRI guidelines. As resource providers, they can help a 
firm develop links with external organisations like external environmental audit 
agencies, and encourage a firm to opt for the decision to get an external audit of its 
CSR report. Research shows that external audit of CSR report is valued highly by 
investors (Lee and Hutchison, 2005). Asset4 measures audit committee expertise as 
a dummy variable with a score 1 if a firm has an audit committee with at least three 
members, one of whom is considered as a “financial expert” within the meaning of 
Sarbanes-Oxley, and 0 otherwise.  
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CSR Strategy 
Relatively little research has specifically identified variables that could capture a 
firm’s strategic stance towards its CSR-related responsibilities. A notable exception 
is the study by Galbreath (2010) who uses five categories of the California 
Environmental Resources Evaluation System (CERES) to demonstrate a firm’s 
proactive posture towards climate change. Asset4 develops an index for capturing a 
firm’s board level CSR policy and strategy based on measures that are closely 
aligned with those used by Galbreath (2010). These variables are: 1) integration by a 
firm of its financial and extra-financial reporting; 2) decision to report or otherwise on 
the firm’s CSR-related global activities; 3) existence or otherwise of a board CSR 
committee; 4) decision to have an external audit of CSR report; 5) decision to comply 
with GRI guidelines. How these variables contribute to an effective CSR strategy is 
discussed below. 
a) Integration of financial and extra-financial reporting; and b) CSR global activities 
reporting: In terms of the relevance for a firm’s CSR strategy, the above two 
variables can be considered to be an attempt on the part of the firm to commit to 
providing relevant and timely voluntary disclosure about its extra-financial activities 
including environmental and social challenges they face globally. As studies suggest 
(e.g., Cormier et al., 2011), such disclosures help reduce information asymmetry 
between a firm and its investors; thus build trust and reduce perceived firm risk.  
Corporate governance is also intimately concerned with honesty and transparency, 
which are increasingly expected of the public both in corporate dealings and 
disclosure (Page, 2005). Investor confidence and market efficiency depend on the 
disclosure of credible information about a firm’s financial and extra-financial 
performance. OECD 2004 principles propose CG framework to ‘promote transparent 
and efficient market’ and to ‘provide timely and accurate disclosure’. It is voluntary 
for a firm to provide extra-financial information, for example, openly reporting about 
the challenges or opportunities of integrating financial and non-financial issues and 
disclosure of global activities in the extra-financial reports. From economic based 
voluntary disclosure theory, the more extra-financial reporting (in terms of challenges 
and opportunities and global activities) a firm provides, the more inclined it would be 
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towards stakeholder engagement and the better environmental or social performer it 
likely to be.  
Existence of CSR committee: Having a separate CSR committee not only indicates a 
public recognition of the importance of environmental and social responsibilities for 
the firm at the top, but also demonstrates the putting in place of human resources 
and organisational structures, for providing effective planning and oversight in this 
area. According to Mackenzie (2007), the key activities of CSR committees are 
discussing issues and risks, setting standards, reviewing implementation and 
disclosure, and philanthropy (e.g., reviewing CSR issues, identifying non-financial 
risks and monitoring risk management, establishing policies and standards, 
monitoring compliance with the performance against companies CSR policies, 
reviewing company reporting on CSR, overseeing philanthropic activity, reviewing 
company’s adoption of external codes and inclusion in CSR indices such as 
FTSE4Good, and looking at management implementation plans and targets). Overall, 
Mackenzie (2007) states that CSR committees play an important role in assisting the 
management in CSR strategy formulation and in reviewing the firm’s CSR 
performance.  
External audit of CSR report: The decision to have the CSR report externally audited 
demonstrates a further commitment on the part of the firm to building trust with its 
stakeholders. “The objective of the verification is to provide an opinion to 
stakeholders on the accuracy and reliability of selected KPI data presented in the 
report” (The Go-Ahead Group Plc, Corporate Responsibility Report 2010, p.22). 
Furthermore, Cooper and Owen (2007) analyze 12 corporate sustainability reports 
and find that assurance providers make specific reference to carrying out their work 
in relation to the AA1000 Assurance Standard that has a profound stakeholder 
orientation. Research shows that external audit of CSR report is valued highly by 
investors. For example, Lee and Hutchison (2005) suggest that for gaining credibility, 
investors demand CSR disclosures of firms to be externally audited. Hence, the 
decision to have an external audit of CSR report is a good indicator of a firm’s 
commitment to its CSR responsibility and represents a strategic choice by some 
firms.  
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GRI compliance: According to Henriques (2010), GRI reporting guidelines have been 
developed by a multi-stakeholder process, which gives it a high degree of legitimacy, 
and set out the most highly regarded and widely used set of environmental and 
social indicators. The decision of companies to adhere to GRI guidelines suggests a 
commitment to standardisation of their CSR reporting. In this context, Clarkson et al. 
(2008) note the importance of compliance with GRI guidelines in CSR reporting, if 
firms are to gain credibility among its various stakeholders. Hence, choosing to 
voluntarily comply with GRI compliance is a strategic choice made by firms. By 
complying with GRI guidelines, firms demonstrate their commitment to their 
stakeholder responsibility (i.e., take their stakeholder responsibility seriously).  
A firm’s CSR strategy is captured by the aggregated strategy score as described 
above. It is reasonable to argue that the more of these strategy and policy measures 
that a firm adopts, the more proactive and comprehensive (in terms of internal 
capacities and external reputation building measures) is its CSR strategy. The CSR 
strategy score ranges from 1 to 100 showing how a firm performs compared to the 
entire Asset4 universe based on the value in the related indicator. In other words, the 
score is normalized using Z-score, equally weighted and benchmarked against the 
complete universe of 4000 companies in the Asset4 database. According to Asset4, 
the aggregated vision and strategy score  
“Measures a company’s commitment and effectiveness towards the 
creation of an overarching vision and strategy integrating financial and 
extra-financial aspects. It reflects a company’s capacity to convincingly 
show and communicate that it integrates the economic (financial), social 
and environmental dimensions into its day-to-day decision-making 
processes” (Asset4 definition).  
Hence, the higher a firm’s aggregated vision and strategy score, the more integrated 
and comprehensive its CSR strategy. Table 6.1 shows the definitions and pair-wise 
correlation of CSR strategy variables. 
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Table 6.1 CSR vision and strategy (Definitions and pair-wise correlation matrix) 
Notes: Integration of financial and extra-financial reporting (Yes/No): Is the company openly reporting about the 
challenges or opportunities of integrating financial and extra-financial issues, and the dilemmas and trade-offs it 
faces? CSR Committee (Yes/No): Does the company have a CSR committee or team? GRI compliance (Yes/No): 
Does the company compliance with the Global Reporting Initiative guidelines? CSR global activities reporting 
(Yes/No): Does the company's extra-financial reporting take into account the global activities of the company? 
CSR report external audit (Yes/No): Does the company have an external auditor of its CSR/H&S/Sustainability 
report? Vision and strategy score measures a company’s commitment and effectiveness towards the creation of 
an overarching vision and strategy integrating financial and extra-financial aspects. It reflects a company’s 
capacity to convincingly show and communicate that integrates the economic (financial), social and 
environmental dimensions into its day-to-day decision-making processes. 
 
 
Environmental and Social Performance Scores  
ESP scores are described in Chapter 3 section 2.5.4.   
6.3.2 Exogenous regressors and control variables  
A number of exogenous regressors and control variables are defined as follows; 
Firm size: natural logarithm of net sales; Profitability measured by return on equity: 
ratio of net income before preferred dividends minus preferred dividend requirement 
to the average of last year's and current year’s common equity; Capital expenditure: 
ratio of capital expenditures to net sales; Strategic shareholdings: percentage of total 
shares in issue held strategically and not available to ordinary shareholders, and 
only holdings of 5% or more are counted as strategic; Slack: natural logarithm of the 
sum of cash and short-term investments and total receivables; Leverage: ratio of 
total debt to total assets; Board duality (dummy variable): 1 if the CEO 
simultaneously chairs the board; 0 otherwise.  
6.3.3 Models tested  
To investigate whether board of directors is an endogenously determined institution, 
structural equation modelling (SEM) technique is adopted. The following structural 
equation model tests hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 simultaneously.  
 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1 Integration of financial and extra-financial 
reporting 
1.00      
2 CSR committee 0.35 1.00     
3 GRI compliance 0.19 0.21 1.00    
4 CSR global activities reporting 0.40 0.49 0.17 1.00   
5 CSR report external audit 0.31 0.37 0.41 0.46 1.00  
6 Vision and strategy 0.37 0.56 0.48 0.54 0.55 1.00 
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CSR strategy = Board CSR orientation + Slack + Leverage + e                  (6-1) 
Environmental or social performance = CSR strategy + Firm size + Profitability 
+ Capital expenditure + Strategic shareholdings + [Industry dummies] + [Year 
dummies] + e                                                                                                (6-2) 
Board CSR orientation = Environmental or social performance + Firm size + 
Strategic shareholdings + Board duality + e                                                 (6-3)    
To carry out this analysis, I use SEM procedure incorporated in Stata12. SEM19 is 
covariance-based (linear model), which only applies to continuous endogenous 
variables. This technique provides for use of latent (unobserved) constructs; for 
dependent variables that simultaneously affect each other; and supports correlations 
of errors including autocorrelation in panel data. Accordingly, this modelling tool is 
used in above regression analysis, and standard errors are clustered at firm level to 
account for panel structure of the data (specifically, possible non-independence of 
observations corresponding to the same firms over years).   
Board CSR orientation is a latent variable measured by three board attributes 
variables, namely board independence, board diversity and audit committee 
expertise. Other then the endogenous variables, control variables used in each 
equation are based largely on prior related empirical evidence. It is necessary to 
note that to show the direction of expected relation with the dependent variable, in 
the following discussion, I provide the predicted sign for each control variable in 
brackets. In Equation (6-1), CSR strategy is likely to be affected not just by board 
CSR orientation (i.e., inclination), but also the availability of slack resources (positive, 
based on the argument made by Clarkson et al. (2011) that firms pursuing a 
proactive environmental strategy are most likely the ones with greater financial 
resources), and, level of financial flexibility available i.e., leverage (negative, based 
on Clarkson et al., 2011). In Equation (6-2), I model environmental and social 
performance. Following Ioannou and Serafeim (2012) who investigate the 
determinants of environmental and social performance in a cross-country setting, I 
also control for: firm size (positive); profitability (positive); and strategic 
shareholdings (negative). Following Clarkson et al. (2011), capital expenditure 
                                                          
19
 The key advantages of the ‘sem’ command from Stata 12 are: 1) it is easy to obtain standard errors, confidence intervals, 
and associated tests that are robust to lack of independence within identified groups of observations (e.g., vce(cluster 
group)); 2) it can be used when the data are unbalanced - mlmv (i.e., there is a different number of observations for 
dependent variables). In other words, when there are missing values for dependent variable (so long as they are missing on 
observables), one can still use the information on the other variables. 
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(positive) is also controlled for. In this equation, industry and year dummies are 
included. In Equation (6-3), in addition to environmental and social performance, it is 
expected that board CSR orientation is affected by: firm size (positive), as larger 
firms are known to be more under the public eye and hence may face greater 
stakeholder pressures, thus more likely to have board members with CSR orientation; 
strategic shareholdings (negative), as equity holders are more likely to be 
shareholder centric thus less inclined to have board members with CSR orientation; 
and CEO duality (negative). One individual performing as both chairman and CEO 
may constrain board independence that may reduce the overall accountability of the 
firm and affect fair decision-making. For example, Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) 
find that when two positions are combined, fewer independent non-executives are 
appointed. Furthermore, Galbreath (2010) finds that firms which split the CEO-
chairman role demonstrate higher performance of their governance practices 
regarding climate change e.g., board oversight dimension.  
6.4 Sample and data 
The sample is the intersection of the Asset4 and Datastream universe of UK listed 
companies, covering the period 2002-2010. The intersection of these data sets 
yields a usable sample of 2028 firm-year observations. This is mainly due to the 
limited coverage by Asset4. Industries are classified by using the FTSE/DJ single-
digit Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) March 2008 version. This leads to 10 
industry groups including financials in the sample. Financials include banks, 
insurances, real estate and financial services. Table 6.2 gives the break-up of 
industries covered in the sample for each year.  
Table 6.2 Number of sample companies in each sector and each year 
Industry 
Code 
Industry 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 Total Percent 
0001 Oil & gas 4 4 12 13 13 14 14 18 19 111 5.47 
1000 Basic materials 2 2 14 14 15 18 22 22 22 131 6.46 
2000 Industrials 18 18 53 65 66 67 67 71 67 492 24.26 
3000 Consumer goods 9 9 17 22 23 23 23 27 26 179 8.83 
4000 Health care 3 3 4 5 5 5 5 9 9 48 2.37 
5000 Consumer services 21 22 46 54 57 59 59 64 62 444 21.89 
6000 Telecommunications 2 2 3 5 5 5 5 5 6 38 1.87 
7000 Utilities 6 6 7 8 8 8 8 8 7 66 3.25 
8000 Financials 18 19 49 54 54 60 60 63 60 437 21.55 
9000 Technology 2 2 6 10 10 10 10 16 16 82 4.04 
Total  85 87 211 250 256 269 273 303 294 2028 100.00 
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As Table 6.2 shows general industrials, consumer services and Financials account 
for the bulk of companies in the sample. The sample represents a wide range of 
industries. The number of firms in each industry sector appears to increase over time, 
apart from the years between 2009 and 2010 (i.e., the number of firms in some 
sectors drops slightly).     
A unique dataset Asset4 with environmental, social and governance (ESG) scores 
and components is used. The G score of Asset4 provides details of each board 
attributes and CSR strategy related variable.  
6.5 Results 
6.5.1 Descriptive and correlation statistics 
Table 6.3 reports the descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analyses.  
Table 6.3 Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 
Environmental performance 59.21 27.46 9.54 97.17 
Social performance 63.40 25.97 4.18 98.82 
Board independence 51.54 14.23 0 100 
Board diversity 7.57 9.04 0 62.5 
Audit committee expertise 0.65 0.48 0 1 
Board duality 0.04 0.19 0 1 
CSR strategy 62.03 29.64 9.51 98.61 
Firm size  14.05 1.67 7.45 19.33 
Profitability (return on equity) 0.25 1.58 -9.04 58.80 
Leverage 0.20 0.18 0 0.88 
Capital expenditure 0.15 0.52 0 15.56 
Strategic shareholdings 0.26 0.21 0 0.91 
Slack 12.76 1.55 7.44 18.78 
Note: All variables are as defined in the “Variables and Models” section. 
As Table 6.3 shows, the mean values of environmental and social performance 
scores are 59% and 63% respectively. About 52% of the board members of an 
average firm are independent, while about 4% of the firms have the same person as 
CEO and Chairman (i.e., duality). On average about 8% of board members are 
women. 65% of audit committees have relevant expertise (i.e., with at least one 
member being considered a "financial expert" within the meaning of Sarbanes-Oxley 
given his or her extensive experience in accounting and auditing matters). The mean 
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value of CSR strategy score (i.e., normalized Z-score) is 62. The average firm size 
measured as natural logarithm of net sales is 14.05, which is equivalent to sales 
value of 1.3 billion GBP. The mean values of profitability, leverage, capital 
expenditure and strategic shareholdings are 25%, 20%, 15%, and 26% respectively. 
The average slack resources available in a firm are 348 million GBP. Of note, the 
number of observations for each variable varies slightly based on the availability of 
data for the variable. Table 6.4 displays the pair-wise correlations for all variables. 
Although firm size is highly correlated with slack (0.80), they are not included in the 
same regression i.e., Equation (6-1). Table 6.4 shows a high correlation between 
environmental performance and social performance (0.72), which is consistent with 
Brammer et al.’s (2006) finding that there is a high degree of association within 
corporate social rating scores of the same category of EIRIS data; especially the 
overall score is highly correlated with the environmental and social score 
respectively. Given the relatively moderate levels of correlations among other 
variables, multi-collinearity is not likely to be a problem for the analyses. 
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Table 6.4 Pair-wise correlation matrix 
Note: All variables are as defined in the “Variables and Models” section. † p .10 , * p .05 , ** p .01 , *** p .001. 
           Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
1 Environmental 
performance 
1.00             
2 Social performance 0.72*** 1.00            
3 Board independence 0.27*** 0.32*** 1.00           
4 Board diversity 0.22*** 0.25*** 0.18*** 1.00          
5 Audit committee 
expertise 
0.17*** 0.15*** 0.27*** 0.14*** 1.00         
6 Board duality -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.13*** 0.02 -0.01 1.00        
7 CSR strategy 0.69*** 0.67*** 0.28*** 0.21*** 0.14*** -0.12*** 1.00       
8 Firm size  0.51*** 0.56*** 0.31*** 0.22*** 0.10*** -0.08*** 0.48*** 1.00      
9 Profitability -0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.05* -0.01 0.00 -0.01 1.00     
10 Leverage -0.01 -0.05* -0.02 -0.11*** -0.01 0.04† -0.02 -0.07** 0.03 1.00    
11 Capital expenditure -0.01 -0.09*** 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.03 -0.28*** -0.02 0.05* 1.00   
12 Strategic shareholdings -0.24*** -0.24*** -0.26*** -0.18*** -0.32*** 0.11*** -0.18*** -0.20*** 0.00 0.03 0.02 1.00  
13 Slack 0.41*** 0.46*** 0.32*** 0.14*** 0.11*** -0.07** 0.42*** 0.80*** -0.02 -0.06* -0.14*** -0.16*** 1.00 
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6.5.2 Structural equation modelling results 
Table 6.5 reports the results of structural equation modelling with respect to 
environmental performance.  
Table 6.5 Results of structural equation model with respect to environmental 
performance (Standardized coefficients reported) 
 
 
Independent variable 
Structural model: 
Dependent variable (Structural) 
CSR strategy Environmental 
performance 
Board CSR 
orientation 
Board CSR orientation 0.34*** (3.91)   
CSR strategy  0.51*** (13.12)  
Environmental performance   0.15* (2.06) 
Firm size   0.28*** (7.91) 0.38*** (4.37) 
Strategic shareholdings  -0.12*** (-4.47) -0.44*** (-7.45) 
Return on equity  -0.01 (-0.69)  
Capital expenditure  0.07** (2.74)  
Slack 0.28*** (3.57)   
Leverage 0.03 (0.70)   
Board duality   -0.05 (-0.61) 
Oil and gas  -0.11*** (-4.52)  
Basic materials  -0.04 (-1.42)  
Industrials  0.02 (0.43)  
Consumer goods  0.08** (2.70)  
Health care  -0.01 (-0.41)  
Consumer services  -0.08* (-2.03)  
Telecommunications  -0.00 (-0.16)  
Utilities  -0.01 (-0.29)  
Technology   -0.02 (-0.55)  
Year fixed effects  Yes  
Intercept -1.12*** (-3.61) -0.90** (-3.16)  
 
 Measurement model: 
 Board 
independence 
Board diversity Audit committee 
expertise 
Board CSR orientation 0.52*** (9.44) 0.37*** (8.09) 0.39*** (7.09) 
Intercept 2.05*** (4.50) -0.25 (-0.72) 0.22 (1.16) 
 
 Model summary: 
Observations 2028 
Clusters 308 
Overall R-squared 62.21% 
Notes: †p .10, *p .05, **p .01, ***p .001. Z-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. 
All variables are defined in the “Variables and Models” section. 
The results of Table 6.5 show that in the measurement model, loadings 
corresponding to all three indicators (namely board independence (β = .52, p < .001), 
gender diversity (β = .37, p < .001), and audit committee expertise (β = .39, p < .001) 
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are statistically significant and have correct signs. The standardized loadings 
reported in Table 6.5 also illustrate that while the relative importance of gender 
diversity and audit committee expertise are very similar, board independence loads a 
bit more heavily on the latent construct, board CSR orientation.  
The results of structural equation modelling in Table 6.5 support all of the three 
hypotheses (i.e., H1, H2 and H3). Specifically, it is found that boards which are more 
CSR oriented tend to show greater commitment to CSR by developing a more 
integrated CSR strategy, which in turn allows them to achieve superior 
environmental performance. Moreover, superior environmental performers also tend 
to choose more CSR-conducive board attributes. Hence, the findings suggest the 
existence of a cyclical link among a firm’s board CSR orientation, CSR strategy, and 
its environmental performance.  
The aforementioned relationships are not only statistically significant, but also 
economically meaningful. In particular, one standard deviation increase in board 
CSR orientation leads to an increase of CSR strategy by 0.34 of the respective 
standard deviation (β = .34, p < .001). One standard deviation increase in CSR 
strategy boosts environmental performance by 0.51 of the respective standard 
deviation (β = .51, p < .001). Finally, one standard deviation increase in 
environmental performance enhances board CSR orientation to somewhat smaller 
extent, i.e., by 0.15 of the respective standard deviation (β = .15, p < .05). 
The results with respect to control variables in Table 6.5 are as expected. Consistent 
with Clarkson et al.’s (2011) finding that only firms with sufficient financial resources 
can pursue a proactive environmental strategy, a positive and significant relation is 
also found between financial slack and CSR strategy (β = .28, p < .001). Moreover, 
consistent with prior literature (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012), firm size is positively 
linked with environmental performance (β = .28, p < .001) and board CSR orientation 
(β = .38, p < .001). This indicates that larger firms being more visible to the public 
face greater pressure from a variety of external stakeholders (Deegan, 2002; Patten, 
2002b). Thus larger firms may be driven to do better in environmental performance 
as well as board CSR orientation. Consistent with prior related literature (Ioannou 
and Serafeim, 2012), strategic shareholdings is found to be negatively related to 
environmental performance (β = -.12, p < .001) and board CSR orientation (β = -.44, 
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p < .001), suggesting that large shareholders in a firm tend to be more interested in 
shareholder, and less interested in other stakeholder interests. Contrary to my 
expectations but consistent with the findings of Mallin and Michelon (2011), there is 
no link between firm profitability (i.e., ROE) and E performance. Capital expenditure 
consistent with previous findings (Clarkson et al., 2011) is positively linked with 
environmental performance (β = .07, p < .01), suggesting that in general firms are 
now investing in environmentally friendly technologies. Prior studies indicate that 
environmental responsibility is influenced by the nature of business activities, 
particularly by industry sectors most closely associated with environmental concerns 
(Brammer and Pavelin, 2008). It is also found that firms in consumer goods industry 
tend to do better in environmental aspect (as also found by Mallin and Michelon, 
2011), while firms in oil and gas industry and consumer services sector tend to be 
poorer environmental performers.  
Overall, the findings are consistent with Hermalin and Weisbach’s (2003) argument 
that the board of directors of a firm is an endogenously determined institution. A 
firm’s CSR performance is determined by its CSR vision and strategy which is 
influenced by board level CSR orientation. Prior studies treating the link between 
board attributes and CSR performance as an out-of-equilibrium phenomenon provide 
a misleading interpretation of this relation. In fact, it can also be the other way 
relation, that is, a firm’s environmental performance affects its board CSR orientation.   
Table 6.6 reports the results of structural equation modelling with respect to social 
performance. Overall, the results are very similar to those in Table 6.5. Notable 
exception is that the coefficient on capital expenditure is not significant, indicating 
that capital expenditure does not affect a firm’s social performance. This is quite 
reasonable, given that better social performance is likely to be less financial capital 
sensitive, but more human relational capital sensitive. Interestingly, it is found that 
the coefficients on consumer goods and consumer services industries turn to be 
insignificant. However, the coefficient on oil and gas industry remains negative and 
significant. Overall, the differences in findings with respect to environmental and 
social performance are in line with Cormier et al.’s (2011) suggestion that it is 
important to distinguish environmental performance from social performance in CSR 
related studies. 
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Table 6.6 Results of structural equation model with respect to social 
performance (Standardized coefficients reported) 
 
 
Independent variable 
Structural model: 
Dependent variable (Structural) 
CSR strategy Social 
performance 
Board CSR 
orientation 
Board CSR orientation 0.32*** (3.73)   
CSR strategy  0.48*** (12.75)  
Social performance   0.19** (2.55) 
Firm size   0.31*** (9.30) 0.35*** (4.04) 
Strategic shareholdings  -0.15*** (-5.41) -0.44*** (-7.69) 
Return on equity  -0.01 (-0.53)  
Capital expenditure  -0.00 (-0.01)  
Slack 0.29*** (3.68)   
Leverage 0.03 (0.73)   
Board duality   -0.05 (-0.58) 
Oil and gas  -0.06** (-2.62)  
Basic materials  -0.04 (-1.35)  
Industrials  0.03 (0.89)  
Consumer goods  0.04 (1.25)  
Health care  0.01 (0.39)  
Consumer services  -0.01 (-0.32)  
Telecommunications  0.01 (0.37)  
Utilities  0.00 (0.18)  
Technology   0.04 (1.27)  
Year fixed effects  Yes  
Intercept -1.10*** (-3.48) -0.68* (-2.33)  
 
 Measurement model: 
 Board 
independence 
Board diversity Audit committee 
expertise 
Board CSR orientation 0.53*** (9.76) 0.37*** (8.20) 0.38*** (7.13) 
Intercept 2.08*** (4.64) -0.24 (-0.69) 0.27 (1.42) 
 
 Model summary: 
Observations 2028 
Clusters 308 
Overall R-squared 62.33% 
Notes: †p .10, *p .05, **p .01, ***p .001. Z-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. 
All variables are defined in the “Variables and Models” section. 
Table 6.7 provides a summary of the standardized results with respect to E and S 
performance respectively. 
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Table 6.7 Summary of structural equation modelling results (Standardized 
coefficients reported) 
 
Research hypothesis 
Predicte
d sign 
Path coefficients  
Final result Environmental 
performance 
Social 
performance 
H1: Board CSR orientation -> 
CSR strategy 
 
+ 0.34*** (3.91) 0.32*** (3.73) Supported 
H2: CSR strategy -> 
Environmental or social 
performance 
 
+ 0.51*** (13.12) 0.48*** (12.75) Supported 
H3: Environmental or social 
performance -> Board CSR 
orientation 
+/- 0.15* (2.06) 0.19** (2.55) Supported 
Notes: †p  .10, *p  .05, **p  .01, ***p  .001. Z-statistics are in parentheses.  
6.6 Sensitivity analyses 
6.6.1 Size effect and FTSE 100 dummy  
To test the robustness of the above results, a number of sensitivity tests are carried 
out. It is argued in the literature that environmental and social responsibility is mainly 
driven by firm size (Brammer and Pavelin, 2008). Hence, an alternative size 
measure, namely the natural log of total assets is used in all regressions, which 
provides results similar to those reported. Furthermore, it can also be argued that 
CSR strategy and performance is a concern for only the largest firms. Therefore, 
FTSE 100 dummy variable is added as a determinant of CSR strategy and/or 
environmental and social performance regression (i.e., Equation (6-1) and/or (6-2) in 
the structural equation model). While the coefficients on FTSE 100 dummy are 
significant in all cases, the other results remain unchanged.  
6.6.2 Analysis using alternative CSR strategy and environmental and social 
measures 
It can be argued that the results may be sensitive to a self-reporting or source bias, 
as the same database for the environment, social, and governance variables is used 
in the analysis. Hence, validity and reliability checks are conducted for above results, 
using two further data sources, namely hand collected CSR strategy variable and 
Bloomberg environmental and social scores. First, aggregated CSR strategy variable 
from Asset4 is replaced by a CSR strategy variable for 2009. This is based on hand-
collected data for FTSE 350 non-financial companies in 2009. The aggregated score 
is the sum of eight components (all dummy variables derived from Clarkson et al.’s 
165 
 
(2008) framework): existence of CSR committee, executive remuneration linked pay 
policy, external audit of CSR report, use of technology or innovation to improve CSR 
performance, participation with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or other 
industries to improve CSR performance, internal audit of CSR report, environmental 
awards, and CSR policy statement. Content analysis approach is used to codify 
companies’ voluntary reporting in these areas, using their sustainability reports 
and/or websites information which is publicly available. If a company provides 
information about any component, then it will be scored 1; and 0 otherwise. It is 
worth mentioning that due to time constraint, the hand-collected data is only 
available for year 2009. Table 6.8 reports the summary of the standardized results, 
replacing the Asset4 CSR strategy variable with hand developed CSR strategy 
variable. As Table 6.8 shows, the results remain largely similar to the main results in 
Table 6.7.  
Table 6.8 Results of alternative measure of CSR strategy (Standardized 
coefficients reported) 
 
Research hypothesis 
Predicted 
sign 
Path coefficients  
Final result Environmental 
performance 
Social 
performance 
H1: Board CSR orientation -> 
CSR strategy 
 
+ 0.39*** (3.79) 0.30** (2.82) Supported 
H2: CSR strategy -> 
Environmental or social 
performance 
 
+ 0.47*** (5.48) 0.30** (3.02) Supported 
H3: Environmental or social 
performance -> Board CSR 
orientation 
+/- 0.11 (0.84) 0.39*** (3.27) Partially 
supported 
Note: CSR strategy variable is measured as the sum of eight components (dummy variables) collected manually 
from companies’ CSR reports and/or websites in 2009. Z-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are 
clustered at firm level. All variables are as defined in the “Variables and Models” section. In the interest of brevity, 
results for control variables are not reported. † p .10, * p .05, ** p .01, *** p .001. 
In another test, Asset4 environmental and social scores for 2009 are replaced by 
Bloomberg environmental and social disclosure scores in 2009. These disclosure 
scores are used as a proxy for a firm’s environmental and social performance, as 
these are based on “hard” information, which as Clarkson et al. (2008) find is difficult 
for poor performers to mimic. Finally, three different datasets are used at the same 
time for the year 2009. In other words, board attributes data is from Asset4, 
environmental and social scores are from Bloomberg and the CSR strategy variable 
is based on hand collected data. Similar results are generated for the latter two sets 
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of analyses (not reported). Overall, these findings are consistent with the main 
findings in Table 6.5 and 6.6. Hence, self-reporting bias of the same data source 
used is less likely in this study.  
6.5 Discussion and conclusions 
This chapter examines the relations among board CSR orientation, CSR strategy 
and firm environmental and social performance. Using a large sample of UK listed 
firms, it is found that boards having certain CSR-conducive attributes particularly 
independent directors, women directors and directors with financial expertise are 
more likely to develop a multi-pronged CSR strategy which in turn translates into 
superior environmental and social performance. Furthermore, it is found that firms 
with better environmental and social performance tend to strengthen their board level 
CSR orientation. In other words, the link between firms’ board CSR orientation, CSR 
related strategy, and their environmental and social performance is found to be 
endogenous and self-reinforcing.    
Research in the field of the determinants of CSR performance has attracted the 
attention of scholars from diverse disciplines including management and corporate 
governance. This study makes significant contributions to existing literature. While 
the findings are consistent with the theoretical predictions and empirical findings of 
studies from both streams of literature, this chapter builds on these studies by 
making new conceptual and methodological advancements. For studies drawing on 
the resource-based view of the firm (e.g., Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Clarkson et al., 
2011), it builds conceptually and improves methodologically by incorporating 
variables that directly measure board level competencies and strategies that lead to 
superior environmental and social performance. For studies drawing on the resource 
dependency theory and examining the link between board attributes and CSR 
performance, it builds conceptually by developing a theoretical model based on 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003).  
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Chapter 7: Conclusions and implications 
The primary aim guiding this entire research is to investigate whether corporate 
environmental and social responsibility matters for firm performance in the UK. To 
meet this aim, three research objectives were developed: first, to investigate the 
relation between firms’ ESD and their operating profitability, as well as to investigate 
the potential causality regarding this link; second, to examine the link between ESD 
and firms’ market value, employee productivity and carbon eco-efficiency 
respectively; and finally to examine the relations among CSR related board attributes, 
CSR strategy and firms’ environmental and social performance. Three empirical 
studies are conducted in chapter 4, 5 and 6 respectively to address these research 
objectives.  
7.1 Research findings and implications 
Chapter 4 examines the link between firms’ environmental and social disclosures 
and their operating profitability. It is found that more profitable firms tend to make 
more environmental and social disclosures. These findings are consistent with the 
accounting and economics based arguments that environmental and social 
disclosures are a real as well as an opportunity cost that more profitable firms with 
higher slack resources are better able to afford. Moreover, it is found that while 
current operating performance (which is relevant for current environmental impact) 
matters for current environmental disclosures; it is the past operating performance 
that drives current social disclosures (as per the results of Granger causality test). 
The reason for the latter finding could be that effects of past profitability and 
presumably past investments in social arena become apparent only in the 
subsequent period, which is then reported.   
Chapter 5 investigates the relation between firms’ environmental and social 
disclosures and their market value, employee productivity and carbon eco-efficiency. 
It is found that higher overall environmental and social, but particularly social 
disclosures matter to investors. Investors appear to be placing higher values on firms 
seen to be behaving in a socially responsible manner. More responsible behaviour in 
the social arena as reflected by its subsequent disclosure, helps mitigate the 
information asymmetry and hence the perceived social risks of the firm. Therefore, 
investors place higher values on such firms. In addition, the results of the sub tests 
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(i.e., the link between a firm’s social (environmental) disclosure and its social 
(environmental) performance) show that more social (environmental) disclosure in 
prior year reflects better social (environmental) performance captured by higher 
employee productivity (more carbon eco-efficiency) in the current year. Taken 
together, the results of Chapter 4 and 5 are consistent with the predictions of the 
voluntary disclosure theory (Verrecchia, 1983) which suggests that despite being 
costs, firms are willing to provide relevant information voluntarily to the market, if the 
expected benefits of such disclosures are higher than the associated costs.  
The findings of these two chapters provide several implications. From a regulatory 
perspective, the findings imply that if higher and better quality disclosures of a firm’s 
environmental and social performance are desirable; and if these are profit and 
resource dependent, there may be room for some minimum regulatory requirements 
for such disclosures, coupled with economic incentives that encourage firms to 
behave in an environmentally and socially responsible manner. For investors, the 
findings suggest that while environmental disclosure is value relevant, so is social 
disclosure. To date, most research in CSR has focused on the link between firms’ 
environmental disclosures and their economic performance. These findings suggest 
that social disclosures matter perhaps more to investors, implying that investors are 
more sensitised to how firms address their human relation challenges.  
Chapter 6 examines the relations among board attributes, firm CSR strategy and its 
environmental and social performance. It is found that boards having certain CSR-
conducive attributes particularly independent directors, women directors and 
directors with financial expertise, are more likely to develop a multi-pronged CSR 
strategy which in turn translates into superior environmental and social performance. 
Furthermore, it is found that firms with better environmental and social performance 
tend to strengthen their board level CSR orientation.  
These findings provide some useful implications for industry as well as the academia. 
For industry, these findings suggest that firms with the combination of right people on 
the board and the right CSR strategy are likely to be better equipped in meeting their 
environmental and social challenges. For academia, the findings suggest that in 
order to develop a more comprehensive analysis, it is important to incorporate 
explicitly the two sets of factors, namely board attributes and CSR strategy variables, 
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in any analysis of the drivers of CSR performance. In particular, for research 
scholars working in the field of CSR, whether from a management or a governance 
perspective, the findings imply that in order to develop a more holistic understanding 
of how corporate boards are responding to CSR challenges, it is important to 
consider explicitly the links between director characteristics, board level decisions 
and firm CSR performance, taking into account the potential endogeneity of these 
links. The approach adopted in this study to the best of my knowledge, provides the 
first step in this direction. From the broader corporate governance research 
perspective, the conceptual and methodological approach adopted in this study, can 
be adapted to any study of the links between various aspects of board attributes, 
board decisions and firm performance.  
In addition, the finding of the endogenous link between board attributes and CSR 
performance has significant policy implications. First, if board attributes and firm 
performance are indeed endogenous outcomes, then policy makers need to take into 
consideration the implications of this endogeneity when considering CSR related 
policies affecting the design of the corporate boards. For example, one policy 
implication of this finding would be that for poor CSR performers, mandating the 
inclusion of women on board (which is currently under debate in policy circles in the 
UK and EU), could act as a welcome exogenous shock for improving their CSR 
performance. Second, the findings of a virtuous circle between board CSR attributes, 
CSR strategies and CSR performance, while consistent with the predictions of RBV 
theory, raise concerns about how firms are using these competitive advantages. As 
the gap between the leads and the laggards in CSR performance widens (which the 
findings of the virtuous circle imply), this could either be a source of the ‘good’ or the 
‘bad’ of CSR (Devinney, 2009). If it is the good, then social entrepreneurship on the 
part of leading corporations can enhance the societal wellbeing; but, if it is the bad, 
then firms may be using CSR to create regulatory competition, with the aim to 
squeeze out the laggards from the market, to the detriment of competitive markets 
(Devinney, 2009). Hence, it is important for regulatory bodies to be mindful of these 
consequences when designing policies related to CSR.  
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7.2 Research limitations 
There are some limitations of this research. One important limitation is that this entire 
analysis relates to the largest listed firms in the UK. Environmental and social 
disclosures are also important for smaller firms. Future work could include smaller 
firms to examine links between their environmental and social disclosures and 
financial performance, but until smaller firms start reporting their environmental and 
social information; scope for such work may be limited.  
Second, this study is limited to a single country – future research can include several 
countries or extend similar analysis to compare two different countries. For example, 
future research can examine the links among CSR related board attributes, CSR 
strategies and firms’ environmental and social performance in developing countries. 
Moreover, a comparative study between the UK and the US context can also be 
carried out to test whether similar results hold.  
Finally, some variables can be captured in a more comprehensive way. For example, 
employee productivity can be measured by using an employee satisfaction based 
survey that can better reflect employee productivity. In addition, Business ethics are 
moral principles that guide the way a business behaves. It can be argued that 
environmental and social issues can be linked with business ethics, which can be 
investigated by conducting interviews with CSR practitioners in future research.  
7.3 Future research 
The results reveal that it is not just environmental but social disclosures that 
investors value. To date, most research in CSR has focused on firms’ environmental 
aspects. It would be worthwhile for future research to examine in greater detail the 
social aspects of CSR, particularly the link between social disclosure, indicators of 
social performance and financial performance. It may also be worth examining the 
influences of individual environmental and social indicators on firm performance. For 
instance, investigate the aspects of social indicators which add economic value such 
as employee CSR training and employee health and safety policy. Furthermore, 
future research can also examine the levels or content of environmental and social 
disclosures through in-depth case study or survey based analysis. For example, 
collect a firm’s sustainability report over several years, read and codify its information 
to examine the real motivation behind its reports. In other words, it is worth noting 
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that from a theoretical perspective, information about a firm’s environmental and 
social disclosures can be open to questions about impression management and 
institutional influences etc.   
The findings suggest that it is important to consider explicitly board level governance 
structures and CSR strategy in an analysis of firms’ social or environmental 
performance. It would be useful for future research to examine in more depth the 
roles that various human and relational capital characteristics on the board like 
education, professional experience and social networks may play in achieving firms’ 
CSR goals. In addition, other governance mechanisms such as shareholder activism, 
institutional ownership influences on firms’ CSR disclosures and/or performance can 
be further explored.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Review of existing corporate social responsibility related indices 
CSR 
assessment 
tools 
 
What the tool covers 
 
Data sources/methodology 
 
Advantages and/or drawbacks 
Moskowitz 
(1972) 
reputation 
index 
Rank firms in terms of outstanding, 
honorable mention or worst 
Survey-evaluated by the author, a 
panel of businessmen and MBA 
students 
Drawback: 
- Only one dimension measurement 
 
 
Council of 
Economic 
Priorities 
(CEP) in 
1977 
- Environment 
- Charitable giving 
- Women in management  
- Minority management 
- Animal testing 
- Information disclosure 
- Community outreach 
- South Africa 
- Family benefits 
- Military work 
- Nuclear involvement  
 
Each company's social 
performance is objectively 
measured in eleven issue areas 
summarized in CEP's unique rating 
system. Company performance is 
monitored throughout the year with 
changes noted in quarterly reports. 
 
Advantage: 
- Researches in the 1970s have used the 
CEP rating broadly 
 
 
 
 
 
Carroll 
corporate 
social 
performance 
(CSP) model 
(1979, 1991) 
 
A three-dimensional model of corporate 
social performance (1991) 
-social responsibilities can be categorized 
into four groups: economic, legal, ethical 
and discretionary responsibilities, which 
are not mutually exclusive 
-include 6 social issues: consumerism, 
environment, discrimination, product 
safety, occupational safety and 
shareholders 
-social responsiveness philosophy 
Carroll (1979) proposed a model 
that contains the following four 
categories of corporate 
responsibility in decreasing order of 
importance: 
a) Economic –be profitable; 
b) Legal - obey the law; 
c) Ethical- do what is right and fair, 
and avoid harm; 
d) Discretional / philanthropic- be a 
good corporate citizen. 
Advantages: 
- A multi-dimensional model of CSP 
- The model is simple, easy to understand 
and has an intuitively appealing logic, 
- Most durable and widely cited in the 
literature, has been tested and supported by 
previous findings 
 
Drawbacks: 
- Gives top priority to the economic 
dimension as an aspect of CSR 
- The major problem is that social issues 
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change and they differ for different industries 
 
 
 
McGuire et 
al. (1988) 
Fortune 
magazine’s 
rating of 
corporate 
reputation 
 
Eight attributes  
- Quality of management 
- Quality of products and services 
offered 
- Innovation 
- Value as a long-term investment 
- Soundness of financial position 
- Ability to attract and retain talented 
people 
- Responsibility to the community 
and the environment  
- Wise use of corporate assets 
Fortune has conducted the survey 
each fall since 1982 and published 
summary results each January. 
The survey covers the largest firms 
in 20-25 industry groups (the 
number of industry groups varies 
from year to year). Over 8000 
executives, outside directors, and 
corporate analysts are asked to 
rate the ten largest companies in 
their industry on 8 attributes; and 
each attribute scores from 0 (poor) 
to 10 (excellent). 
Advantages: 
- It provides comparable data over an 
extended period 
- The number of respondents is comparable 
or superior to those of other ratings. 
 
Drawbacks: 
- Respondents rate only firms in an industry 
with which they are familiar (i.e., respondents 
are selected for their knowledge of a 
particular industry rather than for their 
specific knowledge of or interest in CSR) 
- Evidence for the validity of the evaluations 
comes from empirical studies using other 
dimensions of the Fortune survey and have 
found that the Fortune evaluations of firms’ 
financial performance are highly correlated 
with accounting and stock-market based 
performance measures.  
 
 
 
 
 
Adams et al. 
(1991) New 
Consumer 
Group (NCG) 
ratings 
13 ratings produced by NCG, 4 main 
elements including CSR disclosure, 
women’s position, ethnic minorities’ 
position, philanthropy and environmental 
actions 
- CSR disclosure (-2, 2) 
- the advancement of women (-1, 2) 
- the advancement of ethnic 
minorities (-1,1) 
- philanthropy or charitable giving 
and involvement to community 
projects (-1,1) 
- environmental action to reduce its 
environmental impact or improve 
its environmental protection 
 
The assessment of companies in 
the NCG book covers the years 
1988 and 1989. The ratings were 
complemented by primary data 
collected via a multi-wave mail 
survey directed to companies. The 
last four aspects are applied to 
relevant industries not all firms. 
 
Advantage: 
- Previous researchers do not differentiate 
between CSR performance and CSR 
disclosure, the NCG ratings include CSR 
disclosure as one of the CSR performance 
measurement 
 
Drawback: 
- The main focus of the NCG organisation is 
the consumer sector. Sectors such as 
financial services and media related products 
were not included, due to the difficulties 
associated in the assessment of CSR 
performance 
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performance (0,2) 
- donation to the British political 
parties in the 1986-1990 period 
(yes/no) 
- subscription to the economic 
league (yes/no) 
- a significant effect on the 
environment (0,3) 
- respect for life 
- respect for people 
- Doing business with “oppressive 
regimes” 
- Production and/or sales of military 
equipment 
- business relationships with the 
least developed countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KLD rating 
 
13 dimensions of CSR  
- community 
- corporate governance 
- diversity 
- employee relations 
- environment 
- human rights 
- product quality and safety 
- alcohol 
- firearms 
- gambling 
- military 
- nuclear power 
- tobacco 
 
 
Data are collected in a disciplined 
process from a wide variety of 
company, government, non-
government organisation and 
media sources, using surveys, 
financial statement information, 
reports from mainstream media, 
government documents and peer-
reviewed legal journals.  Once the 
information is collected, KLD rates 
the social, environmental and 
governance performance of 
companies using a proprietary 
framework of positive and negative 
indicators. Companies are rated in 
seven major qualitative issue 
areas: Environment, Community, 
Corporate Governance, Diversity, 
Employee Relations, Human 
Advantages: 
- Widely accepted by practitioners and 
academics as an objective measure of CSR 
- All companies in the S&P 500 are rated. 
- Each company is rated on multiple 
attributes considered relevant to CSP 
- A single group of researchers, working 
independently from the rated companies or 
any particular brokerage house, applies the 
same set of criteria to related companies 
- The criteria are applied consistently across 
a wide range of companies, with data 
gathered from a range of sources, both 
internal and external to the firm 
 
Drawbacks  
- The binary ratings do not distinguish 
between the levels of e.g., hazardous waste 
production.  
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Rights and Product Quality and 
Safety. Analysts assign Strengths 
and Concerns associated with 
these issues, providing a social 
and environmental profile of 
companies. The business 
involvement screens are 
associated with activities that are 
controversial to certain social 
investors.  
- Firms in heavy polluting industries like Oil 
and Gas have lower KLD score than other 
firms that have very limited or no disclosure 
to e.g., producing hazardous waste, 
regardless how well the firm manages its 
hazardous waste.  
- The number of measures within each of 
KLD’s dimensions can skew overall CSP 
scores. E.g., a firm has a total of 5 strengths 
and 10 concerns. By definition, the KLD 
ratings system is biased toward a higher 
concern score for those industries disclose 
information about their environmental 
concerns.  
 
 
 
EIRIS 
performance 
criteria 
The data is in the form of a searchable 
database with roughly 170 questions 
covering the whole range of social 
concerns. 
- Environment 
- Employee 
- Community and Society 
- Human rights 
- Supply chain 
For example, key ESG criteria - board 
practice, bribery, human rights, labor 
standards in the supply chain, health and 
safety, environment, and climate change 
 
The thrust of the database is 
overwhelmingly based on 
exception reporting or negative 
screening. 
Advantage: 
-The answers or responses are both 
quantitative and qualitative 
 
Drawbacks: 
-There is little order in the database, 
questions can jump from one area to another 
and then back again.  
- An entry is made, if something ‘bad’ has 
been noted. If there is no negative 
information, no comment is made. Therefore, 
a company with little comment or profile 
would be judged to have high CSR and vice 
versa.   
- Do not distinguish between general and 
industry-specific ESG criteria. 
 
 
 
Corporate 
Knights 
10 KPIs and a transparency indicator 
- Energy productivity 
- Carbon productivity 
- Water productivity 
- Waste productivity 
 
Data is sourced from ASSET4, a 
Thomson Reuters business, and 
the BLOOMBERG 
PROFESSIONAL. The KPIs were 
 
Advantages: 
- ESG information was obtained from a group 
of data providers rather than a single data 
provider 
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Research 
Group 
(CKRG) 
index and 
rank for 
Global 100 
(2010) 
- Leadership diversity  
- CEO-to-average worker pay 
- % tax paid 
- Sustainability leadership 
- Sustainability remuneration 
- Innovation capacity 
- Transparency 
Each company receives a score of 0 to 1 
per KPI and a score of 0 to 1 on the 
transparency indicator.  
developed by CKRG, a signatory to 
the UNPRI. 
- ESG data was integrated with financial data 
to enhance analysis 
-  A greater number of companies from 
emerging markets were included in the 
analysis 
- Cross industries 
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Appendix 2: E, S and G indicators with Bloomberg fields 
Environmental   
Percent of Disclosure PERCENT_OF_DISCLOSURE 
Direct CO2 Emissions DIRECT_CO2_EMISSIONS 
Indirect CO2 Emissions INDIRECT_CO2_EMISSIONS 
Travel Emissions TRAVEL_EMISSIONS 
Total CO2 Emissions TOTAL_CO2_EMISSIONS 
CO2 Intensity (Tonnes) CO2_INTENSITY 
CO2 Intensity per Sales CO2_INTENSITY_PER_SALES 
GHG Scope 1 GHG_SCOPE_1 
GHG Scope 2 GHG_SCOPE_2 
GHG Scope 3 GHG_SCOPE_3 
Total GHG Emissions TOTAL_GHG_EMISSIONS 
NOx Emissions NOX_EMISSIONS 
SO2 Emissions SO2_EMISSIONS 
SOx Emissions SULPHUR_OXIDE_EMISSIONS 
VOC Emissions VOC_EMISSIONS 
CO Emissions CARBON_MONOXIDE_EMISSIONS 
Methane Emissions METHANE_EMISSIONS 
ODS Emissions ODS_EMISSIONS 
Particulate Emissions PARTICULATE_EMISSIONS 
Total Energy Consumption ENERGY_CONSUMPTION 
Electricity Used (MWh) ELECTRICITY_USED 
Renewable Energy Use RENEW_ENERGY_USE 
Water Consumption WATER_CONSUMPTION 
Water/Unit of Prod (in Liters) WATER_PER_UNIT_OF_PROD 
% Water Recycled PCT_WATER_RECYCLED 
Discharges to Water DISCHARGE_TO_WATER 
Waste Water (Th Cubic Meters) WASTE_WATER 
Hazardous Waste HAZARDOUS_WASTE 
Total Waste TOTAL_WASTE 
Waste Recycled WASTE_RECYCLED 
Paper Consumption PAPER_CONSUMPTION 
Paper Recycled PAPER_RECYCLED 
Fuel Used (Th Liters) FUEL_USED 
Raw Materials Used RAW_MAT_USED 
% Recycled Materials PCT_RECYCLED_MATERIALS 
Gas Flaring GAS_FLARING 
Number of Spills NUMBER_SPILLS 
Amount of Spills (Th Tonnes) AMOUNT_OF_SPILLS 
Nuclear % Total Energy NUCLEAR_%_ENERGY 
Solar % Total Energy SOLAR_%_ENERGY 
Phones Recycled PHONES_RECYCLED 
Environmental Fines # NUM_ENVIRON_FINES 
Environmental Fines $ ENVIRON_FINES_AMT 
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ISO 14001 Certified Sites ISO_14001_SITES 
Number of Sites NUMBER_OF_SITES 
% Sites Certified %_SITES_CERTIFIED 
Environmental Accounting Cost ENVIRONMENTAL_ACCTG_COST 
Investments in Sustainability INVESTMENTS_IN_SUSTAINABILITY 
Energy Efficiency Policy ENERGY_EFFIC_POLICY 
Emissions Reduction Initiatives EMISSION_REDUCTION 
Environmental Supply Chain 
Management 
ENVIRON_SUPPLY_MGT 
Green Building Policy GREEN_BUILDING 
Waste Reduction Policy WASTE_REDUCTION 
Sustainable Packaging SUSTAIN_PACKAGING 
Environmental Quality Management 
Policy 
ENVIRON_QUAL_MGT 
Climate Change Policy CLIMATE_CHG_POLICY 
New Products - Climate Change CLIMATE_CHG_PRODS 
Biodiversity Policy BIODIVERSITY_POLICY 
Environmental Awards Received ENVIRONMENTAL_AWARDS_RECEIVED 
Verification Type VERIFICATION_TYPE 
 
Social   
Number of Employees NUMBER_EMPLOYEES_CSR 
Employee Turnover % EMPLOYEE_TURNOVER_PCT 
% Employees Unionized PCT_EMPLOYEES_UNIONIZED 
Employee Average Age EMPLOYEE_AVERAGE_AGE 
% Women in Workforce PCT_WOMEN_EMPLOYEES 
% Women in Mgt PCT_WOMEN_MGT 
% Minorities in Workforce PCT_MINORITY_EMPLOYEES 
% Disabled in Workforce PCT_DISABLED_IN_WORKFORCE 
% Minorities in Mgt PCT_MINORITY_MGT 
Workforce Accidents WORK_ACCIDENTS_EMPLOYEES 
Lost Time from Accidents LOST_TIME_ACCIDENTS 
Lost Time Incident Rate LOST_TIME_INCIDENT_RATE 
Fatalities - Contractors FATALITIES_CONTRACTORS 
Fatalities - Employees FATALITIES_EMPLOYEES 
Fatalities - Total FATALITIES_TOTAL 
Community Spending COMMUNITY_SPENDING 
Employee Training Cost EMPLOYEE_TRAINING_COST 
SRI Assets Under Management SRI_ASSETS_UNDER_MANAGEMENT 
# Awards Received AWARDS_RECEIVED 
Health and Safety Policy HEALTH_SAFETY_POLICY 
Fair Remuneration Policy FAIR_REMUNERATION_POLICY 
Training Policy TRAINING_POLICY 
Employee CSR Training EMPLOYEE_CSR_TRAINING 
Equal Opportunity Policy EQUAL_OPPORTUNITY_POLICY 
Human Rights Policy HUMAN_RIGHTS_POLICY 
UN Global Compact Signatory UN_GLOBAL_COMPACT_SIGNATORY 
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Governance   
Size of the Board BOARD_SIZE 
Indep Directors INDEPENDENT_DIRECTORS 
% Indep Directors PCT_INDEPENDENT_DIRECTORS 
% Women on Board %_WOMEN_ON_BOARD 
Board Average Age BOARD_AVERAGE_AGE 
Board Age Limit BOARD_AGE_LIMIT 
Board Duration (Years) BOARD_DURATION 
# Board Meetings BOARD_MEETINGS_PER_YR 
Audit Committee Meetings AUDIT_COMMITTEE_MEETINGS 
Board Mtg Attendance BOARD_MEETING_ATTENDANCE_PCT 
Political Donations POLITICAL_DONATIONS 
CEO Duality CEO_DUALITY 
Business Ethics Policy ETHICS_POLICY 
GRI Criteria Compliance GRI_COMPLIANCE 
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Appendix 3: Variable definitions, measures and data sources 
Category Measure Definition/Measurement Source 
Environment 
and social 
disclosures 
E Environmental score (60 environmental data points adjusted by industry and weighted by importance) ranges 
from 0 to 100%.  
Bloomberg 
S  Social score (26 social data points adjusted by industry and weighted by importance) ranges from 0 to 100%. Bloomberg 
Governance G Governance score (14 governance data points adjusted by industry and weighted by importance) ranges from 
0 to 100%. 
Bloomberg 
Slack Slack Slack resources – natural logarithm of the sum of cash & short-term investments (02001) and total receivables 
(02051). 
Worldscope 
 
 
Operating  
Profitability 
ROA Return on assets – the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes (18191) to total assets (02999) at the 
beginning of the year i.e. EBITt/TAt-1. 
Worldscope 
 
ROE 
Return on equity (DWRE) - the ratio of net income before preferred dividends minus preferred dividend 
requirement to last year's common equity. The calculation differs from Worldscope. Datastream data is based 
on the current period, and Worldscope is an average of prior and current period Equity. 
 
Datastream 
ROS Return on sales – the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes (18191) to net sales (01001). Worldscope 
 
 
 
 
Firm 
characteristics 
Size_emp Size – natural logarithm of employee number (07011). Worldscope 
Size_sales Size – natural logarithm of net sales (01001). Worldscope 
Leverage Leverage - Total debt (03255) divided by total assets (02999). Worldscope 
Fin_acts Financial activities - the ratio of net proceeds from sale/issue of common and/or preferred stock (04251) during 
the year divided by total assets (02999) at the beginning of the year. 
Worldscope 
Capex Capital expenditure - the ratio of capital expenditures (04601) divided by net sales (01001).  Worldscope 
 
Media 
Media exposure – natural logarithm of the number of environmental news exposed. It is obtained by searching 
company’s name and any one of the terms ‘environment sustainability’, ‘waste management’, ‘pollution’ and 
‘environmental award’ within all English language news published over the world. Specific date for each year is 
from 1 January 200X to 31 December 200X.  
 
Nexis@UK 
Str_holds Strategic holdings - the percentage of total shares in issue held strategically and not available to ordinary 
shareholders (NOSHST). Holdings of 5% or more are counted as strategic. 
Datastream 
Capital market Analyst 
coverage 
Analyst coverage - number of analysts issuing earnings forecasts for the firm. IBES 
Market value Q ratio Tobin’s Q - total assets (02999) plus market value of equity (MV) minus book value of equity (03501) divided by 
total assets (02999).  
Datastream  
 
Other 
stakeholders 
Employee 
productivity 
Sales (01001) to employee number (07011) ratio. Worldscope 
Carbon 
intensity 
Carbon emission to sales (01001) ratio. Carbon 
Disclosure 
Project 
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Appendix 4: A plot of E/S/ES disclosure distribution 
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